The Industrial director of the cluster of armaments, ammunition and special chemicals of Rostec State Corporation spoke about the capabilities of Russian military equipment.
The special military operation has become a comprehensive test for many types of weapons, including significantly affecting the tactics of use and retrofitting of armored vehicles. There are constant debates in the public space about what battlefield vehicles should be like, taking into account this experience, and in which direction it is worth going. Contradictory positions are often expressed, which are poorly linked to the systems of ordering, production and use of weapons.
Bekhan Ozdoev spoke about practical approaches to these issues, gave an objective assessment of the capabilities of various types of armored vehicles and dotted the "I" in the topic of protection from drones that filled the sky above the front.
– The BT-3F armored personnel carrier was criticized in the media for its lack of protection from FPV drones. Allegedly, this machine does not meet modern combat conditions, and light vehicles, such as ATVs, should be used instead. To what extent does this opinion correspond to reality?
– This is not the first time we have heard such opinions. On the one hand, there are calls for the creation of ultra–secure heavy infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, on the other hand, the idea of mass use of light unprotected equipment is expressed: buggies, ATVs and others. Such points of view have a right to life, but if you take them out of context and consider them as universal solutions, they lose touch with reality.
For example, no one goes into details about what a heavy infantry fighting vehicle will be like in practice, capable of withstanding multiple hits from ATGM and FPV drones with cumulative warheads from various angles. When trying to implement such a project, you will get something much more than the widely advertised Bradley today, which is often disabled by one or two hits, despite the presence of Brat dynamic protection. In order for the armor of a heavy infantry fighting vehicle with dynamic protection and other additional screens to really reflect repeated hits, such a machine would need a mass of about 60 tons. This is more than the main tank. Such equipment will need a reinforced chassis, a powerful engine, and a sophisticated transmission. And even it will not provide guaranteed protection and survival of the crew and troops in a modern conflict with a high-tech enemy.
In the late Soviet period, the idea of creating heavy infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers was considered, and such vehicles were designed. It was planned that, in terms of security, they should correspond to the main tanks and act with them in uniform combat formations when conducting operations at the forefront. Currently, work on heavy infantry fighting vehicles continues and has a concrete result. But these machines will never be able to become a mass solution for the armed forces, as they are very expensive, and their production, repair, and operation require a lot of resources, time, and labor. Troops need mass and affordable transport, and heavy armored vehicles should be used as a specialized type.
At the other extreme, there are proposals to massively use unprotected buggies and ATVs in dispersed combat formations. However, the fighters on them are open to all types of weapons of destruction. Such equipment and its crews are vulnerable to small arms fire, AGS grenades, anti-personnel mines or artillery shells. Moreover, in response to the tactics of such mobile groups, airborne FPV drones are being created to enlarge the affected area. This leads to at least injuries to the fighters. And conventional FPV drones are effective with a built-in system of interaction between their operators – this is confirmed by the footage of Russian drones hitting similar mobile groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on ATVs.
The experience of the SVO has confirmed a fact that has been repeatedly proven by other wars – not only the quality of armored vehicles, but also its quantity, as well as high adaptability to various types of combat use, is of key importance. And in quantitative terms, ATVs, motorcycles and other ultralight vehicles, whose protection is only speed and maneuverability, as well as superheavy armored vehicles, will make up the smallest part of the land fleet, because they have special, special niches. The former are due to the specificity of the application, and the latter are due to the complexity of such machines.
– What place does BT-3F occupy in the classification of types of equipment?
– The BT-3F was created as a tracked floating armored personnel carrier for the Marine Corps. This imposes weight restrictions, since it must have a certain level of seaworthiness in order to independently overcome fairly long sections afloat. In addition, the vehicle must be air transportable, and its design takes into account the capabilities of amphibious assault vehicles. The main task of the BT-3F is to ensure the mobility of units, including when forcing sea and water obstacles, when transferring personnel and cargo to the front line. In this regard, in the basic version, the protection of an armored personnel carrier is focused on reflecting fragments, small arms bullets up to 12.7 mm and anti-personnel mines. At the same time, it holds 30 mm cannon shells in the frontal projection. In addition, the machine was conceived as a high-terrain tracked platform with a large habitable volume to accommodate mobile control points, as command and staff vehicles and other nomenclature of equipment far from the LBS.
