Where is the militarization of space moving
An analysis of the available indirect and direct signs of preparations for an arms race in outer space suggests that there is less and less time and opportunities for proactive diplomatic steps on the PARAC. Let's analyze this situation using the example of US military space preparations both at the political and doctrinal level and in the military-technical sphere (" The space of peace or the space of war? " – "HBO", 12.05.22).
Currently, we are witnessing an active phase of the implementation of this project – at a meeting of the NATO Defense Ministries in June 2019, the alliance's space policy was preliminarily approved, which subsequently found its development in the form of practical coordination measures in this area.
As for the policy documents, attention is drawn to the space policy directive published by the Pentagon back in October 2012. The document, designed for ten years, replaced the directive of 1999 and put into effect the provisions of the US National Space Policy of 2010 and the Space Security Strategy of 2011. The document declares that any interference in the activities of American space systems, including ground infrastructure, is considered a violation of US rights and will require retaliatory actions. The document is also indicative of the fact that it, in fact, lays down the parameters for the creation of a "space NATO", in which an attack in space or on space objects on Earth by one of the alliance member states will be considered as an attack on everyone.
Attention is also drawn to a series of bills "On marginal expenditures on US national defense" in the period 2019-2022 fiscal years, the specific provisions of which indicate the intensification of the process of preparation for the use of outer space for the purposes of combat operations. In particular, the bills require the US Department of Defense to submit a comprehensive strategy for military operations in outer space and specific stages of its implementation.
Thus, the bill for 2022 highlights the US plans for the development of its global missile defense system and its space component. The document, in particular, declares the intention to form a whole echelon of space-based means to intercept ballistic missiles by 2030. It is expected to start testing prototypes at the end of 2022. Significant financial resources are allocated for this.
The US Department of Defense adopted a military satellite survival program back in August 2013. The program is presented in the form of a White Paper on resilience and Disparate Space Architecture and is aimed at making the satellite grouping more resistant to external influences. The process launched by the program led to the physical separation of various elements of the same space system between several spacecraft capable of interacting with each other.
The process of placing military equipment on commercial satellites and Allied spacecraft is involved in the practical plane. At the same time, the spacecraft of NATO member states are placed in different orbits with simultaneous duplication of tasks in cyberspace on Earth.
Attention was also drawn to the National Space Strategy announced on March 23, 2018, which lays down the conditions for US leadership in space for many years to come. In accordance with the Strategy, in addition to greater security, the spacecraft group should have broader capabilities for strategic deterrence, improved parameters for conducting combat operations. For these purposes, it is planned to create a space segment of the global missile defense system, as well as a whole set of measures to fend off Russia's new capabilities in the field of strategic deterrence (we are most likely talking about the Avangard hypersonic planning unit and the promising Sarmat heavy complex).
A serious emphasis on the formation of a space-based missile defense strike group was also made in the review of US missile defense policy (January 2019). The Pentagon was instructed to study the most promising technologies, including "space", as well as the schedule, cost and necessary staffing. Thus, the United States actually announced plans to place strike weapons in orbit.
Doctrinal attitudes are also supported by appropriate organizational measures.
In June 2018, then-President Donald Trump ordered the creation of space troops designed to become the sixth branch of the US armed forces, and in September 2019, the Space Command (CC) of the US Armed Forces was established, which should be regarded as part of a multi-vector effort to prepare conditions for the forced transformation of space into a battlefield.
The US Space Forces (CS) already number from 15 to 20 thousand people. In general, the buildup of American military potential in space involves relying on an organizational and bureaucratic "triad": the creation of a separate space command, the space development agency and the space forces themselves. The Americans do not hide that such practical steps are primarily aimed at fending off the capabilities of Russia and China.
The total budget for 5 years is almost $ 13 billion. In addition to all matters directly related to space, for which the Air Force was previously responsible, the US CS will also take over all operations of the Army, Navy, Missile Defense Agency, Office of Strategic Capabilities, NASA and the US Department of Commerce. They will also maintain close ties with the National Directorate of Military Space Intelligence of the United States.
The Space Forces at this stage included: the Space Operations Command, the First Army Space Brigade, the US Navy Space and Naval Combat Systems Command and the Naval Satellite Operations Center. The creation of a Reserve and the National Guard of the Space Forces is not excluded.
Commenting on the creation of the US Space Forces, their commander, Air Force General J. Raymond stressed that "over the past few years, space has become a sphere of military operations, as well as air, land and sea."
