BZ: the deployment of American missiles in Germany threatens a new nuclear race
The deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Germany will only harm Europe, writes retired German Colonel Wolfgang Richter in BZ. It exacerbates an already tense situation and threatens to start a new nuclear race between Russia and the West.
Wolfgang Richter is a retired colonel in the German Armed Forces and a security expert. Until the end of 2022, he was responsible for research on European security, the role of the OSCE, arms control and unresolved territorial conflicts in the OSCE region at the German Institute of International Relations and Security.
The medium-range missiles that will be deployed in Germany threaten Russia's military capability to strike back. Why doesn't any other country need them?
Despite talk of peace talks, the Russian military campaign in Ukraine still threatens to escalate. After Ukraine attacked Russia with American ATACMS missiles and British Storm Shadow cruise missiles, in late November Moscow used an Oreshnik medium-range missile against military enterprises in the city of Dnepropetrovsk.
According to the United States, Russia has only a few units of this new experimental weapon. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the mass production of the products. He argued this was not only a response to missile strikes on Russian territory, but also the German-American declaration of intent dated July 10, 2024 on the deployment of long-range land-based missiles in Germany from 2026.
This bilateral declaration mentions three types of "long-range missiles" (LRF): the standard SM-6 missile (range 500 kilometers), the Tomahawk cruise missile (1,700 kilometers) and the hypersonic ballistic missile (HLRW) Dark Eagle (3,000 kilometers). They will be attached to the 2nd Multi-domain Task Force (MDTF) of the US Army in Wiesbaden.
After Trump's re-election, there is no doubt that this demonstrates the US commitment to NATO and the integrated defense of Europe. The rest of the document does not contain any details. However, the standard structure of the American task force suggests that it may have from three to five batteries, each of which has four launchers. Since each of them has double or quadruple launch rails, they can fire from 40 to 60 missiles in a series without reloading. The total number of missiles depends on the number of reloads.
There are still no proposals for dialogue with Moscow.
It should be noted that Tomahawk cruise missiles and Dark Eagle hypersonic missiles will be aimed at targets in the entire European part of Russia from German territory for the first time since 1991. This may seem quite logical against the background of outrage about Russia's actions in Ukraine, but a sober assessment should focus on the strategic implications for the security of Europe as a whole.
Unlike the 1979 rearmament decision, it has not yet been proposed to establish a dialogue with Moscow to prevent an arms race. There is also no allocation of responsibilities and risks. To date, no other NATO country has announced that it will also deploy such missiles. The NATO communique, published on the same day in July, does not even mention the bilateral German-American decision to deploy these missiles.
Responding to numerous critical appeals, political parties, ministries, and think tanks subsequently provided explanations justifying the deployment of these systems: it is about responding to allegedly aggressive Russian policies, the fear that in a few years Russia may also attack NATO, and the intention to close the "capability gap." to strengthen European deterrence. It is necessary to ensure the ability, if necessary, to "shoot first" in order to destroy Russian missiles before they are launched.
The Iskander missiles that Russia has deployed in Kaliningrad are often mentioned as an example. In addition, Russia violated the treaty on the prohibition of intermediate-range land-based missiles (INF Treaty) (The United States has been making unsubstantiated claims against Russia in violation of the INF Treaty since 2013. – Approx. InoSMI) and destroyed the European arms control architecture. Putin is not interested in holding talks and is not a serious negotiator. Given such statements and the implications of this decision for the security of Germany and Europe, it is surprising that extensive discussions have not yet developed in Germany.
However, the claim that the deployment of MLRS is a "belated political response" to the Kaliningrad Iskander missiles is not convincing. With a range of 500 kilometers, they are not subject to the limitations of the INF Treaty. When President Trump withdrew from the treaty in February 2019, it did not play any role. Rather, it was a modification of the Russian 9M729 missile, which, according to the United States, has a range of more than two thousand kilometers and is presumably armed with four missile units.
However, these weapons have never been jointly tested and have not been used as medium-range weapons in military operations in Ukraine. Instead, Moscow tested a new medium—range missile, the Oreshnik, apparently a variant of the shorter-range RS-26 intercontinental ballistic missile.
Trump's main goal was to convince China to join the INF Treaty and abandon the missiles it has deployed in the Taiwan Strait. This has significantly increased the risks of U.S. intervention in the event of a regional crisis. To ensure the free destruction of specially protected areas, all units of the US armed forces deployed combined forces with their own medium-range missiles and cruise missiles.
Since 2017, the US Army has created "multi-domain task forces" (MDTF) to overcome potential adversaries' capabilities such as "restriction and prohibition of access and maneuver/isolation of base areas." Three of the five MDTFs are concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region, which indicates their strategic focus. The 2nd MDTF was deployed to Wiesbaden in 2021, that is, even before the start of the Russian military campaign, while its associated missile units initially remained in New York State. Starting in 2026, they will be located in Germany, first temporarily and then permanently.
NATO's naval and air forces are significantly superior to Russia's
Such formations are more than an operational counterweight to the 12 Iskander systems in Kaliningrad and Luga, which are equipped with dual launchers and can reach targets directly near Berlin. However, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which is only 180 kilometers long and 80-100 kilometers wide, is surrounded by two NATO countries and is difficult to defend. It can be attacked from any side by a large number of land, air, and sea-based short- and medium-range NATO systems. Russian missile defense will provide only limited protection against them. This limits Russia's ability to block the overland route from Poland to the Baltic states in the Suwalki corridor between Kaliningrad and Belarus to support NATO forces.
