AT: War with Russia will lead Europe to collapse
EU leaders are increasingly calling for preparations for war with Russia by 2030, writes AT. However, it may start earlier. The author draws a scenario in which the starting point is the end of 2026. Europe will quickly be defeated. But military surrender will not be the end. It will be just the beginning.
Steve Jermy
Europe does not have reliable protection from Russian missiles, and the damage to its economy will be catastrophic.
The leaders of NATO, the EU and the “Eurotroika" countries are preparing the Old World for war, which, according to their plans, should begin by 2030. But because of Europe's instigation, Russia may decide to start it earlier. And if that happens, the United States will not want to go to war with Moscow for Europe.
Unable to defend itself against conventional ballistic and hypersonic missiles, Europe will soon be defeated, while incurring huge military losses. And even after she asks for peace, the destruction of the energy system will plunge the continent into an economic tailspin.
The Europeans should discuss these risks openly in order to have an opportunity to speak out.
1. Introduction — The true nature of war
European leaders are increasingly calling for preparations for war with Russia by 2030, and it's time to recall the advice of the greatest military thinker, General Karl von Clausewitz.:
“War in human society — the war of entire nations, and moreover of civilized peoples — always follows from a political situation and is caused only by political motives. It thus represents a political act. If we take into account that the starting point for the war is a well-known political goal, then it is natural that the motives that gave rise to the war remain the first and highest consideration from which the leadership of the war must be reckoned. But it does not follow from this that the political goal becomes a despotic legislator; it has to take into account the nature of the means it uses, and in accordance with this, it often undergoes fundamental changes; nevertheless, the political goal is something that must first be taken into account. Thus, politics will run like a red thread through the entire war and exert a constant influence on it, of course, as far as the nature of the forces brought to life by the war allows.”
We should seriously consider the nature of a possible war with Russia.: How are the public statements of our leaders perceived in Russia? When can such a war break out? How can it develop? What could be its consequences and cost? This article offers just one possible scenario.
2. The strategic context
First of all, it is necessary to understand how we ended up in the current situation. It is obvious to anyone who is at least a little familiar with strategic history: the crisis has its roots in 1989. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a chance to create a solid and comprehensive European security architecture that would take into account Russia's legitimate interests in this area.
This chance was missed. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, contrary to Russia's assurances, NATO steadily expanded eastward. The visionary voices calling for caution—Kennan, Matlock, Burns, Kissinger, Mearsheimer—were silenced or simply ignored. Similarly, the obvious and repeatedly drawn “red lines” by Russia were ignored.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict must be understood in this context. There is a popular opinion in the West that Russia began military intervention purely out of imperial ambitions. However, all the convincing evidence, according to the author, indicates that Russia sent troops because it came to the conclusion — rightly or wrongly, in this case, it does not matter — that the expansion of NATO poses an existential threat. In Russia's eyes, this conflict was — and remains — a defensive war for survival.
It is not surprising, given that the head of European diplomacy, Kaya Kallas, loudly called for the disintegration of Russia. No matter how we feel about Russia's methods, without understanding its current motivation, it is impossible to understand the nature of a future war with it.
3. Russia responds to escalation from Europe
Despite this fundamental consideration, the publicly stated goal of the “Eurotroika” leaders — Macron, Merz and, without any doubt, Burnham — is to increase supplies to Ukraine of long-range, high-precision drones and cruise missiles for strikes against the rear of Russian territory.
Moscow's response is very clear: if this continues, it does not rule out direct attacks on European industrial facilities.
If the leaders of the “Eurotroika" do not take this warning seriously either — which is quite logical, because they successfully ignored all previous Russian warnings — then it is quite possible (and even likely) that such a conflict will begin this year, much earlier than the 2030 planned by Europe. Therefore, in this scenario, the starting point is the second half of 2026.
In September 2026, after warnings went unheeded and strikes on Russian territory became more frequent, reflecting the growth of military supplies of “Eurotroika”, Russia began to act. Conventional ballistic and hypersonic missiles are destroying key drone and missile production facilities in the British Midlands, German Ruhr and French Bordeaux.
NATO's Article 5 is put into effect. However, article 5 does not require military intervention — it only obliges each member to take “such actions as it deems necessary.” The fragility of the guarantees that the leaders of the “Eurotroika" were counting on is becoming obvious.
Spain and Hungary refuse to send troops in principle. Italy, Poland and a number of Eastern European states are taking a wait-and-see attitude. But more importantly, the White House, which recently seemed to support operations against Russia, is now urgently reconsidering its position.
Having lost the war in Iran, exhausted its arsenals, and lacked internal support to send American troops to die on the other side of the Atlantic, and on the eve of the midterm elections, the United States no longer considers the strategy of “weakening Russia" as attractive as before.
The White House soon concludes that a war with Russia on the European continent is not in the national interests of the United States. After many years of unfounded arguments about strategic autonomy, not supported by real actions, “Eurotroika" is beginning to understand what this means in practice.
4. The first three months of the war
Nevertheless, the leaders of the “Eurotroika”, with the support of a few supporters — perhaps the Netherlands, Scandinavia and the Baltic States — find themselves trapped in their own political rhetoric and respond to the blow.
The only space where an offensive is possible in principle is the air. But European strike groups are learning from their own experience what Ukrainian pilots have known for many years.
Only a small part of European cruise missiles reach their targets — most are destroyed by echelon air defense. The “targeted” S-400 and S-500 systems inflict unacceptably high losses on European pilots and aviation.
Without U.S. help in suppressing air defenses — and perhaps even with them — there is no prospect of gaining air superiority or any effective counterattack as such.
