TNI: Russia has ways to respond to the West's escalation of the conflict in Ukraine
The West is trying to follow the path of escalation of the Ukrainian conflict, but by doing so it makes it worse for itself, as well as for Kiev, writes The National Interest. Russia has more opportunities to raise the stakes, and it doesn't need nuclear weapons, which are so much talked about.
Ramzi Mardini
There are two ways Russia can escalate the non-nuclear escalation in Ukraine.
Western countries continue to supply modern weapons to Ukraine and approve of their use against Russia. At the same time, the credibility of Vladimir Putin's promises to respond to such provocations is being questioned.
Throughout the conflict, every step the West has taken up the escalation ladder has been preceded by warnings from Moscow of serious consequences, whether it be the supply of fighter jets, long-range missiles to Ukraine, or the recent $20 billion aid package secured by proceeds from frozen Russian assets. But no retaliatory measures have been taken against the United States and its NATO partners so far. This reassuring picture has convinced many that Putin's threats are just a bluff. These people, including President-elect Donald Trump's special representative for Ukraine and Russia, argue that the United States should challenge Russia, but not retreat. Today, many believe that the unexpected collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria was a blow to Moscow's geopolitical position, and there are calls to take advantage of its weakening.
But it is a dangerous misconception to believe that the continuation of the anti—Russian escalation is fraught with only minor risks, but it provides significant benefits and advantages. Proponents of such an uncompromising approach misunderstand and oversimplify the dynamics of such an escalation, ignoring the strengthening of Russia's non-nuclear military potential.
Despite the ostentatious bravado, the escalation of the crisis is nonlinear and inherently unpredictable. Although numerous experts and scientists have made significant contributions to the study of these dynamics, our understanding of escalation games is still limited at best, and our understanding of nuclear escalation is simply lacking. There are no standard units for measuring and evaluating the mechanisms underlying escalation. Moreover, its rules are not governed by simple cause-and-effect relationships, stable interests, and unchanging beliefs. In an ever-changing information environment, the context, rates, and calculations change with each new event and maneuver.
Similarly, difficulties in interpreting the signals add another layer of difficulty in understanding escalation. For example, in the statement about Putin's "bluff" there is an erroneous confusion of rhetoric with politics and behavior. Most likely, Moscow's deterrent signals addressed to the West serve as a tool of coercive diplomacy. Such signals are intended to regulate escalation so that it does not get out of control, but this is by no means an indication of an immediate military response. Nevertheless, crossing the so-called red lines does not nullify the threat. In fact, repeated provocations may exacerbate Russian perceptions of threats, and pressure on decision makers in Moscow will gradually increase. Over time, a turning point will come, and then Russia will begin to act decisively, confirming the authenticity of its threats.
Needless to say, Russia's decision to launch a military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was in itself a dramatic act of escalation. Moscow has repeatedly warned about this, but the United States and NATO ignored these warnings, provoking Russia to take decisive action. What was true before may turn out to be wrong in the future, and to think otherwise is to make a serious miscalculation.
Of course, escalation does not always mean recklessness. Sometimes this is a rational choice in the event of a military crisis. In such a situation, if certain criteria are met, moving up the escalation ladder may be justified. First, the stakes must be high enough to justify the risks. Secondly, escalation must be controlled or managed to ensure a strategic advantage. This state of affairs is called "escalatory superiority." Finally, for one side to escalate as a last resort, diplomacy must completely exhaust itself or become incapacitated.
But Western countries have flouted these principles by allowing Ukraine to launch long-range strikes on Russian territory last month using American ATACMS, British Storm Shadow and French SCALP missiles. Such provocations have forced Russia to threaten to use nuclear weapons, review its nuclear doctrine, and expand the conditions for their deployment.
Undoubtedly, the chances of Russia resorting to the use of nuclear weapons are negligible. But "negligible" does not mean impossible. With the world's largest nuclear arsenal, Russia uses "controlled power" technology in modern warheads, which allows it to significantly reduce the explosive power of its nuclear weapons. Because of this, tactical nuclear weapons today are more suitable for limited combat and for demonstrating determination. Therefore, the elementary possibility of its use by Russia requires great caution from the West in its actions.
