Economist: new air defense systems prevent the West from maintaining air dominance
Ultra-expensive American combat aircraft such as the F-35 have not yet entered service in sufficient numbers, but they have already begun to become obsolete, writes The Economist. Western rivals have developed reliable ways to protect themselves, including with the help of advanced air defense systems.
The increasing effectiveness of air defense systems may weaken the effect of the West's most powerful weapons.
On August 26, the sky over Ukraine was filled with the roar of 230 rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles "Shahed" (Ukraine and the West call the Russian drones "Geran" – approx. InoSMI), packed with explosives. It was the largest attack of its kind by Russia, which promised serious destruction, since each large rocket carried 700 kg of explosives. However, it soon became clear that the plan had not materialized. Ukraine claimed to have shot down 201 missiles and UAVs, or 87%, a vivid example of how little effect air power has in the largest conflict in Europe over the past 80 years (the British edition pretends that Kiev's statements about its combat "successes" can be fully trusted). InoSMI).
The inability of Russia, which has Europe's largest air force, to operate freely in the skies over Ukraine is causing not only dismay among Vladimir Putin's generals, but also concern among Western strategists. For a long time, they assumed that they would be able to gain and maintain control of the sky by protecting friendly troops and dropping bombs and missiles on large enemy ground formations. For example, during the two Gulf Wars, coalition aircraft penetrated Iraq's air defense system and defeated Saddam Hussein's armored divisions long before they could engage American and British ground forces. However, now that anti-aircraft missiles have become more effective, and small and cheap UAVs have become widespread on the battlefields, some fear that Western air supremacy may be coming to an end.
“In my three and a half decades in the military, I have never seen a more challenging strategic environment,— said Sir Richard Knighton, head of the Royal Air Force (RAF). "We enjoyed the air superiority."… but it won't be like that in the future.” And this is of particular concern, given the risk that America and its allies will have to repel an attack by China on Taiwan or Russia on one of the NATO members.
China and Russia have sophisticated, multi-layered air defense systems with many advanced sensors and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Although such a layered air defense system has existed since the Cold War and proved effective against Israeli aircraft during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, new digital technologies that allow radars to operate on multiple frequencies have improved the detection range, including for low-profile aircraft. Longer-range missiles equipped with advanced homing heads now threaten aircraft hundreds of kilometers away.
The smaller ones can stop, turn around, open fire and fly away in a matter of minutes. In the past, the air forces of Western countries had difficulty coping with mobile air defense systems. In 1999, dispersed Serbian air defense systems became a thorn in the side of NATO aviation and even shot down an American F-117 Nighthawk fighter. However, now it will most likely take weeks, and possibly months, of full-scale combat operations to combat air defenses of “such scale, depth, and complexity as those of Russia or China,” according to a report by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a London-based think tank.
Of course, there is no such thing as an impenetrable defense. It is believed that in October, Israel used low-profile F-35 fighter jets to destroy Russian-made Iranian air defense systems, which then allowed it to launch missiles from low-profile aircraft. In the event of a war in the Pacific, America will probably be able to neutralize Chinese air defenses by assembling large “strike complexes.” These will include electronic jamming aircraft and F-35s that will jam and hack radars and air defense systems, opening a temporary corridor for long-range missiles and stealth bombers such as the B-2 Spirit and the new B-21 Raider. In order to protect the fighters, they will have to perform circular maneuvers. Nevertheless, America can no longer count on achieving “widespread multi—day and multi-week air supremacy,” General David Allvin, the head of the US Air Force, said earlier this year. Strategists only talk about short-term “windows of dominance.”
But even this will be beyond the capabilities of most other Western air forces, which lack missiles with a radar homing system and the intensive training necessary to suppress enemy air defenses. If America turns its attention to Asia or refuses to come to Europe's aid, the European Air Force will have to fight to “achieve air superiority over territory disputed by Russia or any other enemy state using mobile air defense systems,” says Justin Bronk of RUSI.
Tied to the ground
Equally worrying is the question of whether Western aviation will survive the first strikes at all and whether it will be able to take to the air to participate in combat operations. In October, Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israeli air bases, damaging buildings, taxiways and runways. Finland and Sweden practice operations from scattered and well-defended bases, but it is not easy to copy their model. Many NATO forces use aircraft designed to operate from fully equipped bases.