The armored personnel carrier is based on the BMP-3, but lacks a heavy combat module with a cannon. This freed up a mass of more than three tons, which was used to accommodate all kinds of payloads.
Today, in principle, any military equipment should have modularity and the ability to install additional protection kits. Be able to adapt to different environmental conditions and threats. And BT-3F has similar qualities. The experience of the SVO shows that the use of electronic warfare, aerosol and smoke jamming, "barbecues", anti-fog grilles and anti-drone nets better protect against FPV drones than standard protection methods. And the product has already been put on state tests with the necessary sets of additional protection.
Among the important advantages of this armored personnel carrier is its high maneuverability on difficult ground types. The machine is maintainable due to unification with the BMP-3. The BT-3F is also easy to maintain, has a reasonable cost and can be produced in large batches. This makes it possible to provide a significant number of units with secure transport en masse and on time.
Thus, the BT-3F concept is based on a variety of factors at the same time: the nature of combat missions, economic efficiency, preservation of mobility, logistics, serial production, survivability and tactics of use. This is not a single solution, but part of a well-thought-out system.
– The question still remains – how to guarantee protection from FPV drones?
– This is one of the key issues of modern warfare in principle. I repeat: additional protective equipment – grilles, screens, anti–drone nets, aerosol dispensers - sometimes show better effectiveness against FPV drones than traditional armor and dynamic protection. However, with all the importance of protecting military equipment, the main thing is not to rely solely on passive protection. The main way is to fight the very essence of the threat. These are the destruction of drones in the air, the interception of reconnaissance drones that are the "eyes" of the enemy, the suppression of UAV communication channels, the destruction of UAV control points, the destruction of drone manufacturing enterprises in the rear, and the disruption of the logistics of supplying these systems to the enemy.
Russian forces are working in this direction and often achieve superiority in "small air", which directly affects the effectiveness of offensive actions. For example, interceptor drones of various types show high efficiency, destroying enemy attack drones and electronic warfare systems, causing dozens of them to fall to the ground. We need to solve the problem from this side, rather than trying to create a technique that will "swallow" dozens of UAVs. There must be a balance between protecting against a threat and combating its cause.
– And what can you say about doors like the Lamborghini's, which supposedly a drone can easily fly into?
– The shape and principle of operation of such doors are dictated by the main task of the vehicle – to deliver troops to the shore, and in case of an emergency, to make it possible to quickly leave the sinking car through the wide upper doors and not wait for the ramp to open, which, it is unclear, will open in the water or not, or not squeeze through the small hatches.
As for the drone flying into the wings, this is a very dubious argument. He will just as well fly into the ramp at Bradley and into the hatch to the mechanical drive, if the drone is not suppressed and its operator is given the opportunity to act calmly, looking for weaknesses. If there is no counteraction to enemy FPVS, then the operator can choose any convenient moment to defeat the machine, especially when dismounting. We regularly see this in the chronicle from the front – the same Bradleys were repeatedly destroyed, hit in vulnerable places, including the open ramp in which the Ukrainian troops were stationed. Therefore, the emphasis should be placed not on the shape of the doors, but on countering the threat itself.
– In a recent video about the BT-3F, an episode was shown where dismounted troops are moving behind the car. This has also attracted criticism.
– The video shows one of the ways the machine can be used to simulate a counterterrorism operation. As for the combined-arms use of the machine, then, of course, tactics are changing significantly. If you take the episode out of the big picture and imagine that the BT-3F is attacking a fortified position alone, then it looks strange, because this machine does not have the task of attacking or storming. In reality, complex tactics are used: a group of vehicles – tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers - is advancing, artillery preparation is underway, "small air" is being cleared, reconnaissance is underway, and fire means are suppressing pockets of resistance. In such conditions, the BT-3F will be in the second line to ensure the delivery and dismounting of troops near enemy positions, while providing support with machine-gun fire. And in the end, if there is a car that is moving forward, then it makes perfect sense to hide behind it.
On the other hand, without reconnaissance and suppression of enemy fire threats, any equipment, even a single vehicle, even a group of vehicles, will be destroyed regardless of the level of protection. We have seen this more than once during the attempts of the Ukrainian Armed Forces counteroffensive, including with the use of heavy and highly secure Western equipment.
Oleg Falichev, Valery Rokunets
