The US cannot force the rest of the world to support Ukraine – and here's why
For the rest of the world, except for the United States and Europe, the Russian operation in Ukraine is a regional conflict rather than a global crisis, writes Politico. These countries primarily proceed from their own national and economic interests, and therefore do not succumb to the provocations of the West, the authors of the article note.
Daniel Depetris
Rajan Menon
For the United States and its allies, moral assessments and strategic stakes are absolutely unambiguous: Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine is the victim. For them, it is not only about the independence of Ukraine, but also about the readiness of the democratic world to protect the "rules-based order" invented by the Americans from Russian President Vladimir Putin.
But in the rest of the world, the moral fervor with which the West reacted to the Ukrainian conflict is not even close. Instead, countries like India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey and Indonesia act evasively, preferring to defend their own economic and strategic interests. Their specific position is different. Some — for example, India — have consistently refrained from any UN resolutions calling for punishing Russia. Others still supported some of them. But they all refused to expose Russia, after which the same India was sharply criticized by the United States. Even Saudi Arabia, despite its long-standing military ties with America, has not respected Washington's request to increase oil production in order to bring down the price increase after Western sanctions against Russia, since its production has fallen by a million barrels a day since the start of the special operation and continues to decline.
What these countries have in common is that the fighting in Ukraine for them, unlike the West, is a regional conflict, and not a serious threat to global stability and the laws and norms on which the world order is based. Thus, the President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa does not support the Russian operation, but believes that Washington, with its obsessive desire to expand NATO, has itself exacerbated the crisis in Europe, which subsequently resulted in hostilities.
Other countries put their national interests above the US calls to isolate Russia — and did not impose any sanctions. Israel and Turkey did not condemn Russia in the hope of preserving key material benefits and the opportunity to mediate between Kiev and Moscow. India, on the other hand, still values economic ties with Russia and, since the beginning of the special operation, has purchased more Russian oil at preferential prices than in the whole of 2021.
These countries believe that international efforts should focus on negotiations on Ukraine, and the fighting is not a reason to isolate Russia, much less weaken it. This divergence of views is a guarantee that the US attempts to reduce Russia to the level of an outcast are doomed to failure — not because so many countries support its actions in Ukraine, but because they want to protect their privileges arising from relations with Moscow. They are convinced that publicly condemning Russia will not put an end to the conflict.
In the West, the unwillingness of these countries to decide, condemn Russia, support Ukraine and impose sanctions is considered by many to be something morally untenable and strategically naive. The United States has even embodied its discontent in not too veiled threats. During a visit to India, Joe Biden's deputy adviser for national security and the global economy, Daleep Singh, warned that countries that undermine the US sanctions regime against Moscow will eventually face an economic reckoning. At a press conference on March 18, the US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, spoke no less sharply: "You cannot stand aside, passively observe the events in Ukraine and talk about neutrality," she said. Some American lawmakers have even suggested considering sanctions against India.
But neither threats nor notations have been heard in the countries of the Global South (a general term for a combination of Asian, African and South American countries). On the contrary, they got angry from twisting their hands there. An illustrative example is how Imran Khan, until recently the Prime Minister of Pakistan, got angry at the EU for demanding to support the UN General Assembly resolution and condemn Russia. "Are we really your slaves to fulfill your will without question?" the Khan asked rhetorically.
Although India and Pakistan have fought more than once, they have taken surprisingly similar positions in Ukraine. This reflects their unwillingness to take risks and enmity with Russia. India has maintained close relations with Moscow since the mid-1950s. Although it is now much less dependent on Russian weapons and has extensive economic and security ties with the United States, Russia remains its largest military supplier: it accounts for almost half of New Delhi's defense imports. And recently, Russia has begun to develop Pakistan. In contrast to its pro-Indian policy during the Cold War, Moscow supplies Pakistan with a limited number of weapons, but has been conducting joint exercises since 2016. So it is not surprising that Khan did not fall for the bait to take a side in the Ukrainian conflict — and his successor Shehbaz Sharif adheres to the same course.