At the same time, the process of forming the US Space Forces should not be considered as a kind of accomplished act. The process of forming Forces continues. The Force structure is constantly being reformatted and reconfigured taking into account emerging new tasks and new challenges.
The need to take measures to improve the organizational structure of the US Space Forces in the leadership of the Pentagon is explained by the gradual increase in threats of the emergence of military confrontation in outer space. Thus, according to experts of the US intelligence community, the "growing threat" from Russia in the space sphere requires an ever-increasing response efforts from the United States and its allies.
The annual report of the US Directorate of National Intelligence for 2020, in particular, notes that Russia "continues to train its military space units and ground-based anti-satellite combat systems (ASAT-ASAT) to undermine and reduce the combat capability of the US space group and its allies, and also develops, tests and deploys a whole line of kinetic anti-satellite weapons and non-kinetic effects...".
Thus, the Pentagon's active offensive preparations to turn space into a "battlefield" are given a certain ideological color – the nature of forced retaliatory measures.
The logical conclusion of the above doctrinal and organizational preparations was the adoption of the Pentagon's Defense Space Strategy on June 17, 2020, which provides for "the most significant transformations in the history of the US national security space program." In short, in fact, the Pentagon has unveiled a space strategy designed to gain US superiority in militarized near–Earth outer space.
At the same time, the strategy separately points out that, since the Pentagon has been engaged in space for decades as a function of supporting military operations on Land, at sea and in the air, and not an area intended for military confrontation, the adopted approaches to the role and significance of space for national security need to be substantially adjusted. In other words, it is actually recognized that space is actually becoming an independent "battlefield".
The document defines the current strategic situation in near-Earth outer space, the vectors of movement and goals that the United States is trying to achieve, the ways in which they are going to do it, as well as what means are needed to solve the tasks.
It is recognized, in particular, that outer space has now become a separate area of armed struggle, requiring fundamental changes in policy, strategy, practice of conducting specific operations, investments, and technology development.
It is noted that space has already turned into a highly competitive environment and therefore it is necessary for the United States to make concrete efforts to ensure its superiority in all spheres of space activity, including commercial.
The document also postulates that the US military has recently been increasingly focusing on protecting its space assets, as major rival powers are strengthening their anti-satellite capabilities, which can seriously threaten the orbital grouping of the United States.
It is emphasized again that in this regard, the United States is creating a new type of armed forces – the Space Forces, reforming the procurement of weapons and military equipment, creating a unified Space Command, which is responsible for military operations carried out at an altitude of 100 kilometers or more above sea level.
The Angara rocket is used to launch communications and surveillance spacecraft. Photos from the website www.mil.ru
At the same time, as Stephen L. Kitay, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, stated during the presentation of the unclassified brief version of the Strategy, "the key strategic objectives of the US Department of Defense include maintaining superiority in space, providing support from space for national, joint and interspecies operations, as well as ensuring stability in near-Earth space." "The United States Department of Defense is beginning the most significant transformation in the history of space programs that ensure the national security of the United States," the presentation notes.
"Space is currently a separate area of warfare that requires large–scale changes in policies, strategies, operations, investments, capabilities and experience for a new strategic environment," the summary of the Defense Space Strategy says.
This Strategy echoes the ideas and approaches voiced, albeit in a very stripped-down form, contained in the unified integrated (including both the Review of US Nuclear Policy and the Review of US Missile Defense Policy) for the first time formulated The US National Defense Strategy, a closed version of which was recently submitted to the US Congress for consideration on March 28.
The approaches to the presented Strategy also state the fact of the transformation of outer space into a separate extremely important and promising area of warfare, talk about maintaining US superiority in space, providing support from space for ground-based military operations, as well as ensuring stability in near-Earth outer space.
Thus, the United States continues the line of unleashing its hands in space, relying on its overwhelming space grouping, and is actually preparing the ground for maintaining dominance in space and its forced "weaponization", that is, the withdrawal of shock combat platforms into outer space (as opposed to using satellite groupings to provide early warning systems about missile attack and for the purposes of management, communications and intelligence, that is, measures working to strengthen strategic stability).
In addition, the doctrinal documents noted above state that offensive capabilities in space should be closely intertwined with strategic defense capabilities, in particular, global missile defense.
It seems that this is an extremely important provision, which, in fact, predetermines the promising role of offensive weapons systems in outer space. We are talking about the placement of global missile defense elements in space.
At the same time, in accordance with the US plans, offensive operations in space are not limited to the enemy's space systems and can also target the full range of its capabilities, which includes targets on Earth and cyberspace. It is also an essential element of the US military space preparations. In fact, operational plans are being worked out, and in a practical way, to use the entire spectrum of military space potential, and the basis for conducting multi-domain operations is being laid.
