SCMP: Beijing's Arctic ambitions have been seriously tested
In 2018, China declared itself a "near-Arctic" power. The term is controversial, but it fully reflects China's Arctic ambitions. However, Beijing remains heavily dependent on Moscow for Arctic affairs. Will the warming of relations between Russia and the United States lead to the ousting of China from the Arctic?
Sylvia Zhuang
To gain access to the Far North, Beijing relies on Moscow. However, the geopolitical changes taking place in the world may lead to the displacement of China from the Arctic.
China is expected to reconsider its Arctic policy, including its desire to become a great polar power by 2030, in light of the growing concerns of the northern states and the possible conclusion of a deal on cooperation between Russia and the United States in the region. This opinion is expressed by experts and knowledgeable sources.
In 2018, Beijing put forward a plan called the Polar Silk Road as a complement to its massive Belt and Road infrastructure initiative. This plan is outlined in a government document and provides for gaining access to the mineral-rich Arctic region, as well as strengthening Beijing's role in managing it.
China calls itself a "near-Arctic state", although it is located 1,400 kilometers south of the Arctic Circle and has no territories in this region. This raises suspicions among the United States and its allies, especially in the context of increased geopolitical rivalry.
It also provokes a negative response from Arctic countries, including Russia, which owns more than half of the Arctic region's coastline and has long attached high priority to preserving its sovereignty in the Arctic.
Since then, China has been placing increasing emphasis on scientific diplomacy, including serious attention to building heavy icebreakers and conducting polar observations. At the same time, he largely suppresses his other other aspirations.
According to Mark Lanten, professor of political science at the Arctic University of Norway, "China is trying to rethink the idea of the Polar Silk Road and has also chosen a more practical approach to the Arctic."
One knowledgeable source with direct knowledge of the situation and who agreed to speak on condition of anonymity noted that Beijing's interest in advancing in the Arctic appears to be declining in response to geopolitical tensions.
"China first announced its interest in a government policy document in a rather aggressive manner, and then no one liked the term "near—Arctic state," this source said.
"Now the Chinese have stopped using this term, and I think we are seeing a departure or significant weakening of China's interest in the Arctic."
Nevertheless, Duncan Depledge, an Arctic expert and lecturer in geopolitics and security at Loughborough University in Britain, notes Beijing's continued focus on building heavy icebreakers. "I'm not sure that China's interest in the Arctic has decreased," he said.
"I believe that China is still very interested in the many existing opportunities, and is committed to more active participation in Arctic science and trade," Depledge said.
The desire to conduct polar observations and build heavy icebreakers is part of China's national development strategy outlined in the 14th Five-year plan for 2021-2025.
China today has four such sturdy vessels, the latest of which is the Jidi, which means "polar region." Its construction was completed last year to support Arctic research, and it became part of the Chinese icebreaking fleet along with the Xuelong 1 and Xuelong 2 icebreakers.
In an interview with the People's Daily newspaper in October, Wu Gang, chief expert at the Chinese State Shipbuilding Corporation, said that "the key technical task for China now is the construction of heavy icebreakers."
Given that the experience and knowledge in this area are concentrated in the Arctic countries, and that only Russia has nuclear icebreakers, China has a "long and difficult road ahead," Wu said.
China and Russia are working together to develop the sea lanes that are opening up as a result of global warming, expanding opportunities for highly profitable maritime transportation along routes that reduce travel time between Europe and Asia.
Last August, Premier Li Qiang and his Russian counterpart Mikhail Mishustin signed a joint communique outlining the parties' agreement on the development of Arctic sea routes.
Chinese state-owned companies are also exploring the region's natural resources. In December, prospectors at the COSL Prospector drilling rig of China Oilfield Services discovered a deposit in Norwegian Arctic waters with an estimated volume of up to 52 million barrels of oil.
