Electronic warfare systems are already playing a key role in countering modern drones
The armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh once again drew attention to the use of combat robots. Azerbaijan very actively used this type of weapons and achieved success, destroying a considerable amount of military equipment of the defense Army of Nagorno-Karabakh and even Armenia with the help of UAVS. Not having its own developments in the field of military robotics and, consequently, their production, Azerbaijan purchased foreign samples, mainly in Turkey and Israel.
According to media reports, semi-Autonomous UAVS were most widely used in the conflict zone, which solved two main tasks-reconnaissance and targeting, as well as hitting ground targets. This was tested tactic of their joint application, when reconnaissance UAVS were given the designation of a shock, then the last struck with the use of available weapons, including ATGM, with a return to the point-based after using up ammunition to prepare for a new mission or died along with the target if the UAV were among the so-called robots kamikaze, as they are dubbed by the journalistic community.
Fresh experience of Karabakh
Based on the experience of using UAVS in Nagorno-Karabakh, once again there were voices claiming that this new type of weapon radically changes the tactics and even the operational art of modern armed struggle, leveling to a large extent the existing conventional weapons systems. It was noted that for the first time found the use of light drones swarm, when at the same time in the area of goals operates from a large number of aircraft, by information exchange between the decisive combat missions with high efficiency, while remaining low vulnerability themselves. It was noted that even the most advanced s-300 air defense systems in this region, which are in service with the Armenian army, were ineffective against these UAVS and allegedly became their victims themselves. On this basis, even opinions were expressed, in particular by Israeli experts, that Russian air defense systems and Russian weapons in General do not meet modern requirements and are unable to fight the latest means of air attack, namely drones.
First of all, we must immediately dismiss the accusations against our weapons, in particular air defense systems and means. In Nagorno-Karabakh, both sides are fighting almost exclusively with Russian / Soviet weapons. At the same time, the defense Army of Nagorno-Karabakh uses only Soviet weapons and military equipment, which are mostly more than 40 years old. And if the Azerbaijani army uses foreign-made UAVS, then the Armenians, without having anything similar, were able to inflict sensitive losses on their opponent with old Soviet weapons, which are numerically superior to their own. This alone suggests that Russian / Soviet weapons in General remain in the line of the best in the world, and this conflict has once again confirmed this.
Air defense systems have also proven themselves well. After all, a distinctive feature of the conflict was the almost complete refusal of the parties to use combat aircraft-individual sorties do not count. And this is at a time when Azerbaijan more than four times outnumbered Armenia in the number of combat aircraft. In Nagorno-Karabakh, there are no combat-ready combat aircraft at all. This indicates that it was the Armenian air defense systems, in particular the s-300 air defense system, that excluded the possibility of actions by Azerbaijani aviation after its first sorties, which ended in the loss of the aircraft. Similarly, they did not even try to use their small aircraft in the zones covered by the air defense systems of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. So in terms of protection from air strikes, Russian-made air defense systems have proven themselves quite well.
With regard to the destruction of UAVS, especially small-sized, which was used by Azerbaijan, such as the s-300 is not designed to defeat such purposes both from the point of view of possible destruction such low speed and small size targets, and efficiency/cost: makes no sense to shoot anti-aircraft missiles at targets, which cost much less spent on their defeat of ammunition. The American Patriot complex also proved useless for defeating the Houthi UAVS that successfully attacked the Saudi oil complexes some time ago.
Not so terrible blah BLAH
In the fight against such targets, modern small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and short-range SAMS demonstrate good performance according to the available combat experience. The Nagorno-Karabakh defense Army does not have such weapons. The most perfect thing that he could oppose to the Azerbaijani UAVS – outdated versions of self-propelled MISSILES "Shilka". All the rest are ordinary 23 mm anti-aircraft guns with the simplest optical sights, large-caliber machine guns and standard small arms. However, according to the Armenian side, about 15 Azerbaijani drones were shot down by such means in the first week of their use. These are very significant losses, which indicate that UAVS remain very vulnerable even at the present stage, when effective specialized countermeasures have not yet been adopted on a mass scale.
Another example is the use of UAVS by Turkey and militants from the Idlib cauldron of UAVS against the Russian Hmeimim base and Syrian troops. The militants ' makeshift UAVS could not reach the Russian base – they were destroyed by the Pantsir-S missile defense system and other means at a decent distance from its borders. As for the Turkish UAVS, after some initial successes with the appearance in the area of their use in support of Islamist militants against the Syrian army, the mentioned Pantsir-S and tor SAMS were destroyed in a short time about 20 UAVs, including seven heavy Anka-type ONES. After that, the actions of the Turkish UAVS were stopped. But in Libya, where Turkish UAVS are used against the troops of Marshal Haftar, the success of their actions is due to the lack of modern air defense systems.
