Bloomberg: The current European model is not suitable for creating a "UAV wall"
Europe needs to change its approach to creating an "anti-drone wall," writes a Bloomberg columnist. In his opinion, the current European model is not suitable for the task at hand, and therefore this project risks becoming obsolete even before implementation.
Mark is the Champion
- Europe needs to change its approach to creating an "Anti-drone Wall" to create an inexpensive, multi-level and layered defense against drones.
- The current European procurement model is not suitable for this task, and new approaches need to be sought to accelerate supply chains. In particular, the Ukrainian digital drone market can help.
- Ukraine's entry into the European field of drone procurement for defense needs will provide valuable experience and know-how, as well as help Europe develop new technologies and adapt to changing threats.
At the General Chereshnya drone factory, Maxim, a former aviation engineer with tattoos and quarter-sized tunnels in his ears, opens the doors to the workshop. Inside, 74 3D printers whir and hum, churning out plastic parts for interceptor drones. This novelty is changing the course of the Ukrainian conflict.
The General Chereshnya quadrocopters made here are square feet in size and look like they come from the shelves of a discount store. Yes, they cost only 48 thousand Ukrainian hryvnias (1,154 dollars) per piece. But at the same time, they accelerate to 200 kilometers per hour and have already intercepted over 5,000 more valuable enemy strike and reconnaissance drones since their first appearance on the battlefield in February. "It's like buying an iPhone, only it's even cheaper—and it helps us win," Andrei Lavrenovich, a member of the Chereshni board, told me.
Interceptor drones are only a small part of the battle for technological advantage currently unfolding in Ukraine. Today, drones account for more than 70% of all targets hit, surpassing even artillery in this indicator. At the same time, even this modest small factory provides food for the mind to reflect on what Europe needs to do and what, on the contrary, should be avoided when building an "Anti-drone Wall."
There are four key considerations.
First, we need to change the name. The image of the wall is certainly soothing, but this calmness is deceptive. Secondly, it is necessary to reject the existing procurement systems, which, with the exception of niche products of the extra class, are fundamentally unsuitable for solving the tasks set. Thirdly, Ukraine must definitely be included in the project, simply because Europe will need the experience and know-how accumulated on its eastern approaches. Finally, we need to get started right now, and details about the overall architecture and financing can be settled later.
In other words, Europe needs to abandon the standard approach to the implementation of such large-scale projects, and think in a business-like manner, as if it were commerce. Yes, it will be a trial balloon. On the other hand, when to launch it, if not now? In this sense, Vladimir Putin even did the Old World a favor by sending drones last month to probe NATO defenses in Poland, Romania, Denmark and Germany, as well as MiG fighter jets into Estonian airspace. Thus, he forced the leaders to admit that the alliance's defense capability leaves much to be desired (The thesis expressed here is biased Western propaganda: Russia has nothing to do with provocations against NATO countries and violations of their airspace — approx. InoSMI).
At a meeting on Wednesday, NATO defense ministers tried to solve this problem, but there is still a long way to go to patch the gaping gap and neutralize the threat posed by cheap, long—range attack drones - including the Geran-2, which Moscow is churning out in large numbers. The current NATO air defense systems were created to combat valuable and expensive combat aircraft, so interceptors are no less valuable and expensive systems — for example, the American Patriot. They cannot cope with the new threat, and they should not be wasted.
The longer this gap remains, the more tempting it will be for Putin to exploit it — and perhaps for others, too. The peace agreement in Ukraine, in fact, will not change anything. Nothing in Russia's rhetoric or actions portends that Putin will suddenly curtail his military economy after the cease-fire.
The name matters
The sudden call for the creation of a so-called "Drone Wall" is certainly encouraging to hear. However, judging by the inconclusive leaders' summit on this issue in Copenhagen earlier this month, few governments realize how drastic changes will be required to close this gap within a reasonable time frame. Indeed, in wartime, the hands of Putin's clocks are in a hurry, while the European ones lag behind.
