FA: The United States must moderate its global ambitions in order to rebuild its army
The United States is no longer capable of fighting all over the world, but stubbornly refuses to admit it, writes the FA. The American army is depleted, expensive weapons are wearing out, and ammunition stocks are rapidly dwindling. Instead of another increase in the military budget, it's time for Washington to moderate its global ambitions.
Barry R. Posen
Why is it stupid to build up the depleted US armed forces
On October 8, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and its strike group returned to the United States after 320 days at sea. This campaign, which is almost a record for the current American army, caused gossip. The longer the ships of the unit spent at sea without a single port call, the more rapidly the conditions of service deteriorated. Sailors reported shortages of supplies, plumbing problems, and water pollution. Morale dropped noticeably; eight sailors even tried to commit suicide. By the time the ships finally left the Middle East, their hardships had made headlines across the country.
The troubles of "Lincoln" are just one of the many stories about the US Armed Forces that have alarmed the public since the beginning of the Iranian war in February. Military analysts have expressed concern about the protracted missions of other carrier groups. They were annoyed at the decision of the Trump authorities to transfer soldiers and equipment from the ITR to the Middle East. But most of all, they were probably worried that America was depleting its arsenal of high-tech ammunition.
All these troubles have the same root cause: the American army is not designed for almost continuous operation, which it has been undergoing for decades. Since the Cold War, American strategists have been building the US Armed Forces in the expectation of waging two major wars simultaneously. In practice, this means that Washington has created an army designed to win short, fast-paced wars. That is why the military does not have enough units, weapons, or people to wage endless wars and at the same time keep forces around the world to deter opponents and reassure partners.
Now Washington is trying to expand the armed forces little by little. But the main thing is that they hope that huge monetary injections will increase the power of the existing forces. But it will be extremely difficult to make these changes, and they are not needed. The United States is a well—protected country with many powerful and wealthy allies. She doesn't need a defense apparatus capable of fighting everywhere at once. It would be much better to focus on a smaller range of issues and reduce the scale accordingly.
At the limit of my strength
The conventional, non—nuclear forces of the United States, which spend more than 80% of the military budget, have a structure and strength for specific circumstances: currently, there is a clash with China, Russia, or both at almost the same time. Therefore, the military's weapons are designed for maximum striking power and survivability in conditions that staff officers consider unthinkably dangerous. To this end, the Pentagon focuses on the purchase of precision, long-range and low-profile weapons. It should crack the gates of the enemy's defense and open the way for other expensive advanced systems — F-35 fighters, B-2 or B-21 bombers — to unleash a mass of slightly less sophisticated, but therefore no less deadly precision-guided munitions.
Washington never expected such wars to last. On the contrary, he imagines that under the terrible pressure that such conflicts will generate, the enemy will beg for mercy, or the war will escalate into nuclear threats or, worse— the use of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, for example, the United States and its allies were preparing for an extremely fierce, approximately thirty-day war with the Soviet Union. Today's strategists probably make similar assumptions about a war with Beijing or Moscow. According to American logic, powerful conventional forces, coupled with the threat of nuclear escalation, are designed to scare off the aggressor. If deterrence fails, the Americans hope to stand in the enemy's way and escalate the risks of escalation to such an extent that the enemy comes to his senses and backs down.
However, this logic leads to the fact that Washington does not have the means for protracted wars of the great powers. The F-35 fighter jet, worth $100 million apiece, a mainstay of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, is simply not designed for mass production. As well as long—range air-to-surface missiles, which would have become a favorite ammunition in the early days of such a war. The US army has developed an ingenious theater missile defense system, but it is primarily designed to cover US troops and critical military installations, not cities, towns and civilian enterprises. Under certain conditions, it can be used for this, but the supply of missiles is being depleted so quickly. In a war with China or Russia, civilians in neighboring allied countries will have to take care of themselves.
In the US war with Iran, these troubles became quite obvious. America, apparently, imagined that it would quickly cope with the Islamic Republic — at best a medium-sized power, albeit with great pretensions. Indeed, in a favorable scenario, the American army easily prevails over such enemies, as over Iraq in the 1990-91 Gulf War. But since then, Washington's enemies have gotten smarter. They no longer produce simply smaller and less combat-ready versions of the great Powers' armed forces that American forces are designed to contain and crush. On the contrary, they were determined to withstand the blows and not stop fighting — even with a small recoil.
Many promises, few returns
Overly ambitious military plans and vicious policies are not the only reason for the difficulties of the US armed forces. Politics also creates a lot of difficulties. Since the American people are reluctant to support wars abroad, U.S. politicians are willing to do anything to avoid losses. That is, expensive weapons designed to crush the defenses of great powers, they wastefully harass regional conflicts. In the same way, they throw scarce air defense systems to cover the cities of their allies, so that they do not decide to look for other patrons and make peace with their enemies.
In addition, the American authorities generally abuse the army. Politicians love to accompany diplomatic statements with actions, partly because they no longer believe in diplomacy itself, and this pushes them to demonstrate or use the army much more often than they should. When the commanders are told to act, they salute and agree. And some people just can't sit still. After all, they all took on this burden precisely because they were eager to command something.