Turkish UAV "Bayraktar". Photo: vestikavkaza.ru
Turkish UAV "Bayraktar". Photo: vestikavkaza. gitakim way, we can conclude-UAVS, of course, one of the most promising classes of weapons in modern armies. However, they are not an absolute weapon that grants victory in all conditions. Even non-specialized air defense systems are effective against it. At the same time, as has always been the case in military history and follows from the dialectic of the attack – defense confrontation, with the advent of new means of armed struggle, weapons are necessarily created in the shortest possible time to protect against them. The ways in which the development of means to combat various UAVS can go is determined by the characteristics of the latter, their strengths and weaknesses, and aspects of vulnerability. It should be noted that robotic weapons systems are being implemented very actively today. Already available combat robots for various purposes are designed to operate in all areas of armed struggle-space, air, on the ground, on the water and under water. It is impossible to consider possible directions for the development of weapons systems to combat them in one article. Therefore, we will focus only on UAVS, and intended for operations on continental theater of operations, since this class of UAVS is most actively used today and, accordingly, is of particular interest to military specialists and people interested in modern problems of armed struggle.
First of all, it should be noted that UAVS as targets for defense do not differ in any way from the already known means of air attack (SVN). Kamikaze UAVS are essentially conventional ammunition, being on a par with guided missiles and bombs of various types. Their special flight modes, the engine, the shape of the body and flight path, the subtleties of the control system and homing only give reason to allocate such UAVS in a separate subclass. They may object to me, but what about swarming UAVS, because there is nothing like this among existing systems. This is not entirely true. First, systems of unmanned weapons capable of collective action have been created for a long time. In particular, this is the Soviet anti-ship complex "Granit", whose missiles have the possibility of Autonomous collective action with the adjustment of flight modes and operation of the RES, classification of targets and target distribution in a group of missiles. The situation is similar with reusable UAVS, which may well be considered as a special subclass of combat aviation-aircraft and helicopters. So it is wrong to single out UAVS as something that has no analogues in modern weapons. And this determines that modern approaches to the fight against known conventional SVN are fully applicable to the fight against UAVS.
From this point of view, there are four main groups of UAVS under consideration. The first is large UAVS, comparable in size to conventional combat aircraft, with powerful onboard control systems and weapons, such vehicles can be both specialized and multi-purpose. The second is a medium-sized UAV, comparable in size to large and medium-sized guided munitions, with onboard RECs that allow you to solve the entire range of management tasks, but within a narrow specialization. The third is small-sized UAVS, comparable in size to small guided munitions, in which on-Board control systems provide solutions only to the simplest tasks within a specific purpose. And finally, the fourth is miniature UAVS, whose on-Board electronics allow you to solve minimal targeting tasks, and carry a charge that is dangerous for an individual or can cause limited damage to a particular type of weapons or military equipment. Such UAVS can be used in a swarm if there are appropriate means of communication and management capabilities within the team with the distribution of management functions between the UAVS of this swarm.
"Turn over" the drone
UAVS of the first group as an object of influence of the air defense system do not differ from conventional manned aircraft. Among them, there are aircraft with a speed of a thousand or more kilometers per hour, corresponding to the cruising speed of conventional aircraft, there are both those that have the ability to develop supersonic speed, and relatively low – speed ones-400-600 kilometers per hour. They can be executed both in the usual form of an aircraft, and using stealth technologies. All these are, as a rule, very expensive, very complex structurally reusable aircraft. UAVS of this type can only be developed and produced by technologically advanced countries, such as the United States and Russia. For air defense fire systems (SAMS and ZAC), they are no different from conventional aircraft, but they are more vulnerable to the effects of electronic warfare due to the algorithmic limitations of onboard control systems. Such UAVS are significantly more dependent on the control centers and, accordingly, on the stability of the communication system. Therefore, the suppression of communication channels with such UAVS can significantly more affect their combat effectiveness than is the case for manned SVN. Hence, we must assume that in the air defense system to counter such UAVS, EW means will be more important than when repelling attacks from manned SVN. There is also the possibility of hacking through the communication channels of the onboard control system of such a UAV in order to intercept control, which, by the way, has been repeatedly demonstrated by Iran with American drones.