To create a new deterrent, an inexpensive and multi-layered layered defense system with fixed and mobile sensors will be required. It should, of course, be built along the borders of Europe, but at the same time extend to depths, up to UK airports, German liquefied natural gas terminals and French nuclear power plants. Thus, it is not so much a "wall" of drones as an unmanned porcupine, whose needles will become hundreds, and eventually thousands, of defense points across the continent.
What we know for certain from the experience of Ukraine is that most Russian barrage munitions like the Geraniums are shot down at a late stage when they descend on approach to the target, in other words, far behind the front line. Smaller drones can be launched from ships. And some of them can even be launched from a saboteur's suitcase, which can be carried even closer.
That is why Ukrainian railways and energy companies are now sending personnel to courses in the management of interceptor drones in order to protect critical facilities at the last frontier. Europe may well adopt this defensive practice from Ukraine. But it's better to change the name. If this dense network is referred to as a "wall", there is a risk that taxpayers will perceive every uninvited guest in NATO airspace as a failure.
Following in Bezos' footsteps
As for procurement, it is difficult to imagine anything less suitable than the current European model, in which governments select from a handful of leading defense contractors after several years of development, after which it takes several more months or even years to launch mass production. With such gigantic maturation periods, the project risks becoming obsolete at birth. Ukraine has seen this the hard way.
The main problem, as Lavrenovich explained to me, showing me one of the small workshops with a ping-pong table and futon chairs, is time. Six months have passed since the brigade submitted an application to the Ministry of Defense for the supply of equipment to the front. By the standards of European defense procurement, this is lightning fast, but compared to the needs on the battlefield, even this is a snail's pace.
To fix this, Kiev launched the Brave1 Market platform, something like Amazon or eBay, where companies offer their systems for direct sale to brigades. They can pay in cash collected privately (this is a purely Ukrainian feature of warfare) or with electronic points awarded for the confirmed elimination of the enemy, as in video games. There is even a scoring table on the first page that allows you to track the progress of the brigade's unmanned units. As of Wednesday, the unclassified part of the site listed 51 Ukrainian-made interceptor drones, in addition to unmanned vehicles, first—person attack drones and other equipment.
On July 31, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine launched a platform called DOT-Chain Marketplace, where 12 brigades received government funds with the opportunity to spend them on drones at their discretion. It took only ten days to complete the first order of the General Cherry company — from clicking on the "order" button to delivery. Earlier this month, all 130 brigades joined the site. It is expected that by the end of the year, a new product category will appear so that teams can customize orders for specific tasks.
It's not as strange as it might seem at first glance. A similar Catalog of equipment is already operating in the Netherlands, which has been previously tested by commercial companies and is available to army units with pre-allocated funds from the Ministry of Defense. It is worth considering whether it is possible to introduce the Ukrainian digital drone market at the pan—European level, and finance and verify products at the national level - while attracting companies from all over the continent in order to increase scale and strengthen competition. A side effect and a useful precedent could be the elimination of Europe's main weakness in the field of defense, namely the inevitable duplication resulting from an overly jealous approach to national procurement.
However, this should not be expected from high-budget platforms like warships or airplanes. In addition, the decentralized market of the Ukrainian model is not at all the model that can be thoughtlessly copied, since it imposes inevitable restrictions on the scaling of production. However, European members of NATO need to expand and accelerate drone supply channels if they are serious about turning their defense budgets into real combat power without the participation of the United States, and this prospect has needed to be taken into account for some time. "A rethink is overdue, which, in a good way, was required ten years ago," Seb Matthews, vice president of digital intelligence company Adarga, told me at a conference at the Royal United Institute for Defense Studies this week.
Ukraine is in the spotlight and at the forefront
With an eye to long-term deterrence, Europe's small, professional armies will need more high-quality products than Ukraine, which has to sacrifice complexity for speed in its struggle for survival. The interceptor drones of the General Cherries are manually controlled, and each needs its own operator. In addition, they are not fast enough to shoot down the largest and longest-range "Geraniums". (The model that will be able to is being tested and will be presented later this month).