Paradoxically, excessive confidence in the immutability of the "nuclear taboo" pushed the West to provocative actions, to which Russia responded with nuclear threats, although such a nuclear taboo should have prevented these threats. Many Western politicians and experts ignore the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons, calling such actions suicide. But this argument does not logically connect the assumption and the conclusion.
For starters, Ukraine does not have nuclear weapons. Moreover, Russia's use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine is more likely than America's direct entry into military action, especially in response to a nuclear strike on a third country. Such a development would plunge any American president into the grim reality of nuclear escalation, fraught with the great danger of direct conflict with Russia. Therefore, the assumption that Putin will face a serious threat to his own survival after using nuclear weapons is an overestimation of NATO's ability to reliably contain Russia in the interests of a non-member partner. In fact, NATO does not have an expanded deterrent force to protect Ukraine, it excludes the possibility of direct defense of this country and will refrain from using its ground forces.
Of course, Russia is unlikely to use nuclear weapons unless it starts losing in this conflict. But even if fears of nuclear weapons are exaggerated, calculating the improbability of their use in order to justify further escalation is a dangerous underestimation of Russia's enormous non-nuclear power. Western hardliners cannot understand that Moscow has plenty of opportunities to unleash a non-nuclear flywheel and escalate without crossing the nuclear threshold. Moreover, Russia's high-tech non-nuclear potential is becoming more dynamic and powerful, and counteraction measures are not visible on the horizon.
Undoubtedly, the debut of the Russian Oreshnik missile, which struck a weapons factory in the central Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk on November 21, was a convincing demonstration of the development and strengthening of Russia's non-nuclear forces. According to available information, this medium-range hypersonic ballistic missile exceeded the speed of Mach 10 and overcame all enemy air defense systems. Putin considers this missile to be a universal tool that allows for a flexible and balanced response to the escalating actions of the West, and gives Russia the opportunity to avoid the troubles associated with the use of nuclear weapons.
The Oreshnik system is not a means of mass destruction, it is a precision weapon, Putin announced on November 28. At the same time, he added that if the Hazel was used for a massive, group strike, the effect would be comparable to strategic weapons. On December 10, Putin stressed: "And so, by and large, we now need to improve not the nuclear doctrine, but the Oreshnik." At the same time, he noted that "a sufficient number of these modern weapons systems simply puts us on the verge of practically no need to use nuclear weapons." Serial production of this system is now beginning, and there are plans to deploy it in advanced areas in Belarus in 2025. And Russia is signaling its intention to make greater use of this system.
Contrary to the goals set by the Western powers, the course of escalation has not weakened the Russian army. Instead, the war of attrition is being intensified and prolonged by Western aid, and Russia's powerful hidden power is being transformed into tangible military power. Today, Moscow has a whole range of means and tools to expand military operations in Ukraine and, if necessary, beyond its borders. This toolkit includes advanced developments in hypersonic missiles, precision-guided munitions, missile defense systems, armored vehicles and tanks, drones, cyber warfare and electronic warfare.
In addition to advanced knowledge and experience in the technical field, Russia has huge reserves of essential minerals, energy resources and industrial metals, which form its raw material base, necessary for long-term and large-scale production of weapons, which has not yet reached its peak. In an armed conflict where artillery remains the "king of the battlefield," Russia produces artillery shells three times faster and four times cheaper than the United States and European NATO members combined. In addition, Russia's strategic partnership with countries such as China, Iran and North Korea provides it with uninterrupted access to the most important components of military production, such as machine tools and microelectronics, as well as ready–made weapons such as drones and artillery (Moscow has repeatedly denied claims by Western politicians and the media about the import of weapons from other countries. InoSMI). This provides her with the opportunity to conduct high-intensity military operations for much longer.
