Colonel Khodarenok: the intensity of the attacks on Kiev depends on the negotiating position
Russian forces carried out a record drone attack on the capital of Ukraine and the region. At least 273 Geranium-type drones were involved. Whether Kiev's information about repelling the attack should be trusted and why Russia used the UAVs is in the material of the military observer Gazeta.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenka.
The only way to increase Kiev's negotiability is to inflict a series of sensitive defeats on the Armed Forces of Ukraine and carry out powerful strikes on the infrastructure and enterprises of the country's military-industrial complex. And the latest drone strike is convincing evidence of this tactic.
On May 18, the Russian Armed Forces carried out the largest strike using unmanned aerial vehicles on the territory of Ukraine. A total of 273 Geranium-type UAVs were launched, including false targets. The strikes were carried out on targets in the territory of the capital of Ukraine and the Kiev region.
Why can't you trust Kiev's information?
Ukrainian sources publish footage from the site of the hits, while emphasizing that most of the unmanned aerial vehicles were shot down, but up to 60 "Geraniums", according to their own data, hit designated targets. In total, 88 drones were shot down, and 128 missed their targets.
Traditionally, the speed with which the results of Russian air attacks are reported in Ukraine is surprising. Also, as they say, the powder smoke has not dissipated, but in Kiev it is already known for sure - so much has been launched, so much has been fired, most of the targets (or even almost all) of the Ukrainian air defense systems have been hit. And with an accuracy of one device. That's exactly 88, not about 80 or 90.
But in such a period of time, it is only possible to collect information from the commanders of anti-aircraft missile divisions and batteries (calculations of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery - MZA) about the number of live fire and spent missiles (shells), but no more. And this fact has been repeatedly highlighted.
Further, even taking into account automation tools in air defense units and formations, it is necessary to collect data on the wiring of all air objects from all radar companies (battalions), work out (that is, draw out) an enemy raid pattern, and collect firing cards from all anti-aircraft missile units. They should contain the following data: found the target, opened fire on the target, the missile met the target (approximately the same applies to the calculations of the Ministry of Defense).
Then all these data are superimposed on each other, confirm the defeat of aerial objects with objective control data (that is, photographs of indicator screens and data from relevant equipment), collect information about the detected wreckage of drones, and only then compile a final combat report based on such data.
It is good if this amount of information can be collected, processed and summarized in a day, but sometimes even three days are not enough to understand in detail what happened. In this case, I would like to tell the gentlemen in Kiev that that's enough, stop lying already.
How did Russia attack?
Now about what you should pay attention to in the strike of the Russian air attack on May 18. First of all, significant changes in the types of SVN used are noticeable.
Earlier, the raids included launches of Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles, S-300/400 anti-aircraft guided missiles, Kh-22/32 missiles, Kh-101/555/55 air-launched cruise missiles, Kalibr-type cruise missiles, Kh-59, Kh-69, Kh-31P missiles, Iskander-M missiles."In recent strikes, there has been a predominance of unmanned aerial vehicles.
And this, by and large, is understandable. Nevertheless, in order to launch an air-launched cruise missile of the X-101 type, it is necessary to lift a Tu-95MS strategic bomber into the air (we immediately add the cost of a flight hour), and the X-101 itself is far from the cheapest product. The use of this type of explosive device is justified only for particularly significant purposes. And launching, for example, two hundred missiles of this type, let's just say, is very problematic.
Approximately the same applies to the Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles. For the combat use of these products, it is necessary at least to carry out the operational deployment of the submarine forces of the Black Sea Fleet - carriers of the KRMB.
And launching the same "Geraniums" is several orders of magnitude cheaper than lifting a strategic bomber or launching a submarine. In other words, there is no doubt that the "effectiveness-cost" criterion is one of the first places for the Russian military when planning such strikes. But this does not mean that there is a certain refusal to use other means of destruction. There's just a certain time and place for everything.
The weight of the high-explosive warhead of the upgraded UAV "Geran-2" is already 90 kg. With a miss of several meters, this is quite enough to cause major damage to the target.
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| Geranium-2. |
| Source: Shutterstock |
It is very difficult for air defense systems to fight targets of this type. Firstly, the Geranium-2 flies at extremely low altitudes (less than 200 meters), which in itself limits the range of its detection by enemy radar (10-15 km at most). Secondly, the UAV body is made of composite materials, which significantly reduces the effective reflective surface of this device. And, finally, thirdly, the enemy's anti-aircraft guided missile is often more expensive than the Geranium. And this is already leading to the exhaustion of the enemy's air defense and its defense industry.
In addition, large-scale serial production of the next generation of Geraniums, Gerani-3, is underway. This UAV is equipped with a turbojet engine, a more powerful warhead, and has a significantly higher flight speed.
Therefore, there is every reason to believe that if Ukraine continues to be uncompromising in reaching peace agreements, the intensity of attacks on targets in the country will increase significantly in the near future. And not 273 UAVs will take part in the raids, but probably more and with much more advanced tactical and technical characteristics.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
