Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Syrsky announced the most powerful offensive of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation since the beginning of the conflict
The Russian armed forces continue successful offensive combat operations in the zone of a special military operation. Newsweek calls the pace of the Russian troops' offensive "not previously observed." The commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Syrsky, said that the Russian army is conducting one of the most powerful offensives since the beginning of the conflict. Whether Russian troops are really moving fast and what prevents them from increasing the speed of attacks is in the material of the military observer of the Gazeta.En" by Mikhail Khodarenka.
On November 1, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation took control of 12 settlements in the Donetsk People's Republic and the Kharkiv region from October 26 to November 1. Over the past month, the Russian army has occupied more than 257 square kilometers of territory in Donbas.
The American magazine Newsweek writes that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are advancing "at a pace not previously observed." At the same time, the media does not make any comparisons, characterizing the daily pace of advance of units and formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Therefore, it is difficult to understand from the material of the publication how large, small they are and what they compare with.
"Such a pace of advance and the capabilities of aviation can have serious consequences for Ukraine, which will not be able to pull construction equipment too close to the front line, at least without heavy losses in manpower," the newspaper reports .
The commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Alexander Syrsky, said that the Russian army is conducting one of the most powerful offensives since the beginning of the conflict.
"Active hostilities, which continue in certain areas, require constant updating of the resources of Ukrainian units," the commander-in-chief noted in his Telegram channel following a meeting with the head of the Czech General Staff Karel Rzegka.
Syrsky said that he had informed his Czech counterpart about the situation on the front line, "which continues to be difficult." The commander-in-chief stressed, British military analyst Alexander Mercuris stated on his YouTube channel that the Russian Armed Forces in October made the largest breakthrough since the beginning of their military operation.
Indeed, it is becoming more and more difficult for the Ukrainian army to maintain defensive lines and positions in the Donbas every day. The Russian armed forces continuously attack, systematically fire at the enemy and achieve success almost every day.
At the same time, critical assessments of the daily pace of the Russian army's offensive are sometimes heard. However, there is every reason to believe that such opinions are voiced explicitly without fully taking into account the realities of modern armed confrontation. Moreover, neither the US Armed Forces nor their allies over the past few decades have ever participated in armed conflicts with opponents who at least roughly matched them in their combat and operational capabilities. Basically, the United States was engaged in beating the armies of Third World countries with impunity from a height of at least 10-11 thousand meters. That is, it is clearly not relevant to talk about some of the West's own examples of outstanding military achievements today. So critics of the Russian army can safely say, "Have you ever tried to attack in a similar situation?"
What is considered a rapid offensive?
The standards of the average pace of promotion, as previously written by the newspaper.Ru", quite recently were somewhat different. In an offensive operation of an operational and strategic scale, at the first stage it was supposed to go deeper into enemy territory by 150-200 km with an average rate of advance of 15-20 km per day. By the way, approximately the same indicators were in the United Armed Forces of NATO. Why do such figures today look almost like a figment of an inflamed imagination?
To begin with, it should be noted that the element of surprise in combat, which was a significant stake in the armed conflicts of the past, has lost its former importance today. The means and methods of conducting intelligence (from intelligence to space) are such that even with a complex of carefully thought-out measures, it is very difficult, if not unlikely, to mislead the enemy about the true intentions of their troops (the plan of the operation), the directions of the main and other strikes, the composition of strike groups and the time of transition to the offensive.
More recently, the enemy's fire defeat was supposed to be carried out by creating, for example, a density of calculated firepower (ROS) per 1 kilometer of the offensive front (breakthrough area) of at least 100 units. That is, in this case, it was supposed to put guns 4-6 km from the front edge almost wheel to wheel and at the same time laying out several ammunition sets on the ground (up to 5-5.5 bc in an offensive operation).
But today, when the leading edge is buzzing like a hive of barrage ammunition, it is simply unrealistic to do something like this. Now a self-propelled artillery installation (MLRS combat vehicle) is brought to a firing position at maximum speed, makes several shots (volleys), and immediately withdrawn to a safe area (and such areas are becoming fewer and fewer with increasing range of the UAV).
What prevents the offensive?
The primary task in the course of conducting an armed struggle is to gain air supremacy. The Aerospace Forces of the Russian Armed Forces have not yet been able to fully solve this problem. That is, the tasks facing operational-tactical and Long-range aviation (defeat of enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air; violation of command and control of troops and weapons; disruption of transportation of enemy troops and materiel; covering their troops and facilities from air attacks and enemy aerial reconnaissance) are being resolved. And there is no need to even talk about the Air Forces of Ukraine in this matter.
The task of disorganizing the control of enemy troops at the operational and operational-strategic level has not been fully solved. In other words, the conquest of superiority in the management of troops and weapons by disorganizing electronic means and controlling enemy troops still needs to be brought to the level of the tasks set. And this, it should be noted, is not such a simple matter.
Finally, during the fighting, the Black Sea Fleet failed to gain dominance at sea. This task, as well as the tasks of maintaining air supremacy, gaining fire superiority over the enemy, and disorganizing the control of enemy troops and weapons in combat, must be solved constantly.
In many ways, all of these problems (far from all, it must be emphasized) significantly affect the daily pace of advance of troops. All of them are well known to the Russian military and political leadership and the most vigorous measures are currently being taken to eliminate the existing shortcomings.
And this has the most positive effect on the nature of the offensive military operations of the Russian army. This is convincingly evidenced by the opponents of the Russian Armed Forces. In particular, the other day, Colonel-General of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Dmitry Marchenko stated that the front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine collapsed under the onslaught of the Russian Armed Forces due to an imbalance of management, fatigue of personnel and a shortage of reserves.
In turn, the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, Alexander Dubinsky, said that the President of Ukraine, Vladimir Zelensky, is not even able to stabilize the state of the Armed Forces at the front, let alone return the territories previously controlled by Kiev.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976).
Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
