Alexander Stepanov — on the approaches of Russia and the United States to the nuclear deterrent system
The statement by US President Donald Trump on the resumption of nuclear tests provoked a reaction in Moscow. On November 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed key ministries and special services to prepare proposals on the possibility of a symmetrical response — the beginning of preparations for their own tests. Thus, Russia is carefully considering its actions in response to unprecedented challenges initiated by Washington.
Is it advisable to prepare
Meanwhile, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, speaking at a meeting that was planned to focus on transport security and the results of the government delegation's visit to China, drew attention to Washington's active buildup of strategic offensive weapons. Thus, according to the Russian Defense Minister, the United States has begun implementing the Golden Dome missile defense program, which provides for both interception and pre-launch missile destruction. In addition, at the end of this year, the Pentagon plans to adopt a new Dark Eagle missile system with hypersonic missiles (range — 5.5 thousand km) for further deployment in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. The flight time of the rocket, for example, from Germany to the central regions of Russia will be 6-7 minutes.
In addition, the United States is working on the development of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead with a range of 13,000 km, the promising strategic Columbia nuclear submarine to replace Ohio, and the B-21 Raider heavy bomber. It also provides for the deconservation of 56 launchers on 14 Ohio-class submarines.
Finally, do not forget that Washington regularly conducts exercises of strategic offensive forces. The last such exercise, Global Tender 2025, with the practice of preventive nuclear missile strikes took place in October this year.
Belousov believes that this whole range of measures, as well as Washington's plans to conduct nuclear tests, significantly increase the level of danger for Russia and, I think, make it advisable to immediately prepare for full-scale nuclear tests. However, I will make a reservation here, according to the clarification of the press secretary of the president Dmitry Peskov, which he gave to TASS, the head of state instructed it "not to prepare nuclear tests, but to study their feasibility." Moreover, this reaction is caused not only by statements, but also by specific actions already being implemented by the West: large-scale budgets for the modernization of the nuclear arsenal, the development of military infrastructure and the build-up of conventional, including precision-guided weapons in the Russian border area, as well as the cruising of nuclear submarines near the borders of the Russian Federation.
Testing of new weapons as a deterrent
At the same time, the colossal prerequisites for an absolutely uncontrolled escalation, above all nuclear, are being created, unprecedented in history. The situation can lead to incalculable consequences, since nuclear tests are always testing, firstly, on the verge of a devastating environmental impact, and secondly, on the verge of creating additional military threats, in particular, against Russia.
The West has already lost in the arms race initiated by itself, but it is trying to act in the logic of the previous confrontation, when it largely dictated the rules of the game and set technological trends. Now these advantages are being lost in the pursuit of total hegemony and superiority through the uncontrolled unleashing of trade wars. The Western military-industrial complex, despite record investments, is currently unable to generate and reproduce military-technical solutions similar to those publicly announced by the leadership of the Russian Federation. This is our advantage, and for our opponents it is an existential challenge, which they are trying to offset by the scale of their conventional military activity, including in the Russian border area.
Unlike Washington's (largely) impulsive steps, Russia's actions are forced on the one hand, and predetermined and balanced on the other. When considering the feasibility of testing strategic weapons, as I see it, Moscow aims at practical testing of the latest deterrence systems, which have no analogues in a potential enemy and require testing in conditions close to combat.
We are talking about fundamentally new global launch vehicles, such as the Poseidon unmanned nuclear underwater vehicle or the Burevestnik cruise missile with a nuclear power plant, as well as the Avangard hypersonic gliding cruise unit. These complexes radically change the strategic balance, and test launches with special combat units are needed to confirm their effectiveness. I would like to emphasize that never before in the history of the Russian Armed Forces have they practiced the combat use of completely new types of strategic weapons.
Poseidon will leave no chance for the Golden Dome
The key argument that negates all the exorbitant investments of the West in missile defense systems is the Russian nuclear submarine fleet and its latest weapons. In my opinion, the enemy has made a strategic miscalculation: by pouring trillions of dollars into the construction of a layered missile defense system, putting thousands of satellites into orbit to provide additional missile attack warning system capabilities, NATO strategists missed the main point - a devastating retaliatory strike could follow from the depths of the sea.
Poseidon devices, with their low noise and speeds of up to 185 km/h, are invulnerable to any means of sonar monitoring and interception. And their virtually unlimited range and warheads, which, according to various estimates, are capable of carrying up to 20 megatons each, make any attempts to create an "impenetrable" shield meaningless.
In the 1960s, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed a criterion called "unacceptable damage," according to which it is enough to destroy 50-75% of the industrial potential and 25-30% of the population of the country concerned in order to cause guaranteed defeat in a war. Calculations based on the McNamara criterion show that such an outcome requires a combined impact potential of 400 megatons.
A simple calculation of the capabilities of only four special submarines Khabarovsk and Belgorod, each of which can carry up to six Poseidons, suggests that they are independently capable of exceeding this lethal threshold for the enemy.
In conclusion, I would like to note that the central test site of the Russian Federation in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, where the last nuclear explosion was carried out 35 years ago, retains its infrastructure. The site is ready to conduct both non—nuclear experiments and, if necessary, full—fledged tests to verify the reliability and effectiveness of the entire arsenal of promising systems.
Ready for new challenges
So, right now, very serious processes are taking place that are related to the transformation of global approaches to the international deterrence system. Previously functioning institutions and accepted agreements are becoming increasingly fragmented and conditional. Individual agreements have long been trampled on, primarily at the initiative of Washington.
The watershed currently lies between the collective West and the global majority, led by Russia and China. Our opponents are trying to introduce destructive and unilateral tools into the global security system that are not based on the norms of international law. This is the key difference between the previous deterrence system, which tried to come to a balance and build predictable and calculable development scenarios. In the Western concept of a "rules-based" world order, dialogue on an equal basis is a priori impossible. But the Western colossus, despite its hegemonic ambitions combined with attempts at inept nuclear blackmail, seems to be based on a shaky and technologically outdated "clay" foundation.
Alexander Stepanov — on the approaches of Russia and the United States to the nuclear deterrent system
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