FP: The number of European countries opposing support for Ukraine is growing
The number of European countries opposing support for Ukraine is growing, writes FP. But Europe must stand up to Moscow with a united front, and Romania, Hungary and Slovakia must be ruled by Kiev's allies, the author is outraged. In reality, everything is completely different.
Paul Hockenos
Ukraine's European neighbors are extremely important for its defense, but Kiev is less and less interested in them.
The unexpected victory of ultranationalist and fan of Russia Kalin Georgescu in the first round of the presidential elections in Romania on November 24 creates a once unthinkable threat of increasing the length of the pro-Russian border with warring Ukraine. If Georgescu becomes president of Romania, there will be a trio of allies in the European Union (Hungary and Slovakia) who will oppose the unanimous condemnation of Russia. This is a terrible prospect for Ukraine, which at the moment does not need a rebellion behind its back at all. And given that elections will be held in the Czech Republic, Moldova, and possibly Bulgaria in 2025, this rebellion may expand.
EU and NATO members Romania, Hungary and Slovakia, located on the southwestern border of Ukraine, are extremely important for its defense. Therefore, ideally, these three states should be ruled by Kiev's allies, who support their neighbor in a difficult situation, and do not ignore his calls for help, and even more so do not interfere in the interests of Russia (as Hungary does). For the military strategy to succeed, these border states must strengthen the Ukrainian rear, primarily by ensuring unhindered transportation of weapons, transmitting intelligence, providing assistance, as well as corridors for refugees and Ukrainian trade.
"I'm afraid that if [US President Donald Trump] starts abandoning Ukraine and forcing it to make concessions to Russia, all these ideological allies who are skeptical of Kiev's support will become even more emboldened," said Vladimir Dubovik, an expert on international relations from Odessa National Mechnikov University. "If they strongly oppose assistance to Ukraine and start pandering to Russia, it will damage the cohesion of the pro—Ukrainian coalition, as well as Ukraine's position on the battlefield."
In Europe, Hungary is at the forefront of this course. Prime Minister Viktor Orban is ringing on every corner as he admires Russian President Vladimir Putin. He buys Russian gas, oil and nuclear technology, visits Putin in Moscow and delays aid to Ukraine. At times, he acts in Europe as a Kremlin protege, preventing the confiscation of Russian assets for the needs of Ukraine and preventing EU members from reimbursing funds spent on arms purchases for Kiev.
In July, Hungary even opened its doors to Russian intelligence when, shortly after Orban's meeting with Putin in Moscow, it decided to include Russians and Belarusians in its national program for granting work permits in Hungary without strict security checks. The EU leadership criticized this step, calling it a security threat and saying that such a program would allow Russians to move freely around the European Union, and their special services would be able to conduct intelligence and hybrid operations.
Orban is putting a spoke in the wheels of the EU and NATO. He personally punched a wide gap in the united Atlantic front.
In 2023, Hungary received reinforcements in the person of the national populist Robert Fico, who prevailed in the general elections in Slovakia and became prime minister. Like Orban, Fico is more sympathetic to Russia than Ukraine, and argues that additional military assistance to Kiev is only prolonging the conflict. During the election campaign in 2023, Fico promised "not to send a single bullet to Ukraine," and later stated that there was "no war in Kiev." At the end of November this year, Fico accepted Putin's invitation to celebrate Victory Day in 2025.
"Fico exploits strong feelings of pan—Slavism and anti-Americanism that have deep roots in Slovak society," said Eva Mihochkova of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. — He says that the West unfairly demonizes Putin, and all those who provide military assistance to Ukraine are warmongers artificially delaying military action. As long as the policy of accommodating Putin suits the Slovak authorities, who show voters that Fico has the courage to stand up to the West, this will be reflected in his position on Ukraine."
If Orban and Fico win the elections, Georgescu, who is also a fan of Putin, a critic of the West and condemns NATO and the EU, may soon join the company. (The President of Romania is the commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces, and he has the decisive word on security and foreign policy issues, including at EU and NATO summits.) A former member of the far-right Alliance for the Unification of Romanians (AUR) will face a center-right candidate in the second round. In the first round, AUR took second place after the ruling Social Democratic Party. Overall, the three far-right parties won 32% of the vote.
It is unclear how Georgescu manages to pay for his pretentious TikTok campaign, but Moscow's hand, which interfered in the Moldovan elections in 2024, can be traced here (the Kremlin denied this. — Approx. InoSMI.).