The second group of drones is medium – sized, and they are already very diverse, differing in engine types, dimensions, design features, combat mission, and, accordingly, on-Board equipment and weapons used. Today, this is usually a reusable UAV. Among them there are high-speed ones-800-1000 kilometers per hour or more and slow-moving ones. All of them for existing fire defense systems represent a standard target, similar to a cruise missile or a guided aerial bomb, but in most cases simpler due to the characteristics of the trajectory and flight modes dictated by the tasks they solve. Shooting at them, from an economic point of view, is quite acceptable even for modern missiles due to the fact that the cost of such UAVS is comparable to them or superior to them. Therefore, all existing air defense systems can be used, including the most powerful ones, such as the Russian s-300 and S-400, as well as the American Patriot. However, in the fight against these drones, electronic warfare will become more important. This is due to the fact that their significantly smaller dimensions in comparison with manned SVN or UAVS of the first group do not allow them to place sufficiently powerful and multifunctional RESS. This makes them significantly dependent on control centers, limits the possibility of equipping them with effective means of electronic protection, and their means of reconnaissance, targeting and guidance are very vulnerable to electronic WARFARE. In connection with the above, among the priority areas of the fight against this type of UAV, along with the development of conventional air defense systems, much attention will be paid to electronic warfare, including specialized ones designed to counter such UAVS. It should be noted that the effectiveness of modern Russian air defense and electronic warfare systems in repelling attacks of such UAVS was demonstrated in Turkey, where almost half of the available composition of Anka-type UAVs was destroyed.
The third group of drones – small – sized-is the most numerous in terms of the variety of types and designs. Although the bulk of them are industrial models, there are many handicraft samples. In particular, these militants extremist organizations were trying to strike at the Russian base "Hamim" in Syria. According to the mode of use, there are both reusable and kamikaze UAVS among them. These are mainly products with a flight speed from 100-150 to 300-450 kilometers per hour, but models that develop 800-1000 kilometers per hour have already begun to appear. These are primarily single – use UAVs-guided munitions. The cost of these devices is several times less than the SAMS of even medium-range missiles. Their low flight speed and effective dispersion area make them an extremely difficult target for long-and medium-range SAMS. For this reason, such air defense systems are ineffective against them. However, as the experience of military operations in Syria has shown, modern zrpc and ZAC are very effective against them. However, these weapons also fall by the wayside in comparison with electronic warfare. The small size of such UAVS makes it possible to place only relatively low-power RES on them, both in terms of functionality and physical potential. These devices are even more dependent on the control centers. With the limited capabilities of their communication equipment, this creates favorable conditions for disrupting the operation of these devices, even with relatively simple and not very powerful electronic warfare tools. Their on-Board reconnaissance and homing systems are also significantly more vulnerable to electronic warfare than similar devices of manned or unmanned aerial vehicles of the first two groups. This means that to effectively suppress them, neither large capacities nor complex modes of electronic warfare will be required. This creates favorable conditions for the development of small-sized, perhaps even portable electronic warfare systems that can quite effectively counteract such UAVS.
The fourth group – miniature UAVS, which can be both airplane and helicopter type, with a maximum flight speed of no more than 40-100 kilometers per hour and the simplest RES. In most cases, the reconnaissance means of such UAVS are optoelectronic and can use the infrared or optical range. Communication means can work both in VHF or even millimeter-wave radio bands, and in optical. Reconnaissance UAVS of this group can be reusable, but shock, equipped with an explosive device up to several hundred grams maximum – are only disposable, a kind of flying mini-bombs. Any complex Autonomous actions of such UAVS are possible only as part of a large group – a swarm and if there is a reliable connection between them. Single actions usually involve continuous communication with the control center. Some exceptions may be shock UAVS whose GOS has already captured the designated target. However, given the short range of the GOS of such a device, almost the entire flight to the target, it must also be in continuous communication with the control center. Naturally, any effective reflection of their attacks by firing UAVs, especially when they act as part of a swarm, is almost impossible, except for the largest of them, acting singly, with small arms and then with a very low probability of defeat due to the small size and high maneuverability of the target. Therefore, EW remains the only and very effective means of combating this threat, which is determined by the primitiveness of the RES of these UAVS and makes it possible to suppress them even with very small capacities and the simplest types of interference. The impact of such EW means on the swarm will lead to its disintegration and loss of combat capability, followed by the UAV falling to the ground after expending energy or self-destruction. Suppression of the communication line with the control center of a separate UAV-to a similar result or interception of control. Given that the range of such UAVS is unlikely to exceed several kilometers, the main means of combating them can be small-sized devices installed on light vehicles, or portable – they should be concentrated in the links from the battalion to the platoon.
The analysis shows that although the UAV is a new and very promising type of weapon, the successful experience of its use is largely determined by the lack of appropriate means of counteraction on the opposite side. And the large losses of UAVS and their low efficiency in conditions when the defending side had a suitable weapon, only emphasizes this thesis. The creation of effective specialized means to combat UAVS will force to maintain their effectiveness to develop new ways and forms of ensuring their actions by other forces and means, including the development of new weapons systems to cover the combat operations of UAVs.
Konstantin Sivkov, Deputy President of the Russian Academy of Sciences for information policy, doctor of military Sciences
Military-industrial courier newspaper, published in issue # 43 (856) for November 10, 2020