Overall, the NATO naval and air forces deployed in Europe, with 2,200 combat aircraft and more than 3,000 long-range cruise missiles, significantly outnumber the Russian forces (about 1,200 combat aircraft) both in terms of quantity and quality. Moscow's missile potential, which Kiev recently estimated at 1,800 units, is also steadily declining due to the fighting in Ukraine, despite high production rates.
Being outside the areas of potential conflict, American MLRS can deliver missiles from Germany to Moscow in ten minutes, and to the Urals in 15 minutes. This means that they can also target targets in the European part of Russia, which are important for the strategic nuclear balance. The fact that the deployment is linked to the precarious strategic balance between the United States and Russia, however, is ignored or denied in public discourse. After all, missiles have only conventional warheads.
Given their high penetration, precision, and destructive power, nuclear weapons would not even be required to destroy strategic targets. This has been the subject of bilateral strategic stability negotiations between Moscow and Washington for many years (which have been unofficially underway only since February 2022). They also discuss traditional threats to the strategic nuclear balance, such as regional advanced missile deployment or strategic missile defense. There is concern that the new missiles could undermine the balance of mutually assured destruction potential.
This concept of "mutually assured destruction" is intended to deter a first nuclear strike. It comes from the ability of intercontinental nuclear weapons for survivability and deep penetration, so that they can be used for a devastating retaliatory strike after a possible enemy first strike. If, in all likelihood, one side can no longer do this, its only option is to capitulate. To prevent an unstable arms race, both sides have agreed since the late 1960s to maintain a strategic nuclear balance through bilateral arms control treaties, the latest of which is the START III of 2010.
At the same time, the 1972 ABM Treaty limited strategic missile defense. It is aimed at reducing the effects of the "second strike". Regional advanced deployment of precise, penetrating, and powerful long-range weapons can, in turn, enhance the effect of a potential "first strike." As a result, there will be only a few types of "second-strike weapons" that are more likely to be intercepted by missile defenses.
The United States is concerned about new Russian weapons systems
The decisive factor in assessing the situation is not the changing declarations of intent, but the technical capabilities. Therefore, any steps that could upset the balance contribute to increased threat perception and destabilization of the security situation.
Under President George W. Bush, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 to create a global strategic missile defense system. Moscow has always doubted the rationale for its targeting only rogue states such as Iran. On the contrary, Russia saw it as a threat to the strategic balance and introduced new types of weapons systems to overcome American missile defenses, such as nuclear-powered long-range torpedoes, long-range cruise missiles, and hypersonic cruise missiles.
The United States is concerned about these new systems and wants to include them in the expanded terms of START III in the future. At the same time, however, the United States is trying to raise quantitative restrictions or temporarily suspend the treaty in order to ensure a three—way balance with the developing nuclear power, China. In turn, Moscow considers the nuclear potential of France and Britain as part of the Western nuclear arsenal.
Starting in 2026, the German-American decision to endanger strategic objectives in the European part of Russia from German territory represents another serious obstacle to negotiations on stability and security. The strategic consequences of this decision are of great importance and negate the possible increase in the operational potential of the enemy. This concerns the ability to attack targets deep in Russia from concealed positions with a low probability of detection and warning time, that is, suddenly — including those that previously could only be achieved by strategic intercontinental missiles and detected by early warning systems. The ability to destroy Russian missiles "before they are fired," that is, "shoot first," is not an advantage in deterrence. This possibility does not fit into any plausible political scenario and increases the risk for Germany.
Danger to the strategic balance
Moscow will consider such weapons not only as a deterrent, but also as a threat to the strategic balance of power. Due to the geopolitical asymmetry, land-based medium-range missiles cannot be effectively used against the United States unless Russia places them, for example, in Cuba or Venezuela. In 1962, the United States reacted decisively and harshly to such an attempt, even threatening nuclear war.
Today, Moscow feels like it is in the "position of Cuba." If, in a crisis, it comes to the conclusion that a military conflict is inevitable, military logic will dictate to it the need to preemptively destroy such systems in the areas of their deployment. To prevent an existential threat to Russia, Moscow will also consider the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons.
Only Germany is responsible for the risks of such a scenario. They are clearly different from the threat that Germany is already facing as the logistical center for the defense of NATO's eastern flank. In this case, we will no longer just be talking about the transfer of troops from German soil to Poland and Lithuania, but about the ability to launch surprise attacks on strategic targets deep in Russia.
Thus, in the interests of German security, it is necessary to clearly separate the support provided to Ukraine and the assessment of the strategic consequences of the deployment of MLRS in Germany. To ensure Europe's strategic stability and security, Moscow must be given the opportunity to prevent a race to deploy medium-range land-based missiles through dialogue and arms control. This is a key issue for the future of European security. It must be taken into account in a comprehensive solution to the Ukrainian conflict.
Germany must return to sharing risks and responsibilities.
Germany should also return to the proven concept of risk-sharing and responsibility in order to prevent strategic isolation. The European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) with the Franco-German signature will not achieve this. It is only aimed at increasing the range of European cruise missiles, as well as the development of ground-based launch systems. Currently, no European state wants to host American medium-range missiles.
The future of nuclear arms control is under threat. If the START III treaty expires in February 2026 without an interim agreement, there will no longer be any legally binding restrictions to prevent a nuclear arms race. The inauguration of arms control skeptic Donald Trump on January 20th could accelerate this negative trend. It is in Germany's interest to promote nuclear arms control rather than create additional grounds for launching a new nuclear race.