And then there is Brazil with the largest economy in Latin America with a volume of $ 1.4 trillion. The country is heavily dependent on agricultural sales — President Jair Bolsonaro even declared it a priority. Soybeans, the main agricultural export, bring Brazil almost $29 billion. Fertilizers are required to grow this crop. Brazil imports 85%, and Russia supplies 23%. Will Moscow stop exports if Brazil supports Western sanctions? Bolsonaro decided not to guess. True, Brazil voted for the UN General Assembly resolution of March 2 condemning Russia, but at the same time its ambassador sharply criticized the "indiscriminate use of sanctions".
Pro—Russian governments at the level of reflexes — for example, Belarus and Syria - have their own reasons to support the Russian special operation in Ukraine: for example, almost complete economic and military dependence on Moscow. Others avoid publicly condemning Russia for a different reason. They believe that loud denunciations of Russia's behavior will not change, but will worsen polarization and will negate the chances of a political settlement of the conflict. Although this is not even expected yet, these countries do not want to undermine even the ghostly prospects of negotiations on the end of hostilities. Thus, Mexico, even though it supported the resolution of March 2, opposes sanctions on the grounds that punitive measures will further complicate diplomacy.
The same logic explains why Indonesia, the current chairman of the G20, refused to withdraw Putin's invitation to the November summit in Bali, despite all Washington's calls, although President Joko Widodo is well aware that Putin's participation could provoke a boycott of the West. Like Mexico, Indonesia supported the resolution of March 2, but considers the strategy of isolating Russia counterproductive. India will preside over the G20 next year — it abstained from voting at all, so it is unlikely that Prime Minister Narendra Modi will slam the door in front of Putin.
Similarly, with all the desire of the United States to brand the Russian "invasion" at the May summit of the United States and ASEAN in Washington, the final statement did not go further than an analgesic call to cease hostilities, provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, and support the principles of "sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity." Russia was not even mentioned in it, let alone scourged. The United States performed no better at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Bangkok with the participation of 21 countries. As soon as the Russian minister prepared to make a speech, U.S. Trade Representative Catherine Tai left the hall. Her example was followed by delegates from Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand. The rest of the participants remained in place.
The key countries of the Global South refused to follow Washington's line for another reason: out of fear, not to say outrage, that the US is abusing punitive sanctions, taking advantage of the dominance of the dollar. Some of these countries have experienced American sanctions themselves — for example, the same India and Pakistan after nuclear tests in 1998 and Turkey after the purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system.
The arguments in favor of sanctions do not help Washington either: he argues that they are necessary to punish violators of the rules on which the world order stands. The global South considers these arguments hypocrisy, considering how many times Washington itself has rejected these principles when it was convenient. Take NATO's unilateral intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which was not supported by the UN Security Council, or the 2003 Iraq war for regime change — it began from the false premise that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction. Don't forget the 2011 invasion of Libya, which went beyond the UN Security Council resolution of 1973, escalated into a war to overthrow Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, left behind political anarchy and exacerbated the growth of terrorism throughout North Africa.
An important lesson follows from this: for many countries outside of North America and Europe, choosing a side in a confrontation between Russia and the West is a losing strategy, since the costs far outweigh the benefits. Moreover, it is unreasonable for the United States to expect that they will sacrifice key interests in order to protect global norms that Washington itself violates whenever it pleases. To write countries that did not support the West into pro—Putin ones means to completely ignore the context.
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Make no mistake about how far the rest of the world will go in supporting Ukraine. Washington mistakenly believes that with proper pressure or prodding, other states will sooner or later support the United States when they want to solve the problem, settle the crisis or punish the aggressor.
But international politics is not an example of a more complicated matter. The perception of the world largely depends on a particular country, its position and interests — and, not least, how many of them it is willing to sacrifice. This is true even in cases such as the Russian military operations in Ukraine, when it is not difficult to understand who is right and who is to blame. It's time for the USA to move from the world of fiction, where countries meekly follow the American example, to the world of reality — however disappointing. Otherwise, the United States is condemning itself to disappointment and annoyance — if not failure.
Daniel Depetris is a columnist for The Spectator magazine and an employee of the Defense Priorities think tank, which advocates restraint in foreign interventions.
Rajan Menon is a senior researcher at the Saltzman Institute for the Study of War and Peace at Columbia University and co–author of the book "The Conflict in Ukraine: Rolling Back after the Cold War" with Eugene Rumer. Director of the "Grand Strategy" program at Defense Priorities.