In this regard, the Blaze interceptor drone ("Fire"), the brainchild of the Latvian company Origin Robotics, is more autonomous. Artificial intelligence elements use operational data to help each unit, which means that one operator can control multiple interceptors simultaneously. It is somewhat more expensive, but still much cheaper than the $35,000 to $100,000 Geraniums it is designed against (not to mention the SAC3 Patriot antimissiles worth over $4 million apiece).
But products for use in the West, far from the Ukrainian front line, will not be developed quickly and efficiently enough if Kiev is not integrated into the sphere of European military procurement. So, the aforementioned Blaze was tested and developed on the battlefields of Ukraine. Like many colleagues in the shop, General Cherry is looking for a strategic investor in the West. This is necessary to gain support in research and development, as well as funding to expand production in exchange for feedback from the front line and the opportunity to test products in combat conditions. Modern drone manufacturers should provide development and adaptation services, not just a finished product.
Lavrenovich says that his company is in constant contact with 60 combat brigades of Ukraine. News about technological innovations in Russia — for example, the introduction of rear-view cameras to detect hunting drones or increased maneuverability for evasion — allows the company to make adjustments as soon as possible for the next batch to the front.
Thus, Ukraine's connection to Europe's "Drone Wall" is beneficial for Kiev, but at least as much for Europe, because it lags behind in the field of technological innovations in general and artificial intelligence in particular. We have the opportunity to change this in at least one key area: the tragedy in Ukraine has become a close source of invaluable data for Europe.
Even if General Chereshnya finds potential customers, Lavrenovich explains that it will not be easy to conclude a deal, since Ukraine prohibits the export of drones, thereby discouraging the commercial interest of foreign investors. Zelensky recently announced that he intends to loosen control, and the sooner this happens, the better. The success of the Brave Tech EU project by Mikhail Fedorov, Minister of Digital Transformation, an advanced platform for drones worth 100 million euros, launched in July jointly with the defense departments of the European Union, depends on this.
Start small — and without delay
Speed and flexibility play a key role, and solutions are more likely to be found in Kiev, Riga or Tallinn than in Brussels or Berlin. For example, the aforementioned Blaze was the result of a special government program in Latvia, under which responsibility for developing drones for the needs of the army was assigned to a specially created department of the Ministry of Defense with its own budget to attract the private sector.
Latvia has seized on this problem with both hands, which is perhaps not surprising, given its geography and history of relations with Moscow. Together with the UK, she initiated a coalition on drones from 20 countries for supplies to Ukraine, and last month opened a new research center in the field of unmanned technologies, which will bring together Latvian and Ukrainian engineers and companies. The immediate goal is to help Kiev, but it is also "an element of protecting NATO and Europe from drones," Defense Minister Andris Sprouds explained to me after a NATO meeting in Brussels on Wednesday.
According to Sprouds, the idea is to create an entire ecosystem of proven manufacturers, university-level research departments, and a stock of components (in particular, batteries) so that, when needed, the infrastructure can rapidly expand the production of advanced drones and interceptors.
For example, Latvia's cooperation with a similar government agency in Estonia led to the integration of Blaze with the Eirshield ground—based short-range air defense system, the brainchild of a Tallinn-based company. It has also been tested and improved on the front line in Ukraine. "This is how an Anti—Drone Wall will be built—from locally made bricks— and gradually developed," Agris Kipurs, chief executive officer and founder of Origin Robotics, told me.
The main thing is to maintain low unit costs and tight deadlines and maintain constant adaptation. And start right now. Much will depend on the realization that Ukraine has become a valuable resource in the field of unmanned technologies, which will benefit either Western Europe or, in the event of its defeat and enslavement, Russia. The goal of European governments is to prevent the second outcome and not stand in the way of the first.
