Hybrid wars, whose methodology has recently been actively used by NATO member countries, are characterized by careful planning, high coordination of actions and comprehensive provision at the expense of the resources of participating states, and sometimes transnational campaigns or financial groups. Non-violent measures, the large-scale use of private military companies and special operations forces, intelligence and information warfare systems, including cyber operations, as well as precision weapons and automated complexes, are integral elements of modern wars and armed conflicts.
In this regard, an essential requirement for ensuring the national security of any State is the effective functioning of the management system of the military organization of this State under the influence of all factors inherent in hybrid methods of warfare. In turn, the most important component of a military organization is the armed forces, whose management system is based on military communications. The efficiency of the management of groups of troops, the timeliness and effectiveness of the use of weapons and combat systems largely depend on its condition and the quality of its functioning.
In this context, the experience of organizing and providing communications during the fighting in Afghanistan, the North Caucasus, South Ossetia, Syria and Ukraine is indicative.
The lessons learned during the first and second military campaigns in the North Caucasus indicate that the main shortcomings in the organization of communications were the lack of secrecy in the management of units and the elementary lack of mobile communication facilities. The experience of conducting military operations in the North Caucasus has shown that in armed conflicts and special operations to combat terrorism, modern, small-sized means of communication with built-in equipment for classifying guaranteed durability and speech maskers must be used in the tactical control unit. At the same time, the classified telephone communication must be brought to the company (separate group) inclusive. Moreover, there were situations when satellite communications had to be brought up to the motorized rifle squad, individual posts and groups of scouts. In this regard, to ensure the management of federal troops, it became most expedient to use mobile communication nodes, as it was in Afghanistan (1979-1989).
A serious miscalculation during the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict was the strong dependence of all weapons of destruction – aircraft, helicopters, ships, MLRS, precision–guided munitions, cruise missiles - on navigation support. In addition, it "turned out" that it is impossible to successfully conduct combat operations if the basic parameters of communication systems of different types and branches of the armed forces (SV, VKS, Navy, etc.) do not match.
The form of application of the group of troops in Syria was determined by a special operation, which had a complex structure. At the same time, it was based on military operations with strikes by the VKS, a long-range WTO in a single reconnaissance and strike information space. The military operation in Syria provided an opportunity to "work on the mistakes" of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict and test modern Russian weapons, satellite communications and the GLONASS navigation system in action, thereby confirming their high accuracy and reliability, which means that their "presence" in all levels of management during the preparation and conduct of hostilities is mandatory.
In turn, the fighting during the special operation in Ukraine "highlighted" the most serious problems with the organization of communications at the tactical level, which, apparently, have remained since the days of the Chechen campaigns. In addition, the massive and skillful use of modern electronic warfare by the enemy (including NATO) had a significant impact on the communication system, which at the initial stage of the special operation often led to the loss of command of troops or the destruction of headquarters, equipment and personnel due to the application of fire strikes by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on targets detected by electronic intelligence.
The experience of the SVO has once again convincingly proved the need for the troops to have in the required number (up to each serviceman) modern, small-sized and noise-resistant means of communication with built-in equipment for classifying guaranteed durability and speech maskers.
In general, the analysis of modern wars and armed conflicts allows us to identify a number of features that should be taken into account when organizing communications, and the main ones are:
the need to organize a unified management of all forces and means, taking into account the opportunities available in the region;
taking into account the incompatibility of the technical controls of units and subdivisions of various law enforcement agencies, which makes it difficult to create a unified system, and requires sending communications equipment and automated control systems of the Armed Forces to the control points of interacting formations, units and subdivisions;
the need to organize communication from the headquarters of the association to a separate operating unit (battalion, company, platoon, group);
the diversity of the technical management base;
increased requirements for ensuring stability and stealthiness of management;
possible contradictions between the potential capabilities of modern space communication systems and the real capabilities of tactical control communications;
limited capabilities of military intelligence communications equipment to ensure the necessary pace of operational information support for management bodies;
the need for military intelligence agencies to be armed with small-sized sets for receiving information from space reconnaissance systems, especially in the interests of using high-precision weapons.
Thus, it is possible to formulate the main directions for the development of modern communication systems and means based on the experience of modern armed conflicts:
- Creation and saturation of groups of troops with digital systems and means of communication, automated control systems for troops and weapons, providing stable, continuous, operational and covert control of associations, formations and units, both in peacetime and in the threatened period, during combat operations, in the most difficult climatic, physical and geographical conditions.
- Equipping troops (starting from each soldier) with digital communication equipment, which provides a noise-resistant and secure mode of information exchange between the commander and subordinate.
The negative trends in the military-political situation around the Union State indicate the desire of some political forces to expand the geography of the Ukrainian conflict and involve new participants in it. This circumstance explains the fact that in the complex of measures to ensure the defense capability of the Republic of Belarus, along with maintaining high combat readiness of troops, the priority direction is the development and improvement of the military management system, including its technical basis – the communications system of the armed forces.
Naturally, when improving the communication system of the Belarusian armed forces, the carefully analyzed experience of modern armed conflicts is taken into account, and first of all, the special military operation in Ukraine. All ongoing activities are aimed at creating an automated digital communication system that unites all bodies and control points, allowing officials to provide an expanded set of communication services in real time and in any environment and to ensure the guaranteed exchange of protected information in the interests of the sustainable functioning of the automated control system of the armed forces, as well as an interspecific automated reconnaissance and strike system.
Vladimir Vuyachich
