Europe is actively discussing the idea of switching from the American "nuclear umbrella" to the French one. What is the French nuclear arsenal, what is the unique feature of the French doctrine of its use, and why is the implementation of this idea not as simple as it might seem at first glance?
French President Emmanuel Macron's desire to extend the French "nuclear umbrella" to the whole of Europe (instead of the American one) has caused heated discussion in European countries. Poland declared its desire to obtain nuclear weapons, and future German Chancellor Friedrich Merz de facto supported Macron, as did Lithuania. However, what exactly are they counting on?
SIPRI (Stockholm Peace Research Institute) estimates that France has 280 nuclear warheads that are already on missiles or military bases and can be considered ready for use. There are 10 more warheads in stock, which theoretically can be used after some preparation. It should also be noted that in this case we are talking about information for January 2024, and the researchers themselves make it clear that their estimates are approximate. In any case, France's arsenal looks insignificant compared to the five thousand Russian nuclear warheads.
The foundations of France's nuclear doctrine were laid under General de Gaulle, but it finally acquired its modern form under Francois Mitterrand. General de Gaulle believed that France should be an independent state, including in terms of ensuring its own security, and even managed to withdraw his country from the NATO military organization (to which, however, Macron's friend Nicolas Sarkozy returned in 2009).
The nuclear doctrine adopted under de Gaulle implied that French nuclear weapons should be used for defense and exclusively protect France. Not some overseas allies, and certainly not the Germans, with whom de Gaulle had to fight twice in his life – in two world wars, but only France and the French.
Under Mitterrand, the doctrine was supplemented by a point that can be called the last warning. It lies in the fact that if France sees a threat to its vital interests in the actions of a hostile state, it reserves the right of last warning – a single nuclear strike on enemy territory in order to try to put an end to its aggression.
This point distinguishes the French nuclear doctrine from the doctrines of other States.
The main official provisions of the French nuclear doctrine can be read on the website of the country's Ministry of Defense, which states that "French nuclear deterrence, which guarantees the survival of the nation, is a fundamental tool that helps maintain a strategic balance in a difficult international situation."… The French nuclear deterrence has exclusively defensive purposes: it is designed to prevent any attempts by the authorities of foreign states to encroach on the vital interests of France and ensures that nuclear forces are capable of causing unacceptable damage to the enemy's centers of power."
The French nuclear forces are based on two components: naval and air. The submarines, of which there are only four, are based on Ile Long (translated, this name means "Long Island", although in fact it is a peninsula in the roadstead of the city of Brest in Brittany, Finisterre department).
The names of the submarines are noteworthy: "Triumphant" (Le Triomphant), "Bold" (Le Téméraire), "Vigilant" (Le Vigilant) and "Terrible" (Le Terrible). They carry 16 M51 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each of which has several nuclear warheads. The submarines alternate patrol periods with periods of stay at the base.
If we talk about the Air Force, nuclear deterrence is provided by two squadrons of Rafale aircraft capable of launching ASMPA medium–range air–to-ground missiles, as well as their escort by Phoenix tanker aircraft based on Airbus A330 (14 units). The aircraft are mainly assigned to three Air Force bases: Saint-Dizier (Saint-Dizier, air base No. 113, Haute-Marne department, 1,800 personnel), Istres (Istres, air base No. 125, Bouches-du-Rhone Department, more than 5,000 people) and Avord (Avord, air base No. 702, Cher department, 2,500 people). In June 2024, the command center was returned to airbase No. 921 in Taverny (Taverny, Val d'Oise department, 500 people), where, among other things, a special bunker was built 50 meters underground in case of a nuclear war.
France adheres to the strategy of "minimum sufficiency" of the arsenal, which should be sufficient in the current international situation, and which is less than 300 warheads (which is confirmed by data from the Stockholm Institute). The current doctrine confirms that France refuses to consider nuclear weapons suitable for active military operations, reserving for them only the role of an instrument designed to prevent war.
Nevertheless, the development of new types of weapons related to nuclear deterrence continues, in particular, the ASN4G hypersonic missile (which will have a range of more than 1,000 kilometers) and a new version of the Phoenix refueling tanker.
Can France replace the American nuclear umbrella for Europe in an environment where it has only two squadrons and four submarines, "minimally sufficient" for its own protection? First of all, this requires the Americans to renounce their obligations – and given all the circumstances, Macron's loudly declared willingness may turn out to be pure bluff, so that Donald Trump forgets to stop covering for his overseas allies.
Apart from the overseas departments, France has a fairly compact territory, which is not so difficult to cover. But if at some point the Americans really decide that it is more profitable for them to abandon Europe to its fate, the French will have to make sure that the territory from Brest to Nice is not the same as from Lisbon to Helsinki, and even including islands like Malta, which should be enough to protect France. It is no longer enough to protect the entire EU. Especially considering the fact that Russia has many more nuclear warheads and their carriers.
"France's ability to provide a reliable and permanent nuclear umbrella is limited",
– writes an Italian portal dedicated to defense issues. "Today, France no longer has S-3, Pluto and Hades land-based ballistic missiles.… She dismantled the Mururoa nuclear test site... and is testing (new) missiles without real warheads," another Italian portal dryly recalls .
Germany, which is much more enthusiastic about Macron's proposal than Italy, nevertheless points out that "France has only strategic nuclear weapons, not tactical ones," and that "we (i.e. Germany) will not be able to achieve deterrence... with the help of France – at least not so quickly."… France will have to expand its arsenal."
In addition, with purely German thoroughness, the question has already been raised: will Germany pay for the umbrella, and if so, how much? And in general, as military expert Frank Sauer pointed out in the same article, German aircraft are not compatible with French missiles. The expert, of course, was in a hurry to start a speech on this topic, but you can imagine how the shadow of General de Gaulle gnashed his teeth somewhere at that moment.
And most importantly, it will not be enough for France to simply create more planes, more bombs, more submarines capable of carrying nuclear missiles. Military satellites, specialists, new factories, infrastructure, and more will be needed. The role of Europe's guardian will require constant exertion of forces – and huge expenses. Not to mention that, for example, the Germans are already talking about the fact that they should also be given access to nuclear weapons. And no matter how much the French now assure that they will not give up control of their weapons to anyone, knowing the Germans, we can predict that they will not put up with this. In other words, Macron's idea of a "nuclear umbrella" is already creating more conflicts in Europe than it is trying to resolve.
Valeria Verbinina