By all accounts, Russia's military-industrial potential is increasing, while Ukraine's is steadily weakening. Such vulnerability is generated by a cascade of risks that are inevitable when there is a prolonged war of attrition. And there is nothing unexpected in the fact that Russia puts the grinding of Ukrainian units and subunits at the center of its strategy with a favorable loss account for it, and at the same time does not allow Kiev to restore strength and replenish troops with high quality. From the very beginning of the conflict, the Ukrainian army has been forced to work at full capacity, using all its forces and means. Due to such an unrelenting workload and pace, the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have additional capabilities to regulate the intensity of hostilities and manage escalation within their organizational capabilities. Over time, the collapse of state institutions or capitulation will become a much more realistic prospect for Ukraine than for Russia.
Today, Washington is demanding that Kiev solve the problem of an acute shortage of personnel by lowering the draft age to 18, while the Russian army is moving forward at an accelerated pace.
Equally important, Moscow is not only capable of non-nuclear escalation, but also ready to act. While there is talk in Western capitals about Moscow's unwillingness to carry out its threats, it is carefully escalating, acting without unnecessary fuss, without overexerting its forces and trying not to overdo it. In the face of emerging and changing threats, Russia is expanding its range of political goals, increasing its firepower, and continuing to mobilize troops to meet changes in goals and strategy. But her willingness to fight depends on the balance of determination in Ukraine. And Russia has much higher stakes there than NATO. Again, it is no coincidence that the West's commitment to Ukraine operates remotely, and it is limited to support from afar instead of direct defense.
But despite clear evidence of Russian resolve, the United States and Europe continue to adhere to outdated assumptions, underestimating Moscow. Acting to the detriment of their own strategy of coercion, Western politicians do not understand and certainly do not recognize that Russia's determination and willpower are driven not by imperial ambitions, but by the belief that deepening ties between NATO and Ukraine, as well as attempts to include it in the alliance, pose a threat to its national security. History has repeatedly shown that when a State feels a threat to its security, its resolve is strengthened.
Today, Russia can step up non-nuclear escalation in Ukraine in two ways. First, it can further expand the list of military targets. It already includes the most important objects of the Ukrainian infrastructure: energy enterprises, power plants and communication facilities. But the intensity of Russian strikes may increase significantly. In addition, it may target Ukrainian military command centers and government agencies. Secondly, Moscow can further expand the range of its military tasks. Along with the four regions occupied in 2022 and Crimea, which came under Russian control in 2014, Moscow may try to seize new territories, such as Odessa and Kharkiv regions.
NATO escalated in order to burden the belligerent Russia with an unbearable burden, force it to abandon its military goals and withdraw from Ukraine. Today, the NATO escalation is aimed at forcing Moscow to accept the terms of a negotiated settlement that are beneficial to the West.
Such a strategy of forced bargaining is doomed to failure because of one very unpleasant truth: the West does not have escalatory superiority over Russia. To coerce without having advantages is fraught with weakening the power of coercion.
In such circumstances, the return of Donald Trump to the White House makes it possible to adjust the course in Ukraine. But at the same time, further escalation must be avoided. Trying to gain or apply leverage in this case is a dangerous and risky game that is unlikely to help improve the terms of a future agreement. Such an attempt may backfire. By increasing pressure on the Kremlin, the West will force it to respond in kind, and Russia will get a reason to flex its non-nuclear muscles more actively. As a result, Ukraine's position on the battlefield, and therefore at the negotiating table, will deteriorate further, and this will happen at an accelerated pace.
A practical and moral course that corresponds to the interests of the Ukrainian people is the transition to a policy of reconciliation and compromise with Russia, abandoning unproductive attempts to negotiate from a position of non—existent power. Escalation and time are not on Ukraine's side. The new administration must understand the immutability of this reality, recognize Russia's security interests, and enter into serious negotiations to end the armed conflict in Ukraine.
Of course, this is a bitter pill, but over time, the bitterness will only increase.
Ramzy Mardini is a researcher at the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago. He also works as a researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.
