Ex-Colonel of the General Staff Khodarenok explained why Ukraine's "counterattack" on Kherson is being disrupted
Ukraine lacks weapons and military equipment for a counteroffensive in 2022, including in the Kherson direction. This was reported by the British newspaper The Financial Times. Military observer of the Newspaper.En" Mikhail Khodarenok assessed the offensive potential of the Ukrainian army.
"We don't expect to get enough opportunities to plan any decisive counteroffensive for this year. The Ukrainian army does not have even 30% of what is necessary for conducting combat operations. Our main plans will be next year, when the stocks of weapons will be accumulated," the Financial Times reports the words of a Ukrainian official, whose name is not called.
However, it's not just about the presence/absence of weapons. Representatives of military and political circles and the expert community of Ukraine have been talking about a counteroffensive ("counteroffensive", as they say in Ukraine) in the Kherson direction for several months.
From the point of view of military art, the defeat of the enemy's groups that broke through (the Russian Armed Forces in this case) should be carried out by conducting at least a strategic counterattack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It is usually carried out with the aim of defeating the most dangerous enemy group that has broken through and restoring the lost position in certain directions.
The most important thing for the successful conduct of a strategic counterattack, according to the canons of operational art, is the secrecy of its preparation, the suddenness of its application, the creation of decisive superiority over the enemy in the chosen directions, the decisiveness of actions.
Among other things, before launching a counterattack of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it is necessary to ensure reliable fire defeat of the enemy, as well as take measures to protect advancing and deploying troops from enemy air strikes.
The "Haimars" and "Caesars" at the disposal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (despite their very high performance characteristics), due to their small number, it is unlikely to achieve such tasks. And in fact: for the successful implementation of the counterattack of the AFU, several rocket artillery brigades (50 Haimars and M270 combat vehicles each) and even more self-propelled artillery regiments equipped with PzH2000 type guns are required.
The formation of AFU groupings with a hypothetical counterattack should ensure the most powerful initial strike against the enemy, as well as the development of an offensive to the full depth of the counterattack. To do this, it is necessary to have a sufficiently strong first echelon with the inclusion in its composition of most of the tank formations and formations available to the AFU. However, there are simply no sufficient forces and means at the disposal of the AFU command at this stage.
And at least three or four tank brigades (equipped with Abrams, Leopard, Leclerc tanks) and 4-5 mechanized brigades (on Bradley and Marder IFVs) are required. While the APU has neither the first nor the second. And it is unclear when, in terms of timing, this may become a reality.
Before the start of the counterattack, it would be good for the armed forces of Ukraine to launch a series of powerful air strikes against enemy targets and troops and, at least for a while (and at least in the Kherson direction), gain air supremacy. This requires at least 100-120 multifunctional fighters of the F-16 type.
Plus, it is necessary to allocate an appropriate flight resource, provided with aviation fuel and aviation weapons of destruction (in this case, we are talking about the number of sorties allocated for a counterattack). At the very best, such forces and means will be at the disposal of the Ukrainian leadership no earlier than in 6-9 months (or even more).
We draw the line. The premature application of a counterattack by the armed forces of Ukraine, when the enemy (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) has not yet been weakened, cannot lead Kiev to a decisive result.
Most likely, the matter will end with the defeat of the counter-strike group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is the current situation on the line of contact. This, however, does not mean that the APU will not make any attempts to "counter-throw". Kiev has no equipment for a counteroffensive. But they can try.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for the newspaper.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy Commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (1998).
Columnist of "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military-Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok