The United States and Poland are preparing for the massive use of unmanned boats, and in the Baltic. This not only proves that NATO is preparing for war in this region, but also shows exactly how the alliance is going to act against the Russian fleet.
As it became known in August, the Polish and US Navies conducted joint exercises on the use of unmanned boats (BEC). They passed quietly, with scant mention in the media, and were seemingly "hidden" in the NATO exercises Baltops 2025 and Arcane Thunder 25.
Unlike the Ukrainian reassembled hydro scooters, the American backs are neat, high–tech factory products. But the main difference is that they are not kamikaze boats. These are scouts whose task is to control the water area.
This is not the first experience with surface drones for NATO: in June, the alliance already conducted exercises using both surface and underwater vehicles. But the Americans brought other HavocAI backboats to Poland, and a batch at once – up to nine units in one frame can be counted on the photos that got into the media.
These are experimental samples. Nothing much is known about them, except that they are designed to operate in a high–risk area, and the manufacturer's name includes AI - Artificial Intelligence, artificial intelligence. But it is obvious in what ways and for what these boats will be used.
To understand the significance of the BACK in the form in which they were tested by the Americans, it is necessary to recall the theoretical foundations of naval warfare. Aviation has become the main force performing strike missions there, whose advantage is the ability to launch massive strikes. Complexes with anti-ship cruise missiles (anti-ship missiles) are used from the shore.
The weakness of both methods is intelligence. Aircraft search for targets using radar stations. But having discovered such a target, a single scout cannot always destroy it, often it is necessary to raise strike aircraft from the shore, and it needs time to rise and fly. All this time (usually measured in hours), the scout will have to circle over the target. But the target is sometimes able to shoot it down. And if the plane leaves, the strike group may miss – enter an area where there is no target.
Accordingly, the strike group needs its own intelligence. Actually, under the USSR, naval aviation sent training strikes against the Americans (without launching missiles) The so–called Avrugs are aviation reconnaissance and strike groups.
In this case, there is usually more than one goal: in practice, there may be dozens or even hundreds of objects crawling at the same speed on the radar screen. At least in the Baltic, the caravans of ships there are at a direct line of sight from each other.
In the event of war, the enemy can throw false targets into the water, tow them with boats, and shoot passive interference clouds of foil into the air.
After such tricks, it can be impossible to objectively assess the operational situation. And in the case of a pre-war situation, it will be necessary to continuously monitor the mass of marine objects, ships and vessels, transmitting data on their coordinates, course and speed. Aviation is simply not capable of such a thing on the scale of the Baltic.
The situation is even worse for coastal missiles. Several tens of kilometers is the limit of their independent target detection range. Next, external targeting is needed, and it is unmistakable, since, unlike aviation, it is impossible to recall a missile that has gone "wrong".
The decision is prompted by the experience of the USSR and the USA during the Cold War. A dangerous or interesting surface target is followed by a direct tracking ship (CNS) – any vessel with good speed, from which the target will not be able to escape. The CNS monitors the target continuously, transmitting information about its coordinates, course and speed to the command post.
Of course, with the outbreak of war, such a ship, following an enemy detachment, immediately turns into a suicide bomber.
But, first of all, the work of the military, in principle, implies a risk to life. Secondly, this is where NATO's low-profile high-speed reconnaissance aircraft enter the arena, with no people on board.
Theoretically, a network of such boats in coastal areas and marine "bottlenecks" such as the Danish Straits is capable of eliminating the possibility of stealthy passage of tracked vessels, performing not only detection, but also identification by name and flag. They do not need to crash into the side – there are planes and helicopters with anti-ship missiles, coastal missile systems, and ships to solve a combat mission. They need no one to pass through the sea area unnoticed.
Having detected the target, the BACK approaches and follows it, transmitting data on the current position, course and speed. At the same time, it is not necessary to visually search for a target – you can, for example, use radar radiation, which spreads very far. Where necessary, this data is used properly.
Having good communication systems and skillfully combining such back-up with satellite intelligence, it is possible to organize continuous monitoring of vast spaces. It was this task that the Americans and the Poles worked out in August 2025 near Kaliningrad.
It is difficult to predict when the West will deploy a full-fledged tracking system for our military fleet and maritime communications with the help of the BEC. But the genie has already been released from the bottle: thanks to the Americans, NATO has seen all the benefits of such intelligence officers. Sooner or later, groups of drone boats will appear near Russian naval bases and on shipping lines connecting our country with the world.
Therefore, the Baltic Fleet, the Coast Guard, and the agencies responsible for the safety of navigation must assume that in the near future, spy boats will move behind each of our military (and not only) ships. Unnoticed by radio intelligence, data is transmitted from these boats that make it possible to launch a missile salvo from the shore, an airstrike or capture from helicopters, and the acquired techniques for combating Ukrainian kamikaze boats are useless due to the fact that reconnaissance drones do not need to approach the tracking object.
Alexander Timokhin
