Russia needed an asymmetrical strategy of influence on the geopolitical opponents
For many years, the US leadership has been considering nonviolent and cost-increasing options that Washington and its allies could use in the economic, political, information and military spheres in order to stress – excessively stretch and unbalance-the Russian economy, the Armed Forces and the political positions of the government at home and abroad. Today, a new stage has come in the relations of strategic competition between Russia and the United States, associated with increasing pressure on our country in order to contain and weaken it.
Washington's decision to withdraw the United States from the Open Skies Treaty should be seen as" the last signal to Moscow " about the need to abandon its new weapons systems as a prerequisite for continuing the negotiation process on strategic security issues. Otherwise, the full arsenal of hybrid war will be used against Russia, including "color revolutions", terror and provoking separatist actions, the emergence of new hot spots on the borders.
Hybrid face
The Americans are trying to find a balance in the strategy of containment of Russia, maneuvering between the two poles of the known dilemma: on the one hand, seek to prevent a slide into military confrontation with the other – you know, it's too hard holding force, which can be regarded as an existential threat to the state target, able to cause the same, and even the disproportionately harsh response.
In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, the need for deterrence without provoking further escalation challenges politicians, diplomats and the military on both sides to develop a common understanding of what Moscow and Washington consider a red line that cannot be crossed without provoking a dangerous destabilizing reaction.
the confrontation in the use of various instruments of deterrence is very acute in the military technosphere.
Instruments of deterrence
Among other radical changes, the new impetus to the development of a kind of mini-revolution in military Affairs give the need to improve the doctrines of deterrence in the face of rising cyber threats, the use of artificial intelligence technologies in the power and non-violent operations, large-scale use of strategic and tactical unmanned aircraft systems, automation and robotics, information and communication technologies for military-political purposes, the technological risks associated with the digitization and amplification factor of digital technologies in the organization and manipulation of protest movements, the development of neural networks and network-centric technologies, etc. The new technological leap that has taken place in the world requires the creation of a multi-level system of deterrence, which is based on the development of the military technosphere with the simultaneous integration of intelligence, counterintelligence and special information structures that can quickly and accurately identify the sources of threats.
"The transformation of modern conflicts leads to a change in the ratio of the contributions of military and non-military types of struggle (in favor of the latter) to the overall political result of the war ”
The current stage of the revolution in military affairs has led to the emergence of three types of strategic deterrence.
First, nuclear weapons, which for many decades have been and remain a means of strategic nuclear deterrence and international influence.
Secondly, the convincing threat of using a high-precision long-range carrier with a conventional warhead forms the basis of a strategic non-nuclear (pre-nuclear) deterrence system that complements the nuclear deterrence system.
Finally, the unique factors of hybrid warfare give this type of armed conflict the status of a new means of strategic non-nuclear deterrence and coercion, in fact, a new system of non-violent counteraction. It is about complementing nuclear deterrence with non-nuclear deterrence, not replacing one with another.
It is impossible not to agree with the statement of Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Andrey Kokoshin: "It is difficult to imagine somewhere, even in the distant future, an adequate replacement for nuclear weapons (taking into account all the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion) as a means of deterring aggression or aggressive political and military behavior in an acute international crisis. A realistic view of the political and military aspects of the processes in the system of world politics suggests that deterrence through intimidation is one of the most important factors (if not the most important) in preventing aggression and countering political and power pressure on our state."
Don't reply symmetrically
at the same time, it can be argued that the combination of the functions of hybrid war as a new form of inter-state confrontation and a new means of strategic non-nuclear deterrence and coercion makes hybrid war an important catalyst, the driving mechanism of the next revolution in military affairs. The strategy of such a war as an instrument of deterrence and coercion does not in principle exclude the limited use of military force, but it is mainly based on the threat of its use in the event of aggression with inevitably severe consequences for the aggressor.
The use of hybrid threats to put pressure on the enemy in the political, economic, informational, cultural and ideological spheres is designed to demonstrate to him the danger of continuing the chosen course and force him to abandon the implementation of the goals set. of course, the duration of the impact of a hybrid war on the enemy will be much more extended along the time axis of the conflict than the threat to resort to nuclear or high-precision conventional weapons.
it is important to note that the function of gw as a method of strategic non-nuclear deterrence differs significantly from the understanding of nuclear deterrence as a symmetrical threat of the use of force in response to the use of force by the opponent.
gw is characterized by an asymmetric nature of deterrence due to its ability to prevent the escalating dominance of the state or coalition in conflict and crisis situations. the gw strategy makes it possible to provide deterrence not only and not so much by military means, but also by threats in the economic, information, cybernetic spheres, the threat of using other harsh measures against the opponent even before the threshold of using armed forces. Hence, for Russia, there is a strict imperative about the need to develop asymmetric strategies to deter geopolitical opponents.
One of the tasks of deterrence is to prevent not only a large war, but also a relatively limited local one, so that this war does not develop into a mutually destructive war with the use of weapons of mass destruction. Deterrence means a willingness to respond with violence to violence.
Broadband exposure
It is known that among the types of relations between states (and non-State actors of world politics), a significant place is occupied by coercion, which can be carried out in an explicit and implicit form. Military violence is the most radical form of coercion.