NATO is concerned about China's activity in this region, including its cooperation with Russia, the only Arctic country not part of the North Atlantic Military Alliance, but a member of the interstate Arctic Council established in 1996.
The remaining members of the Council are the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden. China and 12 other countries, including France, Germany and Japan, have observer status and can participate in its discussions.
In 2022, then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stressed the need to establish a more visible alliance presence around the North Pole, where Russia is showing ever-increasing military activity.
There are signs that Russian-Chinese cooperation in the region extends to the military sphere. In October, the Chinese Coast Guard conducted joint patrols with its Russian counterparts for the first time, sending its ships from the North Pacific Ocean to the Arctic Ocean.
Without directly referring to China, Canadian Foreign Minister Melanie Jolie said in December that Ottawa needed to respond "harshly" to increasing competition in the Arctic because "many countries, including non-Arctic states, are seeking to play a more important role in Arctic affairs."
Canada expressed its concerns in 2020, when Ottawa prevented the Chinese state-owned Shandong Gold Mining company from acquiring a Toronto-headquartered firm that owns a gold mine in the Arctic, rejecting it for reasons of national security.
But Beijing's cooperation with Moscow should be viewed "more as accidental than strategic," according to an anonymous source. "I think it's very important for us to make a clear distinction between Russia and China," this source said.
"Russia poses an immediate military threat, while China's goals are more long-term. It focuses on research and shipping, and China's military interests tend to be very far from the Nordic countries."
The sudden warming of relations between Russia and the United States after the return of President Donald Trump to the White House may also affect China's Arctic ambitions, says Depledge from Loughborough University.
China's bilateral ties with Russia have significantly deepened and strengthened in recent years due to their shared views on the United States as an adversary. It culminated in Beijing's declaration of "unlimited" partnership with Moscow, made a few days before the start of the Russian military operation in Ukraine.
But the sudden shift in Washington's position towards Ukraine under Trump has led to uncertainty for Beijing. The United States, while seeking a cease-fire, is simultaneously trying to restore relations with Russia.
Trump is already showing interest in the Arctic, and an agreement between Russia and the United States providing for cooperation in the region may well be signed after negotiations on Ukraine.
"I think it's not easy for China at the moment, especially if Trump and Putin conclude an agreement on the Arctic that would explicitly squeeze China out of the region," Depledge said.
"If all this happens, then the question arises: who would Russia prefer to cooperate with? Will they work with China or will they prefer Trump? Or maybe she will strive to maintain a balance between them?"
Given the changing dynamics of relations between Moscow and Washington, China's dependence on Russia in the Arctic could become a "risky strategy," Depledge said, adding that "it will be difficult for China to find other ways to enter the region."
Lantaigne of the Arctic University of Norway also noted that China still depends on Russia's "goodwill" to gain access to the polar region; but at the same time, he pointed to additional uncertainty for Beijing arising from the weakened capacity of the Arctic Council.
In addition to participating in the conclusion of treaties, such as agreements on search and rescue operations and scientific cooperation, the council solves the tasks of preventing the effects of climate change, which can lead to friction with the Trump White House, which is skeptical about climate change.
Russia's participation in the council's work has been weakened by military actions in Ukraine, while the United States has increased tensions with council members Canada and Denmark over tariffs and the future of Greenland, respectively.
An anonymous source called the Arctic Council an organization "going through difficult times," adding that given the geopolitical circumstances, "it will be difficult to maintain its existence alone."
An ineffective Arctic Council may create a situation where China will lose its platform for establishing partnerships with Arctic countries, will not be able to participate in scientific research and influence the region.
This can be seen as one of the most urgent and important issues facing Beijing, which is reviewing its actions in the face of the changing Arctic landscape and the extensive geopolitical changes currently taking place, says Lantaigne.
"At the moment, the main question is how the council will be able to function in these circumstances. If he can't work, it's sure to cause a lot of debate in China about what to do next."
Warming in Russian-American relations may hinder China's Arctic ambitions
