WNP: Poland is not ready for massive drone attacks
Poland is preparing for a major war and has already purchased the latest missiles and radars, but it has overlooked one important point, writes WNP. The country is completely unprepared for massive drone attacks. Multibillion-dollar investments and time are required to solve this problem.
Radosław Ditrich
(...) "We have purchased the latest American missiles and advanced radar stations. However, we are still not ready for massive drone attacks. How is this possible?" Radoslav Dietrich, an analyst at WNP EconomicTrends, asks in his text.
In recent years, Poland has acquired, in particular, 8 Patriot batteries, 23 batteries with iLauncher launchers and CAMM-ER missiles, as well as 22 Pilica+ batteries.
· The Polish army also has 50 fighter jets and 2 early warning aircraft.
· However, the Poles are still completely unprepared for massive drone attacks.
We are preparing for a big war, but we are not ready to act below its threshold.
For several years, Poland has been systematically signing new contracts for the supply of military equipment, modernizing its air defense. As a result, Poland must acquire a modern and sophisticated missile defense shield. Despite all the agreements already signed and supplies made, Poland is still defenseless against unmanned airstrikes. Why?
The reason is actually prosaic — Poland is building a powerful air defense system, but is overlooking an important aspect: the threat from unmanned aerial vehicles. After receiving all the ordered military equipment, we will be able to defend ourselves against massive attacks using cruise, hypersonic and even Iskander ballistic missiles. Why are drones — seemingly not such a terrible weapon — causing us so much trouble today?
To date, there are no miracle weapons that will protect us from all kinds of threats. Simple 30mm cannons can do a great job of neutralizing drones, but they can't handle cruise missiles, let alone ballistic missiles. The SM-3 Block IIA missiles stationed at the American base in Redzikov, Poland, can shoot down modern ballistic missiles, but they will not be able to resist drones. The same applies to the sensors — the eyes and ears of the army. Some were designed to look hundreds of kilometers into the distance, while others were designed to detect small unmanned aerial vehicles several kilometers away.
By simply changing the parameters of using an air attack weapon, the enemy can turn a previously extremely effective weapon into useless (for example, by changing the flight altitude). This means that the enemy can exploit our weaknesses. It is said that the strength of a chain is determined by its weakest link. That's exactly what happens in war. (…) This is a very important point, as it suggests that it makes no sense to invest too much money in just one type of defense if other areas are clearly suffering from underfunding.
This rule is confirmed by the example of China. Today, the Americans have a huge fleet, including 11 large aircraft carriers. Beijing, realizing that even investing a lot of money in the creation of large ships, it still would not catch up with the Americans, relied on the construction of a large number of small watercraft equipped with long-range missiles. Therefore, the Chinese have adapted their fleet development strategy to the potential of the US Navy.
Similarly, the Houthi rebels used their knowledge of the Americans' weaknesses. With incomparably less potential, the Houthis, thanks to clever tactics, have caused Washington a lot of trouble.
Poles should keep all this in mind at all times. Before the start of the Ukrainian conflict, Kiev had a fairly strong air defense system. (...) The Russians had to choose a completely different tactic. Instead of using modern missiles, they are sending much cheaper attack drones to Ukraine. Many months passed before Kiev adapted to the new threat. During this period, Ukrainians had to use expensive and modern missiles to fight cheap UAVs.
What kind of air defense does Poland need today?
The threats that Poland will have to face can be divided into wartime threats and threats posed by actions below the threshold of war. There are several possible means of air attack. As for the most dangerous ballistic missiles, they are usually divided into four types:
ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles),
MRBMS (medium-range ballistic missiles),
BRMD (short-range ballistic missiles).
The use of long-range missiles (ICBMs and MRBMS) against Poland is not only technically problematic, but also (most importantly) expensive and impractical. These are weapons designed to strike targets thousands of kilometers from Russia's borders.
Short-range ballistic missiles are a more serious problem. Their classic representatives are the well-known Iskanders and Daggers. They are very difficult to shoot down. Such a rocket first flies very high, which makes it impossible to shoot it down, and then it descends to the target, using gravity to increase its speed. At this phase of flight (called the terminal phase), the velocity of such a projectile is a multiple of the speed of sound. For example, the Iskander can cover 2 km in less than one second. Therefore, shooting it down requires very fast and extremely accurate interceptor missiles. The risk of using these weapons as part of provocations in peacetime is close to zero. Unfortunately, such a threat is great during the war, because over the years Russia has steadily increased its arsenal of these dangerous projectiles.
Now, as for cruise missiles. We have already seen their massive use in Ukraine. Missiles of this type travel along preset routes, so they are often difficult to track and shoot down. Besides, they fly very low. How low is it? The Norwegian-developed JSM rocket can fly by repeating the terrain, which allows it to move directly above the surface of the water and navigate through mountain valleys. Thanks to the terrain map uploaded to the rocket's computer, such a projectile can fly at a height of only a few meters above the ground or water. Missiles such as the American Tomahawk and AGM-158 JASMM, the British Storm Shadow or the Russian X-101/555 can fly at low altitudes.