In this context, the overall assessment of military space preparations, which is given by the American developers themselves, is very remarkable. In their opinion, the complex "architecture" of the military space system - the space segment, the ground segment and the communications segment – makes defensive and offensive operations inherently multi–sphere.
At the same time, it is argued that in order to preserve the military space potential, all three of the above segments should be protected. Conversely, a successful attack on any of the segments of the space architecture can neutralize the overall military space potential. Thus, defensive and offensive operations should be conducted on the basis of an approach based on interaction in all segments of the military space architecture.
As U.S. Navy Admiral S. Haney emphasizes in this context, "although strategic deterrence is backed up by our nuclear capabilities, it is more than just a nuclear triad. Effective deterrence of the 21st century includes reconnaissance, space and ground-based radar facilities for continuous monitoring." At the same time, in his opinion, strategic deterrence in the conditions of the multipolarity of the international system should also include missile defense, the use of cyberspace and space capabilities, as well as the availability of an effective and mobile nuclear infrastructure capable of solving American strategic tasks.
The US NATO allies are also joining the space military race. The speech of the Minister of Defense of France F. drew attention . Parley, which presented the national military space doctrine back in July 2019. This is the first document of its kind, and it will undoubtedly affect the situation in space. The analysis of the document raises serious questions, first of all, to the concept of "active defense" stated in it – the central idea of the doctrine. We are talking about the development of shock weapons based on new physical principles (lasers, including for equipping nano- or mini-satellites).
The doctrine also presupposes the adoption of a special program called "space management". This means not only improving the capabilities of monitoring the security of satellites, but also "detecting suspicious and hostile behavior", as well as creating means to "neutralize possible threats". The question arises by what criteria "hostile behavior" will be determined and how to neutralize possible threats without placing appropriate means in space. The French space defense strategy sets the task of creating by 2030 the potential for conducting military operations in space using space-based means. With this in mind, it is impossible not to come to the logical conclusion that the plans of France and NATO as a whole have the ultimate goal of deploying strike weapons in space.
The situation is complicated by emerging new technological capabilities: the process of miniaturization of spacecraft, the use of spacecraft by the "swarm" method, the possibilities of remote subordination of alien spacecraft to their will with the use of inspection satellites, plans for the development of kinetic weapons, as well as "hidden" anti-satellite systems operating in a "passive", non-kinetic mode, that is, in an unobservable mode of influence on spacecraft (spacecraft), etc.
The factors of stealth and surprise of weapons in space, as well as the emergence of dual-use systems, can have the most destructive impact on strategic stability. With the acquisition of such capabilities, it will be increasingly difficult to draw a line between shock systems and means working to maintain stability in space.
Comments on measures to increase the hidden anti-satellite capabilities of the United States on the basis of the US Agency for Advanced Research (DARPA) deserve special mention R&D. These programs include, in particular, the launch into orbit of an experimental aerospace aircraft, formerly known as XS-1 - a reusable horizontal take–off and landing spacecraft, orbital satellites of maintenance inspectors and the creation of an integrated system of situational awareness in outer space (SDA - Space Domain Awareness). According to a number of experts, if this program is implemented, the United States will acquire qualitatively new capabilities in near–Earth space by the end of 2022 - beginning of 2023.
In conditions of aggravation of the political conflict, the "neutralization" of foreign satellites in orbit or manipulation of them will lead to an inevitable and instant escalation with unpredictable consequences. The dependence of modern armed forces and their control bodies on space assets when the latter are damaged creates a real threat of a situation in which the Armed Forces actually become non-functional in the absence of external damage.
In addition, the defeat of the spacecraft does not necessarily have to lead to its destruction – it is enough to exclude the possibility of its use. A particular danger in this context is the application of a deliberate impact on the control systems of nuclear forces, which will practically make any low-intensity conflict unmanageable. At the same time, attempts to hit the spacecraft with warnings about a missile attack can be considered as the beginning of a nuclear missile strike.
It should be noted that both Russian and American similar systems are mainly located in geostationary or highly elliptical orbits. In the event of the emergence of stable opportunities to defeat this kind of spacecraft, strategic stability will not only be violated, but its nature will actually be changed. At the same time, the combination of the importance of spacecraft and their continued high vulnerability, despite the measures taken to protect them, turn spacecraft into objects attractive for a preventive strike. Thus, the threshold for the use of force in outer space is reduced.