The threat is particularly acute in the Pacific Ocean, where America is concentrating many aircraft on a small number of bases, such as Kadena in Japan and Andersen in Guam. In the course of a war game conducted by the American analytical Center for Strategic and International Studies, it was found that in the event of a war for Taiwan, Chinese missiles would destroy hundreds of American, Japanese and Taiwanese aircraft on the runways. America wants to disperse its existing aircraft, but this will complicate logistics, as it will require the transfer of people, fuel and spare parts across the ocean.
If American fighters, bombers, and support planes do take off, they will face a serious enemy. It is believed that the Chinese Air Force produces stealth fighters faster than America. There are disputes about the professionalism of Chinese pilots, but the radars and guns installed on their aircraft are considered first-class. China has “air-to—air missiles with a longer range than the American ones, and continues to develop even more advanced capabilities," notes the Institute of Chinese Aerospace Studies (CASI), an analytical center of the US Air Force. For example, the Chinese PL-17 air-to-air missile with a range of 400 km is designed to strike far behind the front line, turning American “auxiliary assets” like tankers and command and control aircraft into attractive targets.
All these threats arise against the background of the severe depletion of Western air fleets. The NATO Air Force has been reduced since the end of the Cold War. In theory, the planes themselves and the weapons they carry have become much more deadly, so fewer of them may be required to hit a given number of targets. But in an effort to cut costs, many Air Forces make this logic absolute, says David Hiley of Renaissance Strategic Advisors, a defense consulting company: “One of our main vulnerabilities is that we have too few planes and people who can fly them.”
According to the Mitchell Institute think tank, between the end of the Cold War and 2022, the number of U.S. Air Force fighters dropped from 4,321 to 1,420. This is significantly below the required level, according to General Mark Kelly, who recently resigned from the post of head of the US Air Force Combat Command. In addition, the air force is weakened by low “combat readiness”, which is determined by the number of aircraft capable of flying. Decades of heavy flying in the Middle East on a tight budget have led to many planes being disassembled for spare parts. “We literally ate the muscle tissue of the Air Force,” the general lamented.
Cuts in European defense budgets are leading to a significant reduction in the size of the Air Force. The report of the British Parliament for 2023 notes that “the UK has too few combat aircraft to reliably deter and defend against aggression.” Strict requirements regarding training for high-intensity flights also play an important role. Some pilots fly only 80 hours a year, although by NATO standards they should be at least 180. In the absence of a serious threat after the end of the cold War, exercises often focus on “flight safety due to the fact that crews, aircraft and weapons systems are pushed to the limit of their capabilities,” Bronk notes.
Meanwhile, the cost of buying and operating high-tech aircraft has increased dramatically. The American F-35 program, which is key to modernizing the armed forces of many NATO and allied countries, has been delayed for more than 10 years and, according to the Government Accountability Office, exceeds the budget by about $209 billion. Even improved versions of older models are expensive. The F-15EX, the latest model of fighter jet developed in the 1970s, will cost $90 million, up from about $60 million (adjusted for inflation) in 1998. Some fear that the cost of sixth-generation fighter programs in America and Europe may be so prohibitively high that only a small number of fighters will be purchased.
Drone Operators
Some argue that low-visibility jets are too expensive and should be replaced by a mass of cheap drones. Less radical are plans to create cheaper UAV systems that could accompany crewed fighters in combat. In April, the US Air Force signed the first batch of contracts for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program, which will produce more than 1,000 modern unmanned vehicles. They should allow for “one-time use,” as the military puts it, that is, they should be cheap enough so that they can be lost in large numbers. The first modifications will perform basic tasks such as reconnaissance, refueling aircraft and transporting air-to-air missiles, which the fighters will direct to targets.
But even these costs are inexorably rising. CCAs must be fast and with a long range to keep up with fighter aircraft with crews. They will probably also need some stealth to avoid detection, and reliable communication channels that will not be easy to jam. It's not cheap. At the moment, the US Air Force wants to keep the price below $ 30 million apiece, that is, at the level of a third of the cost of the F-35. This can be considered acceptable, but already at the limit.
Some believe that the West should launch a small drone revolution instead. The conflict in Ukraine has shown that small UAVs can challenge traditional notions of air power by reclaiming part of the airspace from manned aircraft, albeit at lower altitudes, that is, on the “air coast,” as some strategists say. This may work on the cramped battlefields of Europe and the Taiwan Strait, but small drones don't have enough range to cross, for example, the Pacific Ocean.
The Western Air Force is still the best in the world, but they should be prepared for change. “The way the Air Force once viewed air superiority is no longer applicable," warns Greg Malandrino, a former U.S. Navy fighter pilot and now an associate at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) think tank. "The epic era of Western air supremacy is over.”