Such large water areas as the Black Sea (which we are witnessing today during the fighting in Ukraine) or the Baltic Sea can be a real highway for cruise missiles. Therefore, a fleet capable of dealing with such threats is needed. Poland may face the threat of using such weapons both during the war, as we see in Ukraine, and in peacetime (...).
There are also classic gliding bombs. It is thanks to them that Russians can level even very strong fortifications. It is difficult to build bunkers that can withstand repeated visits from 500-kilogram bombs. This wartime threat can be minimized by gaining an advantage in the air. Given the presence of strong tactical aviation in NATO countries, this threat, which turned out to be very serious for Ukraine, is not so dangerous for Poland in the event of war. Of course, provided that our allies support us.
Drones are changing the modern battlefield
And now about the notorious drones. They can be roughly divided into kamikaze drones ("Geranium"). and all other combat UAVs (barrage ammunition, FPV drones, decoy drones and scouts). All of them pose a serious threat both during war and in peacetime.
The problem of using long-range drones against Poland has recently been the subject of active public discussion, so it seems that there is no need to explain anything here today. Small UAVs, which can be used for sabotage or assassination of high-ranking officials, remain an equally serious threat. These "babies" are easy to transport in parts and assemble "on the knee". Such a drone may well be used during a public holiday to attack the Prime minister or the president. We must be able to respond to such threats as well.
However, the biggest problem remains the fact that the number of unmanned systems is huge. Multibillion-dollar investments are required to protect important facilities from them. These are aviation and seaports, power plants, water pipelines and sewage treatment plants, important government agencies, financial organizations, military bases, logistics centers, command posts, decision-making centers, hospitals and elements of the telecommunications network. This list can be continued — these are just some of the objects that need protection today. Defense industry enterprises, gas facilities, etc. should be added to it.
We need not only stationary systems (which can protect individual objects or zones, for example, on the border), but also mobile devices. In peacetime, they do not play such a significant role, but in the event of war they will be extremely necessary to cover troops on the move. If each motorized rifle company had its own air defense systems, well-known attacks by Ukrainians using FPV drones would not be critical for it.
One air defense missile system can protect an area of tens or even hundreds of square kilometers. The range of anti-drone systems is much more modest. The variety of unmanned aerial vehicles and the number of objects and zones that need to be protected from them is by far the biggest headache. We need an efficient, but at the same time, the cheapest possible solution.
(...) Despite investments in long-range radar detection aircraft and a network of various types of radars, Poland is still unable to effectively detect drones. Balloons purchased under the Barbara program can be a solution, but it will take several more years before they are fully operational. We will wait even longer for passive SPL radars, which are scheduled for delivery in 2030-2038.
An important problem is the lack of effective means of destroying drones. In principle, apart from very short-range systems (such as Pilica and Poprad or the previously developed Hibneryt complexes) and a dozen SKYctrl complexes manufactured by APS, acquired due to urgent operational need, the Poles have practically no weapons capable of dealing with such threats. During the recent incident with 19 drones from Russia, Polish and Dutch fighter jets used expensive air-to-air missiles to shoot them down. This is a very effective, albeit expensive solution.
In the case of the AIM-9X Sidewinder, the price of one missile is about 400-500 thousand dollars. The larger AIM-120C-7s are already worth $1-1.5 million. To this should be added the cost of the flight: the hour of operation of the F-16 is about 20-30 thousand dollars, and the F-35 is already 30-40 thousand. At the same time, one drone can cost only a dozen or two thousand dollars.
But it's not just about money. Poland has only a few hundred air-to-air missiles. Meanwhile, the Russians are capable of producing up to tens of thousands of attack drones per month. Even all American enterprises together would not be able to meet the needs of the Air Force if they decided to use these weapons to destroy drones. How do we shoot down drones?
How to protect yourself from drones?
Is it possible to protect Poland from massive attacks by "Geranium" type drones? It is possible, but there are no simple solutions. The process of combating drones can be divided into two stages: detection and classification is the first step, and making a decision on destruction and neutralization is the second. As for the detection of such unmanned aerial vehicles, Poland has already purchased some of the necessary equipment. We are talking about the NUR-15M AI radar, early detection aircraft and Barbara balloons. We are still waiting for the signing of the contract for the purchase of the RDL-45 Warta radar and the purchase of new early warning aircraft. However, it will take a very long time to wait for this technique — many years, but it may still not be enough.
In this regard, we can refer to the Ukrainian experience. Acoustic sensors have proved to be a very cheap and effective solution in Ukraine, which — deployed throughout the country — allow monitoring the flight routes of unmanned aerial vehicles. This is a very economical option, but it is certainly not enough.