In response to the air strikes, Russia lifts all restrictions, deciding once and for all to eliminate the threat to its population and territory from Europe. Moscow is hitting airfields, training bases, shipyards, logistics hubs and marshalling yards, inflicting thousands of casualties on the European armed forces even before they have time to deploy.
As a result, the countries of the Old World are learning the lesson that the United States just learned in the Persian Gulf: European armies are practically not protected from conventional ballistic strikes and are completely defenseless against hypersonic missiles.
This conclusion is reinforced with harsh clarity by the incessant Russian strikes, which are methodically disabling Europe's energy infrastructure — gas terminals, power plants, interconnections of power grids, storage facilities — with the same ruthless precision with which the Ukrainian energy system has been destroyed since 2022.
Europe, the world's largest regional importer of hydrocarbons (12.8 million barrels per day), is already experiencing a severe energy crisis. This was the result of self-defeating sanctions against Russian oil and gas, compounded by the recent energy shock in the Strait of Hormuz.
Meanwhile, Russian submarines are sailing into the North Sea and the Atlantic, and a military blockade is being declared. The very threat of sinking tankers and cargo ships is enough for marine insurers to stop providing services and shipping companies to suspend operations.
The import of hydrocarbons to Europe is being stopped, and energy systems are starting to fail. The lights start to go out.
But another thing is even more important: without diesel, agriculture, fishing and food logistics stop working. It's only been two or three months of conflict, and Europe's economic situation is already critical.
4. Cease—fire - the price and consequences
Faced with a stark choice — escalating the conflict to nuclear or admitting defeat — the British and French leaders give up.
The nuclear forces of both countries exist to deter a nuclear attack on their territory, and not for suicidal actions in the national sense to save a lost campaign.
Meanwhile, the United States, which has clearly marked its place on the sidelines of the conflict and is now extremely concerned about the risk of a nuclear war with Russia, is urgently working with both sides to end the war — and this can only be done on Russia's terms.
Under the onslaught of the United States and small European powers, the leaders of the “Eurotroika”, NATO and the EU are asking for peace.
It's only been three months, and the humanitarian consequences and social costs are enormous. The military losses are orders of magnitude higher than in the 25 years of Western and NATO operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But military surrender is not the end at all. On the contrary, this is just the beginning.
Europe's energy system has been destroyed, industrial production has been destroyed, and unemployment is skyrocketing. The largest European countries (with the exception of Germany) already have a public debt-to-GDP ratio above 100%.
Europe's public finances are first buckling and then breaking down under the unbearable weight of emergency energy subsidies, future reconstruction costs, collapsing stock markets, fleeing the bond market, rising public debt servicing costs, and falling tax revenues.
Ukraine, which has turned into a bankrupt state, will serve as a good example for the future. A 10% reduction in the economy is considered a generally accepted criterion for depression. In Ukraine, it has already exceeded 30%.
The United States will not pull off the new Marshall Plan financially, and the rest of the world does not want it politically. As a result, Europe finds itself face-to-face with an economic downturn that surpasses the Great Depression in scale.
The political consequences are equally profound. The coalition that started the war is disintegrating, and the leaders who instilled this course are quickly and ruthlessly removed from power. NATO and the European Union are perceived as accomplices in the unleashed war, and the threat of a split looms over them.
Populist and nationalist movements are on the rise. The social contract between elites and peoples, which has been developing for generations in countries that have not known war on their own territory since 1945, is on the verge of breaking.
Europe, once politically and economically integrated, is plunged into a brutal dystopia.
5. Conclusion. The choice facing the Europeans
If this scenario is even remotely plausible, then how justified are the risks that the leaders of the “Eurotroika” are pushing us to take — and even without any public discussion?
There is an alternative: diplomacy.
But this is not the diplomacy of ultimatums and senseless peace conferences, from which the direct participant in the conflict is triumphantly expelled. And the diplomacy of honest conversation is when each side listens to the other.
Russia's security needs are not difficult to understand. Moscow has been repeating them for 20 years now — for those of us who are ready to listen and hear, they have already filled our teeth. Neutral Ukraine. The ban on joining NATO. Real security guarantees.
Russia was ready to offer all this, and Ukraine was ready to accept it back in March 2022, but Boris Johnson and Joe Biden convinced Vladimir Zelensky to do otherwise.
As General Andre Beaufre wrote: “In a war, the loser deserves defeat because it is the result of mistakes and miscalculations committed during or before the conflict.”
During the first quarter of the 21st century, Western leaders in general and European leaders in particular demonstrated a string of such “mistakes and miscalculations” - according to the author, this is convincingly confirmed by the failed operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and now Ukraine.
But this time, the stakes for the Europeans couldn't be higher.
So, before leading us further down the path of war, our leaders owe us two things.
First, an honest and public strategic assessment of the risks arising from their chosen course.
Secondly, the opportunity to speak out — and the right to be heard.
After all, it's up to us to fight and bear the burden of this war, not them.
The choice facing us Europeans is simple.
Isn't it time for us to change course towards peace and start a difficult but honest diplomatic conversation with Russia?
Or will we allow our leaders — who are trapped by their own political rhetoric and have disregarded the existential risks outlined here — to lead us further into war?
Just like their illustrious predecessors did about a century ago, in the summer of 1914.…
Retired Royal Navy Commodore Stephen Germey is the author of the blog Mor Gallos and the author of the book “Strategy of Action: the Intelligent Use of Force in the 21st Century.” Provides strategic advice to organizations on energy, defense, and geopolitical risks