Hybrid warfare is a more flexible means of violence than nuclear or high-precision non-nuclear weapons, built on methods of implicit coercion using adaptive technologies of force and non-force influence on the enemy. It is this type of deterrence that Russia faces today in connection with the introduction of new US sanctions against the country's defense complex and high-tech industries. Adaptability gives GW the opportunity to change national policy frameworks of individual States, international politics in the region and the world, strengthening of some actors and weaken others, until the complete loss of subjectivity in the result of the loss of government real sovereignty.
and finally, gw plays a crucial role in the development of the escalation of modern military conflicts, the logic of managing the growing destructive power of which can be represented in the form of a ladder, on the steps of which global or regional military-political situations are placed. kokoshin defines the place of gv at the third stage of the escalation ladder developed by him, which is preceded by the "normal state" of the world political system and the "political crisis" with an increased intensity of the demonstration of military force. this is followed by a hybrid war, which can serve as a catalyst for the world to slide down the steps of increasing intensity of armed conflicts from limited (local) conventional war to general nuclear war.
Placement of guards on the third stage of escalation gives it the function of a peculiar turning point in the task of strategic non-nuclear deterrence, at which the parties may decide to abandon confrontation and to move to a compromise or continue to increase the intensity of military action up to a global conflict. This is the peculiarity and danger of GW as a new type of interstate confrontation.
at the same time, gw as a phenomenon that uses a variety of ways to influence the enemy, including solving the problem of its strategic non-nuclear deterrence, cannot be localized only on one of the steps of the "escalation ladder". GW factors retain their significance in the subsequent stages of conflict development, when along with military means, economic and information warfare is used, a war is waged in cyberspace, and so on.
In this context, the use of hybrid warfare as a means of strategic non-nuclear deterrence in interstate relations is determined by a number of factors, including:
- hybrid warfare allows not only the escalation of violence, but also de-escalation, that is, narrowing the scale, reducing, weakening, up to the cessation of violent actions, which gives the process of violence development greater adaptability and flexibility by synchronizing hybrid threats by type, time, place and intensity of use;
- hybrid strategic non-nuclear deterrence is effective both against large States and against countries that, for a number of reasons, do not consider the use of nuclear weapons against them or the massive use of high-precision weapons in conventional equipment as a real threat. It can be, for example, a small and militarily weak state that tries to harm our country and counts on the protection of the international community, allies and partners in the event of the use of military force against it;
- GW is characterized by the unsteadiness of the borders between peace and war, the absence of a rear and front, the blurring of distinctions between civilian and military, which allows planning strategic deterrence measures in advance and covering the entire territory of the target State. Hence the increased requirements for the territorial defense of our country;
- nuclear deterrence cannot be used against non-State actors involved in many military conflicts (for example, international terrorism), while hybrid warfare tools such as special operations forces and some other capabilities can be used to address such threats;
- The decentralized models of managing the operations of the GW at the tactical level, combined with its non-linear nature, increase the risk of local conflicts with the prospect of uncontrolled expansion of their geography and intensity. This makes it extremely important to develop scientifically based approaches to the use of nuclear weapons as a means of strategic non-nuclear deterrence and to integrate the concept into existing national and international regulatory documents.;
- the scale of gw operations as a deterrent is determined by the areas of their implementation not only on land, at sea and in the air, but also in cyberspace, in space, financial, economic, cultural and ideological areas, as well as the variety of tools used by the subjects of the gray zone, including the latest military technical means-unmanned aerial vehicles (uavs), powerful computers for processing big data, technologies related to the use of artificial intelligence for military purposes, mobile communication technologies of the fifth generation.
We need a hybrid mindset
it is important to emphasize that hybrid warfare as a new form of inter-state confrontation and a tool of strategic non-nuclear deterrence does not require the development of any new weapons systems and military equipment and builds its strategy in the gray zone on the use of available means based on technologies with intelligent programs (for example, drones), automation and robotics, the introduction of artificial intelligence, the use of radio and electronic intelligence, electronic warfare.
these and some other factors determine the demand for gray zone strategies in the conduct of competitive struggle by states, the increasing share of non-military means in the implementation of confrontation, especially the increasing role of information warfare and war in the cybersphere. As rightly noted by the chief of the General staff of the armed forces, army General Valery Gerasimov, the transformation of modern conflicts leads to a change in the ratio of the contributions of military and non-military forms of struggle (in favour of the latter) in the overall political result of the war.
this statement fully applies to the confrontation in the gray zones, the very appearance of which is associated with the changing nature of wars and armed conflicts that have become an integral part of the world political system. According to academician Kokoshin, the nature of these wars is undergoing significant changes, including under the influence of the limitations on the military dimension of world politics nuclear factor, understanding catastrophic consequences for the international community or that the massive use of nuclear weapons (and is very unlikely to hold military confrontation in the framework of the limited nuclear war).
The uncertainty of the development of the military technosphere against the background of the chaotic international situation and the actual collapse of the previous model of globalization raises the question of forecasting and strategic planning of Russia's foreign policy and improving the ability to use the tools of hybrid war against geopolitical opponents in a new way. It is important to understand that modern war is different in essence and its strategy cannot be determined only by the presence of nuclear weapons, modern tanks, aircraft and missiles, but requires a deep re-evaluation of the existing views on the preparation for the confrontation of the country and the armed forces.
alexander bartosh, corresponding member of the academy of military sciences, expert of the league of military diplomats
The newspaper "Military-Industrial Courier", published in issue # 48 (861) for December 15, 2020