Anti-Satellite Defense (ASW) is also gaining new opportunities. At the same time, the bet is on the invisibility of the spacecraft in combination with non-kinetic effects. As an example, the XSS-11 spacecraft, developed under the DART program (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology – demonstration of autonomous Rendezvous technologies), launched on April 11, 2005. During the almost two-year period of stay in orbit, the spacecraft carried out maneuvers, approached other spacecraft and periodically disappeared from view. At the same time, the Pentagon made it clear that the spacecraft can solve the tasks of the PSO.
The beginning of the practical use of mini- and nanosatellites, including the "swarm" method, became largely possible thanks to the operation of the unmanned reusable vertical take-off and horizontal landing spacecraft X-37B. Six consecutive launches of this spacecraft, which has already spent more than 2,500 days in orbit, indicate real preparations for the entire spectrum of capabilities – from reconnaissance to anti-satellite actions and testing of space-based missile defense systems.
Back in the days of the well-known Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), it was recognized that the deployment of a strategic space-based missile defense system would not only have a destabilizing effect on strategic stability, but also stimulate the other side to create means of destroying these objects.
The relevance of the problem of mutual influence of missile defense and missile defense has increased significantly after the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002. At the same time, it is important to be aware of the trend of the interchangeable use of missile defense and PSO systems. In fact, such a close interweaving contributes to the creation of a single information and impact potential. Moreover, the task is to create a unified situational awareness system in outer space, which will provide both missile defense and potential PSOs with information.
A powerful orbital grouping of combat control, communications and intelligence assets must be protected. In this regard, the United States is making efforts to increase the viability of the spacecraft, creating conditions for the creation of a so-called megagroup of satellites, when the failure of one or even several satellites does not disrupt the entire system.
Taking into account the awareness of the strategic consequences of the vulnerability of satellite groups, the United States is making practical efforts in this direction. So, on August 8, 2019, a new generation satellite was launched from Cape Canaveral. The upgraded ultra-high frequency communications satellite (Advanced Extremely High Frequency comsat), which has an increased degree of protection against various types of impacts, will simultaneously be used in an offensive manner – in the interests of missile defense and protection against hypersonic platforms in the mode of non-kinetic impact on ICBMs before their launch. The launch was carried out in the interests of the Integrated war-fighting solutions beyond active defense program in order to adapt the development of missile defense systems to measures of passive preventive action against "alien" ICBMs.
In fact, we are talking about a set of measures aimed at disrupting the launch of an ICBM, which can have the most destructive impact on strategic stability. It is important that all these measures and practical steps actually balance on the verge of indirect and actually direct signs of a qualitative arms race in space and allow us to say that the creation of prerequisites for a breakthrough to the "weaponization" (launching shock weapons into space) of space at this stage can lead to the creation of a new strategic situation capable of fundamentally change the very nature of strategic deterrence and have a significant destabilizing long-term impact on strategic stability.
Thus, assets launched into space are becoming increasingly integrated, interchangeable and intertwined. All this dramatically complicates the achievement of agreements on the PARAC, as it turns the work on identifying the scope of the document into a very difficult task.
With the acquisition of such capabilities, it will be increasingly difficult to draw a line between the launch into space of communications, reconnaissance, identification, working for stability and "weaponization", as well as between shock systems and dual-use means in space.
Despite this, it seems that the work on prevention, that is, on preventing the implementation of the worst case scenario in relation to the forced transformation of space into a battlefield, does not lose its relevance.
It is appropriate to assume that, despite the sharp aggravation of relations between Russia-the United States and Russia-the West as a whole, the active stage of the hybrid war unleashed by Western elites against Russia in its various forms, the objective need to maintain channels of strategic dialogue will prevail and it will be resumed after a difficult period of analysis and rethinking.
In this context, the relevance of practical discussion of issues related to ensuring the BCD in its military dimension and possible regulatory measures in this area does not decrease, but rather increases, as was envisaged within the framework of the US-Russian dialogue on strategic stability, which was launched even before the active phase of the aggravation of the international situation, and two working groups were established: on the principles of and the tasks of future arms control (START) and the potentials and actions of the parties capable of solving strategic tasks (strategic non-nuclear weapons, missile defense, space, etc.).
The topic of protecting outer space from forced transformation into a "battlefield" capable of critically undermining strategic stability is intended to occupy a special and important place in this dialogue.
Andrey Malov
Andrey Yuryevich Malov – Candidate of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of International and National Security of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, expert of the Center for Military and Political Studies of MGIMO (U) MFA of Russia, member of the Expert Council of the PIR Center.
