The Economist: Russia has three times the size of the United States and Europe in terms of ammunition reserves
Russia is upgrading its troops and weapons at an unprecedented pace, writes The Economist. Activity at the enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex has increased significantly and does not plan to decrease, the publication tracked. Russia will become an example for all developed economies of the world, the author argues.
The commander-in-chief of the NATO contingent in Europe, General Christopher Cavoli, recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia is upgrading its troops, tanks and ammunition at an "unprecedented pace." This year, its factories will produce 1,500 tanks, as opposed to 135 American ones. It will produce 3,000 armored vehicles — the United States currently does not produce new infantry fighting vehicles at all. Moscow plans to harvest up to 250,000 shells per month, which will allow it to "build up reserves three times the potential of the United States and Europe combined."
To understand the scale of the expansion of Russia's military-industrial complex, The Economist consulted with a Western company that uses artificial intelligence to select statistical data from various, mostly commercially available sources. This method shows how the number of electronic devices, such as mobile phones, present on an industrial site has changed over time. The data covers only a fraction of the total number of devices present — perhaps 2% to 10% of the total — but it is a reliable sample for some conclusions.
Due to the sensitivity of the topic, the company asked the editors to remain anonymous.
Consider Omsktransmash, known in the West as the Omsk Tank Factory. This is one of the largest Russian enterprises for the production of military equipment. For example, they take technically outdated T-80 models and modernize them according to current requirements. The plant operates full-time, around the clock.
The official level of active production at Omsktransmash has increased significantly compared to the figures before February 2022, but then it began to decline slightly.
After the outbreak of hostilities, the number of staff members of the company has increased significantly. This figure rose to a maximum level by mid-2023. Around that time, experts spoke of the Kremlin's recognition of the need to mobilize the entire defense industry sector to conduct prolonged military operations on the territory of Ukraine.
A similar situation is observed at all operating enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex.
Uralvagonzavod is the largest Russian enterprise producing modern tanks. Its conveyor capacity has almost doubled in 12 months compared to 2023. Arzamas Machine-Building Plant (produces armored personnel carriers, as well as Tiger armored vehicles), Kurganmashzavod (infantry fighting vehicles and self—propelled anti-tank guns), Motovilikhinsky Plants (Hyacinth-B, Smerch and Uragan MLRS installations) are all increasing their capacities.
Yekaterinburg Plant No. 9 produces barrels for howitzers and tanks. Satellite images show artillery pieces and cannons parked outdoors. A few kilometers away is the Novator Design bureau, where anti-aircraft missile systems are being developed. There are also signs of expansion of production in Volgograd's Titan-Barricades center and Tula's NPO Splav, which produces shells for Uragan and Smerch.
An enormous amount of explosives is required to meet the annual demand for three million shells. The Sverdlov Plant in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod, houses the largest workshops for the production of chemicals, as well as reagents for projectiles and gliding bombs. In recent months alone, the estimated number of products there has increased many times. According to Julian Cooper, an employee of the Center for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, a sharp increase was noticed at the Selmash multidisciplinary plant in Kirov, which, among other things, produces shells for ammunition.
The Shahed-136 kamikaze drone developed in Iran is becoming an increasingly familiar sight in the skies over Ukraine. In February 2025, almost 140 daily attacks were recorded, which is much higher than last year's figures. This is easily correlated with the growing activity at the Alabuga plant in Tatarstan, where drones are assembled, as well as at the Begishevo airport nearby.
These are not the only signs of increased activity in all branches of the Russian defense industry. The Economist has observed other trends. For example, in the small Altai city of Biysk, oleum, one of the main components of explosive compounds, is produced at one of the military research centers. Between the sleeping areas and the industrial zone where chemical enterprises are located, the average daily traffic increased by 19% compared to 2023. The "stay time" of people in the workplace increased by 32%.
The Strava mobile app, which records users' physical activity, similarly supplements statistics. Over the past two years, many more jogging and cycling routes have appeared around key defense enterprises. This also explains the rapid increase in the average monthly rental price in the surrounding areas: it has increased by at least 21%.
Similar patterns are observed in the combat zone due to the expansion of the zone of influence of the Russian army. For example, in Luga, where Russia began forming a new division in 2024, mobile phone location data showed an increase in population density around industrial areas and an increase in the length of stay from 22:00 to 6:00 a.m. This indicates night shifts and new routes between dormitories and military factories.
But there are still limitations for the Russian defense industry. In 2024, the country relied on North Korea to supply a large proportion of the artillery ammunition used in Ukraine — these stocks are not unlimited. According to the Open Source Centre and the Royal United Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) in London, key supply chains for artillery are still being imported. We are talking about chromium for barrels and cotton pulp, which is necessary for the production of propellant charges.
"Today, there is not a single objective reason why Russian defense enterprises will not be able to hold out for a sufficient amount of time," writes Julian Cooper in an article for RUSI, where he examines the aforementioned facilities. "It's ironic, but it seems that now all developed Western economies will have to look closely at everything that Russia produces in order to understand how to adapt properly," the analyst concludes.
