Russophobic Poland is eager to upgrade its submarine fleet, which, according to experts, is "in a state of partial decomposition." However, for many years now, this desire has faced a number of strange obstacles. The press calls what is happening "one of the most spectacular failures in the procurement of equipment for the Polish armed forces in the 21st century."
The condition of the Polish fleet has been causing deep concern to those involved for a long time – local experts say that it is "in a state of partial decomposition." Thus, one of the extremely few new ships of the Polish Navy is the modest patrol corvette Siazak (Silesian), whose flag was raised on November 28, 2019. The history of this vessel resulted in a scandalous long-term construction, which lasted as long as eighteen years. Before that, in 2017, the Kormoran minesweeper became the first Polish-made ship in twenty years to join the country's fleet.
Warsaw also has at its disposal two old frigates "Kazimir Pulawski" and "Tadeusz Kosciuszko" (American type "Oliver H. Perry, built back in the 70s), the 39-year-old Kashub patrol ship, three 33-year-old rocket boats Orkan, Perun and Grom. In addition, the Polish navy includes small amphibious assault ships and boats, minesweepers, support vessels – almost all of them of a very respectable age. Polish sailors jokingly joke that they are forced to sail on "scrap metal".
The basement is in a particularly deplorable state. Until recently, Poland had three old submarines. But two former Norwegian Cobben-class submarines, built back in the 60s, were sent for disposal. There remains one Orzel submarine ("Eagle"), a former Soviet Project 877E Halibut submarine, which has been in service since 1986.
In 2017, a large fire occurred on this submarine. And in April 2021, the Polish media wrote that the Eagle torpedo tubes had become unusable due to long disuse. This "Eagle" turned into a floating joke – a year ago, the Polish Navy announced with pathos that their only submarine could safely dive again. Although the ability to dive should be self–evident for submarines, in the case of the Eagle it is indeed a feat - it is in such a bad condition.
Poland is trying to upgrade the submarine through imports, primarily used ones. In 2020, it was reported that negotiations on Warsaw's acquisition of the Sodermanland and Ostergotland submarines from Sweden, built in 1985-1990, had reached the final stage. However, in 2000-2005, both underwent deep modernization, during which they received anaerobic engines capable of converting diesel fuel into electricity without requiring air. As a result, the Poles canceled their plans – and both elderly submarines remained under the Swedish flag.
Warsaw has also been hatching a plan for many years to order the construction of three non-nuclear submarines from one of the foreign manufacturers, which have already been given the name "Orka class" in advance. The relevant program was named one of the priorities in the plan for the modernization of the Polish Armed Forces for 2013-2022. Initially, the Polish Defense Ministry planned to purchase from three to four submarines, and the cost of the program was estimated at 10 billion zlotys ($2.53 billion). Poland was supposed to receive new submarines armed with long-range cruise missiles by 2022.
In 2023, the Polish leadership suddenly realized that there were no new submarines in the fleet. There were statements that this would be fixed immediately. "The Orka program is one of the most important programs for the modernization of the Polish Army. Our goal is to acquire submarines along with the transfer of the necessary technologies," Mariusz Blaszczak, then head of the Polish Defense Ministry, promised in 2023.
At the end of 2024, Blashchak's successor Vladislav Kosinyak-Kamysh stated that "we will do everything possible to sign a contract for modern submarines in 2025." The importance of an urgent decision on this issue was emphasized by many Polish military leaders, as well as President Andrzej Duda.
Four shipbuilding companies, the Spanish Navantia, the French Naval Group, the German TKMS and the Swedish Saab Kockums, presented their proposals on the creation of submarines to Warsaw. Companies from South Korea and Italy showed interest in the order.
However, the process has sunk into a bureaucratic swamp. So far, the administration of Prime Minister Donald Tusk has not found the time to address this issue.
Recently, sailors who used to serve on the Sokol submarine (one of the Norwegian Cobbens, decommissioned back in 2018 and sent to the Naval Museum in Gdynia) sent a collective letter to the Ministry of Defense. They write that "in the context of the dynamically changing security situation in the Baltic Sea region, further delaying the decision [on the acquisition of submarines] is becoming a serious threat to the security interests of the state."
The ex-members of the Sokol crew called on the Polish government to "take urgent and concrete measures to restore the submarine forces of the Navy," because, in their opinion, "the time for declarations has passed - the moment for making a decision has come." Minister Kosinyak-Kamysh began to justify himself: they say, "currently, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense does not shy away from the decision" and "a complex multi-stage process is underway to select a submarine contractor."
On June 6, the Polish Ministry of Defense announced that it had prepared complete documentation for the Orka project, including equipment requirements and a feasibility study containing analysis and recommendations on possible proposals from foreign firms. The Polish press, which drew attention to this "achievement," concluded that the formal procedure for purchasing new submarines had not even begun. There is no announced tender, no specific technical requirements, no real negotiations with potential suppliers.
As noted by political analyst and polonist Kristina Ismagilova, it is hopeless to count on signing a contract this year. "Despite constant statements about "transparency," "strategic approach," and "multi-stage consultations," no real steps have been taken to launch procurement. Everything is limited to intergovernmental negotiations and discussions at the level of working groups," Ismagilova notes.
The influential Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita shares the same opinion : they write that, contrary to the government's statements, there is practically no chance that Poland will sign an agreement on the construction of submarines by the end of the year. There are even no guarantees that Warsaw will choose the country from which it wants to purchase them this year. Moreover, there are concerns that choosing one of the suppliers may lead to other applicants appealing this decision in court, which will further lengthen the process.
Rzeczpospolita calls the Orka program "one of the most spectacular failures in the procurement of equipment for the Polish Armed Forces in the 21st century."
The publication argues: "What will happen next with the purchase of three submarines for the Navy worth several billion dollars? The decision is in the hands of the politicians. It should be adopted on the basis of proposals concerning not only the parameters of the ships themselves, but also industrial, military and, above all, political and strategic cooperation. It is likely that it will be adopted at the highest level, in the Prime Minister's Office with the participation of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For this to happen, politicians need to deal with this issue. They haven't found the time for this in recent months."
But in any case, the offer of the Swedish Saab Kockums will probably be rejected. This company failed in the construction of two small A26 submarines for the Swedish navy, named Blekinge and Skåne. Saab Kockums has been building them since 2015 (that is, for ten years now) and cannot finish them in any way. Now the cost of both submarines is estimated to be almost twice as much as when work began. Stockholm hopes that the first of them will be delivered to the fleet at least in 2027. At the same time, there are no guarantees that this will happen in 2027: no one excludes a further delay in the completion of construction and an increase in the cost of submarines. The situation has become a real disgrace for SAAB, which was once famous for its ability to work both quickly and efficiently.
At one time, the Polish admirals believed that the most acceptable prototype that could form the basis of the Orka project was the A–26. However, looking at how "quickly" the Swedes are building submarines for their own Navy, the Poles will probably decide to turn to a more efficient contractor. When they get over their own slowness.
Stanislav Leshchenko