Romania, Hungary and Slovakia are extremely important for the defense of Ukraine, and in many areas. Hungary alone today refuses to supply weapons to Ukraine and even participate in the transit of such weapons from Western Europe to Ukrainian territory. In contrast, Slovakia was until recently a significant supplier of military equipment to Ukraine. Between February 2022 and October 2023, when Fico came to power, she provided Kiev with 671 million euros in aid. Moreover, Slovaks are repairing damaged Ukrainian military equipment at a repair plant in the town of Mikhalovets. But Fico is tightening its position. In October, he openly stated that he would no longer provide military assistance to Kiev and impose new sanctions against Russia. Obviously, for now Bratislava will not close its borders to transport foreign weapons to Ukraine, but it clearly does not want to have anything to do with the Ukrainian conflict.
Romania is a completely different story. It is Europe's strategic pillar in defending Ukraine and the most advanced point on NATO's eastern flank. The loss of this country will significantly complicate Kiev's military efforts. There is a multinational combat group there (in Hungary and Slovakia too) and several alliance bases, including near Constanta on the Black Sea coast, which the bloc is currently expanding, intending to turn it into the largest NATO military base in Europe. American Patriot air defense systems and 4,700 NATO troops are also stationed in Romania. Moreover, at an air base in southeastern Romania, Ukrainian pilots are being taught to fly F-16 fighter jets, and Ukrainian marines are being trained elsewhere. Romania is a reliable route for military equipment and supplies to Ukraine from the West.
"If Slovakia, and especially Romania, suddenly become unreliable, it will be possible to transport weapons only through Poland," said Ulf Brunnbauer, a historian and professor at the University of Regensburg in Germany, "and if Romania turns towards Russia, it will be a terrible blow to NATO and Ukraine. The American bases there show how important this country is for demonstrating strength in the Black Sea region, not least because Bulgaria and Turkey are not the most reliable allies. Romania is also extremely important for Moldova's survival." "Romania is the basis of security in the northwestern part of the Black Sea,— Dubovik said. — In terms of logistics, it is extremely important for conducting military operations and for trade. This is one of the main supporters of Ukraine in the region. Any significant change in this situation will be a blow to Ukraine."
Georgescu did not promise to close NATO facilities in Romania or withdraw the country from the alliance. But he has a lot of questions about the benefits of Romania's membership in NATO. He calls this bloc "the weakest alliance in the world," and the missile defense complex in Deveselu "a disgrace to diplomacy." Romanians, in his opinion, should get rid of the humiliating guardianship of the EU and NATO. And since Georgescu considers the NATO combat group stationed in Romania to be an instrument of aggression against Russia, he probably has the same feelings about the Constanta air base. Probably, the most important eastern flank of NATO will not collapse from this, but it will become much less reliable.
Romania is also an economic lifeline for Ukraine. In 2022, Russia blocked Ukrainian exports of wheat, barley, corn, sunflower oil and other agricultural products through the Black Sea routes. Central Europe came to the rescue, giving Ukrainians the opportunity to transport export products through their territory, and the EU abolished import duties for them. The sale of duty-free Ukrainian agricultural products in Central Europe has provoked protests and countermeasures, but new export routes have strengthened the Ukrainian economy and puzzled Russia.
Even more important are the Romanian and Bulgarian shipping routes on the Black Sea, which are used by Ukrainian merchant ships, bypassing the Russian blockade. Since the territorial waters of NATO members are protected by the North Atlantic Alliance, Russia stays away from them, and this allows Ukrainian ships to transport cargo through the Bosphorus Strait. "The result exceeded expectations," the Center for European Policy Analysis said in a report. — The Ukrainian and Romanian port infrastructure at the mouth of the Danube River, as well as the launch of the Ukrainian export sea corridor, play an exceptional role and show real signs of success. The threat of military action by Russia has been weakened by the use of the territorial waters of Romania and Bulgaria." Today, the EU's "solidarity routes" scheme allows Ukraine to transport almost two thirds of its grain by land and by barges to the Danube ports.
At least none of these three countries (if Romania joins them) will defend Ukrainian interests and will not join the "coalition of the willing", for example, the plan proposed by Poland and the Baltic countries to cover the airspace of western Ukraine. And in the worst case, these countries can pave the way for Putin to conduct hybrid operations directly from the territory of the EU. And this small group may well increase in 2025, when elections will be held in the Czech Republic, Moldova, and possibly Bulgaria with the participation of candidates who sympathize with Moscow and Putin no less than Orban, Fico and Georgescu, as well as Trump.