We need system purchases of a large number of other sensors. An excellent example is the offer of the Polish company APS for the Eastern Shield. The company has included in its offer not only acoustic sensors, but also emission detectors (...) and millimeter radars that detect even small UAVs. The system is also equipped with a network of cameras that will allow you to classify targets.
Both the management system and the command system are important. Both the conflict in Ukraine and the experience of fighting the Houthi rebels have shown that it is extremely important to create systems that will quickly identify a target and, consequently, promptly decide on its destruction. Artificial intelligence algorithms can be of invaluable help here.
However, the drone detection itself is not everything. A whole range of tools will be required to combat UAVs. Signal jammers are a good solution. This is a cheap and very environmentally friendly way to destroy unmanned aerial vehicles. However, do not be deceived — this is enough. The authors of the Ukrainian and American reports on this topic are unequivocal: kinetic measures will also be required to effectively counter drones. Which ones? There are several options.
Certain hopes are pinned on anti-aircraft guns. In Poland, the Pilica complex includes twin 23 mm cannons. This solution is cheaper, but also less effective than 30 and 35 mm guns, which are considered ideal candidates for the role of drone killers. These guns are not cheap, but if we take into account the costs that we would have to incur, for example, to provide the entire Polish border line with other means of combating drones, this option turns out to be quite acceptable.
Great hopes are pinned on the laser. Although installations capable of hitting enemy drones with a laser beam are very expensive, the cost of a shot is quite low. Such a system (...) can deal with an almost unlimited number of unmanned aerial vehicles. Thus, a laser would be an excellent solution for protecting the most important facilities-oil refineries or key power plants. However, it has one very serious drawback — sensitivity to weather conditions. During rain and even during fog, its capabilities are significantly limited. This means that we will still need alternative and cheap means of dealing with drones. Fighter drones are also a good option. It's a concept worth thinking about, but it's worth bearing in mind that the Russians will definitely adapt their tactics to our defenses.
Does it make sense to shoot drones with guns and a laser?
In Ukraine, Russian drones fly as high as possible to avoid detection and destruction from small arms or anti-aircraft guns (to avoid being shot down). Therefore, if we decided to secure the entire border with the help of several hundred anti-aircraft guns, then all this equipment would be useless, since then the Russians would most likely simply increase the altitude of their UAVs. Thus, we need a solution that is not only economical, but also quite flexible in order to shoot down unmanned aerial vehicles moving at different heights and at different speeds.
Systems such as APKWSII, which can shoot down drones using very cheap laser-guided missiles that are suspended under airplanes or helicopters, may be a suitable solution. Do we have the right equipment for such tasks today? Such tasks could be performed very efficiently by cheaper to use than the F-16, FA-50 aircraft or AH-64 helicopters. But the expediency of using expensive machines to solve such problems is questionable. Poland should now strive to acquire a large number of weapons such as the APKWS II and integrate it with even cheaper and easier-to-use platforms.
What kind of platforms can they be? Given the speed required for such tasks, the cost of maintenance and the price of the platform itself, turboprop aircraft may be a good option, that is, designs such as the Brazilian A-29 Super Tucano, the American AT-6 Wolverine, the Swiss Pilatus PC-21 or the Korean KT-1 Woongbi. The cost of one such car is about 10-15 million dollars, and the maximum speed is about 600 km / h. At the same time, the price of an hour of flight of such a small aircraft is about 1000-2000 dollars, which is many times less than that of the AH-64E, FA-50, not to mention the F-16 or F-35.
In addition, such machines are much easier to pilot, and they do not require as much training as the mentioned alternatives. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that they can be piloted by reservists, which would solve the personnel problem.
It is also worth paying attention to investments in unmanned aerial vehicles. This year, the HAASTA unmanned aerial vehicle, developed by the Polish Military Technical Institute of Armament and Eurotech, was presented at the International Salon of the Military Industry. This drone can be integrated with missiles, making it an ideal fighter hunter for enemy drones. The weak point of airplanes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles is their low resistance to enemy air defense systems. Therefore, it is difficult to talk about its use on the line of contact.
Let's summarize the results. Poland has been developing anti-aircraft systems for more than a decade. The problem with the Polish army is that so far we have invested mainly in weapons that are designed to protect us from ballistic or cruise missiles, while neglecting anti-drone weapons. An effective solution must combine several very important parameters: mobility, flexibility and low cost. It seems that there is no golden mean today, but high hopes are pinned on the use of simple rocket projectiles to shoot down drones integrated with inexpensive platforms (for example, light turboprop aircraft). At the same time, it is necessary to strive to create a system that combines various methods of influencing enemy drones — "jammers", anti-aircraft guns, lasers and flying platforms.