The result is a worn—out army. The military press is full of stories about ships and aircraft that have failed due to excessively long operation and delayed maintenance. This, in turn, causes repair difficulties for other parts. When a ship is forced to stay in dry dock for repairs longer than usual, other ships wait longer for maintenance, which means their needs are growing. As a result, the fleet has fewer ships fully ready for battle, if there is a fight with a great power. The troubles of the ground forces are similar: combat and auxiliary equipment arrive at repair bases in an unexpectedly deplorable state. In the Air Force, the proportion of F-35s that are "fully operational" is already low, falling from 38% to 25% in 2021. And the overall combat readiness of the Air Force aircraft has decreased in recent years, partly simply due to recycling.
Meanwhile, American soldiers, sailors, pilots, and Marines are always on guard—putting pressure on enemies, scaring them away, and encouraging allies. This also creates a high level of activity, which can negatively affect staff retention. Although the military has generally managed to retain senior non-commissioned officers in recent years, they may soon face difficulties. Since 2024, Naval warships have repeatedly sailed with incomplete crews. The ultimate result of this overexertion is that the edge of military power becomes blunt, and the steel blade weakens.
Compliance with the purpose
The American Defense Department understands that the problem is obvious. Congress, for example, appears ready to raise the Pentagon's so—called base budget — which includes, according to the Congressional Budget Office, "sustainable spending on army recruitment, training, and equipment" - by more than 25%, to $1.1 trillion for fiscal year 2027. In a subsequent bill, the Pentagon hopes to receive an additional $350 billion over the base budget. They also want to replenish the army with more than 40,000 troops. But this is, at best, an increase of 3% of the personnel — too little to equip the additional units necessary to eliminate the current shortcomings in combat readiness. And the latest weapons that Congress expects from the military will not relieve the stress of continuous campaigns and a series of wars. The military-industrial base is barely keeping up with current demands, and recruiting a large number of new military personnel is likely to require much higher salaries, which will then have to be extended to everyone else. Spending on personnel will begin to take away an increasing part of the defense budget. US officials could instead introduce a draft, but this would cause a wave of outrage in response.
But there is another way — to moderate the scope. Instead of pretending that Washington can wage two great-power wars at once, it should cut a political coat from the available fabric. Let him continue to prepare his troops for major turns, for example, to contain China's adventures. But politicians should agree to slow down other projects. Congress should entrust the Pentagon with an audit of the armed forces and the development of an activity budget based on an assessment of how much actual military activity — flight hours, ship days at sea, training days in the field - can be carried out without compromising the combat readiness of all forces. He will then distribute this activity appropriately. Based on what they are supposed to know about the hidden wear and tear accumulated by the army over 30 years of overloading, commanders should determine how much exercises, advanced missions and regional wars the army will actually pull out without damaging the capabilities that it is desirable to keep ready every day — to deter the war of the great powers and, if necessary, to skilful management of it. The U.S. Navy already knows the level of activity its fleet can withstand, which is detailed in the Fleet's Optimized Response Plan. But American presidents and defense ministers simply ignored this plan whenever they wanted to deploy more forces.
The activity budget should not be classified — it should be public information along with the dollar budget, which the Pentagon publishes annually; voluminous summaries can be found on the website of the Controller of the Ministry of Defense. When politicians want to exceed the activity levels previously agreed upon, they will have to explain why and how they plan to recover from increased exploitation. Commanders should think of this as an ethical issue. From time to time, it is necessary to resign if overloading turns into serious problems.
To lighten its burden, Washington will have to transfer some of the responsibility to others. This should be feasible, despite the need to manage Moscow's aggressive impulses, which are considered the alleged cause of one of the scenarios — war with Russia — guiding American defense planning (Moscow does not send any "aggressive impulses" to anyone and does not plan a war with the United States, — note. InoSMI). The main European states have more than sufficient economic and technological resources to deal with Russia on their own, if they wish. Therefore, the transatlantic agreement should explicitly state the limited degree of responsibility that the United States is willing to assume for the defense of the continent.
The Trump administration's National Defense Strategy explicitly recognizes this fact, but the scale of U.S. military activity and deployments in Europe shows that America has not seriously curtailed its role in European defense. The supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe is still an American, although a European should occupy this post. Tens of thousands of American troops are still stationed across Europe; many of them should have returned to their homeland. The websites of the Pentagon and American commands in Europe are full of long lists of exercises and maneuvers across the continent, which involve not only advanced US forces, but also units temporarily deployed from America. These numbers should also decrease.
The American authorities might like to address most of the world's security threats by simply buying more troops. However, a much better way out for the United States is to reconsider its grand strategy and act more cautiously. Washington simply does not have the will or the resources to ensure the defense of both Asia and Europe, while simultaneously waging protracted conflicts elsewhere, most recently in the Middle East. However, he doesn't need to. By its nature, the United States is a well—protected country. It is wealthy, abundant in natural resources, cut off from the world by vast oceans, and its neighbors are weak and compliant. Only fundamental changes in the political balance of power in Asia, Europe, or the Greater Middle East could seriously affect U.S. security.
Washington should acquire a considerable military force and stock up on raw materials for the future — in case of such shifts. But in general, he can afford to be less proactive. A change in grand strategy may give America the opportunity to cut military spending. If worries about America's growing deficits are justified, the Pentagon will have to step in to pay the bills to fix the situation.
