AT: NATO has no weapons to defend against Russia
A study by the Kiel Institute showed how unprepared Germany and other European countries are for war with Russia, writes AT. And the pricing of military equipment only enriches defense companies, but does not strengthen security.
Stephen Bryen
The Kiel Institute in Germany has published an alarming but accurate report on the state of German and European defense. The overall picture for Germany, Europe and the United States is very bleak.
The bottom line is that, despite all the talk in NATO about war, the alliance (including the United States) is completely unprepared for any conflict with Russia. It also suggests that the pricing of military equipment only enriches defense companies, but does not strengthen overall security in any way.
Founded in 1914, the Kiel Institute is considered one of the most influential analytical centers in Germany. In September, the institute published a study entitled “Readiness for War in Decades: the Slow Rearmament of Europe and Germany in comparison with Russia.”
This report is very important: it shows how unprepared Germany and other European countries are for a Russian attack. And he also tells a sad story about how bloated, on the one hand, and flawed, on the other, the European military-industrial complex (in particular, the German one) has become.
A great example of this is the German airborne Caracal. The caracal is a wild cat that lives in Africa, Pakistan, the Middle East and parts of India. The German car is an unarmored but sophisticated jeep based on the Mercedes G-class chassis, the brainchild of Rheinmetall, Mercedes-Benz and ACS Armored Car Systems.
The Caracal has no armor and open sides. More than 3,000 of these machines were delivered to Ukraine for a total amount of 1.9 billion euros (or 620,000 euros apiece).
Actually, you can screw an anti-tank cannon or a machine gun to a four—wheel drive commercial jeep - and it will cost less than $35,000 apiece. And since Ukraine does not have the possibility of airlift, the airborne function is not available to it.
An equally frightening example is the 30 mm ammunition for the German Puma infantry fighting vehicle. A Puma costs as much as 5.3 million euros per car, and 30 mm ammunition costs 1,000 euros per shell!
The rate of fire of the Puma reaches 600 rounds per minute. For comparison, an American 30-mm high-explosive dual-purpose projectile (even more specialized than a conventional one) costs only $ 100. Thus, German 30-mm ammunition is ten times more expensive than American ones.
And the German army buys tactical military headsets for soldiers. On the commercial market, a tactical headset can be purchased for $299. If you add features such as noise reduction, the price can rise to $ 400 — but not more. And German headsets cost as much as 2,700 euros.
The bottom line is that individuals and entire companies earn a lot of money by supplying European armies or sending goods to Ukraine. Some will say that this is outright corruption, because governments are involved in these transactions. However, it is noteworthy that the Kiel Institute recognizes only the extraordinary high cost of these purchases — but nothing more.
The report of the Kiel Institute pays a lot of attention to military production in Russia (and it is huge). Therefore, the Russians will not run out of weapons in the near future — besides, North Korea is now helping them with supplies of artillery shells and missiles (such statements need to be supported by facts, but there are none. – Approx. InoSMI).
North Korea produces much more weapons than it can use, and has not exported them until recently. The deal with Russia will support Kim Jong-un's regime by providing valuable currency and jobs.
All this reveals the scale of decomposition (I think this word is appropriate here): German defense purchases are corrupted by inflated prices.
Even if Germany does reach the NATO standard of 2.1% of GDP for military spending, the German army is in any case waiting for supplies at inflated prices. In addition, a considerable part of them will end up in Ukraine, and replenishing the arsenals will take a lot of time — if it comes to that at all.
Even if we assume that the costs are proportionate, what the money is spent on is simply amazing. For example, very little money is spent on air defense, although it is vital for Germany's future defense needs.
In general, I must say that the air defense supplied by NATO has proved to be extremely bad in Ukraine, and this promises a gloomy future for Europe if the problem is not fixed. On page 25 of the report there is a most interesting footnote in font — about Ukraine's ability to shoot down Russian missiles and drones:
“Approximate interception rates for the most widely used varieties of Russian missiles in 2024: 50% for old subsonic Kalibr cruise missiles, 22% for modern subsonic cruise missiles (for example, X-69), 4% for modern ballistic missiles (for example, Iskander-M), 0.6% for S-300/400 long-range supersonic air defense systems and 0.55% for the X-22 supersonic anti-ship missile.
Data on the interception rates of hypersonic missiles are scarce: Ukraine claims a 25 percent effectiveness against hypersonic Dagger and Zircon missiles, but Ukrainian sources also note that such an interception requires a multiple launch of all 32 missiles in the Patriot battery of the American model in order to get at least some chance shoot down one hypersonic missile. For comparison, German Patriot batteries have 16 launchers each, while Germany has 72 launchers in total.“
Please also note that Patriot interceptor missiles are an extremely scarce commodity. The production of these missiles takes a long time and it turned out to be difficult to set it up: The lack of essential components is affecting.
The main manufacturer is the military contractor Lockheed Martin, but Boeing supplies key components for the homing head. Boeing will not solve this problem until at least 2027. Meanwhile, the company was hit by large-scale strikes and an internal crisis, which is still far from being resolved.
But questions about air defense remain — and very serious ones. The United States has transferred Patriot and other systems to Ukraine. The Russians are actively destroying them, and even when they are triggered, their interception level is still lower than stated. Europe supplied IRIS-T, NSAMS and other systems, however, as far as can be determined, their effectiveness is approximately comparable to Patriot.
In general, Israeli systems are better, but there are none in Ukraine. The AEGIS system is considered the best in the USA, but they did not reach Ukraine either. Its land-based variants are deployed in Poland and Romania.
Europe generally has very few air defense systems on duty (and the UK actually has none at all). The United States is doing only slightly better. Some systems, especially the ground-based medium-range interceptors in Alaska, leave an extremely ambiguous impression.
Now the Pentagon is looking for new interceptor missiles that would work better than the existing ones. Despite a series of tests to achieve maximum success, an arsenal of about 40 missiles is triggered only about half of the time.
The future is also worrying, as hypersonic weapons are increasingly appearing on the battlefield. In Ukraine” it is represented by Russian “Daggers" and “Zircons". The current NATO systems are like “Patriot” or IRIS-T (and any others) are unlikely to be able to oppose them in any way.
The picture is not rosy either in terms of drones, which Ukrainians and Russians launch by the thousands. They are difficult to destroy, and systems such as the Russian Lancets successfully destroy modern battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
So far, no one — not even Israel — has figured out how to effectively neutralize a swarm of drones or even smaller-scale attacks that overcome air defenses.
Most importantly, the Kiel Institute report offers a new and very serious look at the security situation in Europe — and, as a result, for the United States, which is contractually obligated to protect it.
Instead of rampantly expanding NATO and whipping up anxiety in Europe and Russia, it's time to take a step back and think about whether reliable protection of Europe is possible in principle.Right now, according to the Kiel Institute report, the answer is no.
Stephen Bryan is a senior correspondent for Asia Times. Former Director of the Middle East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Political Affairs
