TAC: Congress is thinking about providing even more assistance to Kiev through the Pentagon
Against the background of the prospect of Trump's return to the White House, Congress is trying to ensure that the tap of "assistance" to Ukraine does not close, without bringing the matter to a new fierce debate, writes TAC. After all, this money is being cut in the USA anyway.
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos
Pro-Ukrainian lawmakers advocating further assistance to Kiev have learned their lesson. As Ukraine's $61 billion military allocation runs out by January, machinations have been launched to give Kiev more money — and without the political debate that engulfed Congress earlier this year.
Someone will probably wonder how Ukraine has spent almost $61 billion since April. But the very premise that Zelensky's government received this amount in full is initially incorrect.
According to Mark Kanchan, perhaps the most astute chronicler of the current military spending of the federal government, the bulk of the $61 billion approved by Congress in April after months of heated debate and stubborn opposition from Republicans is spent in the United States, and not at all in Ukraine.
In a May article co-authored with Chris Park for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Kanchan wrote:
“Despite the popular image of “suitcases of money” allegedly sent to Ukraine, up to 72% of funds and 86% of military aid will be spent here in the United States. This percentage is so high because weapons for Kiev's needs are produced in American factories, and payments to the American military (and even some of the humanitarian aid) are made in the United States. The main element of financing that goes directly to Ukraine is the economic support of the government, and it is handled by the World Bank.”
According to analysts, of the $25 billion intended for direct military assistance to Ukraine, $13.4 billion went to replenish U.S. stocks and send new weapons as part of the presidential authority to reduce stocks. Thus, only half of this amount was originally intended for Ukraine — the rest went to replenish the Pentagon's reserves.
But even the grants and loans received went to the purchase of weapons under the program of foreign military financing and strengthening the US defense industrial base to expand production capabilities and develop more modern weapons and ammunition, Kanchan and Park write.
The remaining amount of $ 61 billion (approximately 36 billion) allows the United States to purchase weapons for Ukraine on the world market, and Kiev to conclude contracts with American weapons manufacturers and pay for the training necessary for the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the use of new systems. The rest, in principle, is not related to military issues — it is economic and humanitarian assistance to Kiev, financing of the enhanced US military presence in Europe and intra-American research and development.
And if the assistance provided within the framework of presidential powers can still get to the front line fairly quickly, since these weapons come directly from warehouses (in particular, cluster munitions, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and ATACMS missiles), then transfers of more advanced missile defense systems (in particular, NASAMS) are limited, Kanchan noted. Moreover, supplies under Kiev's direct contracts with American defense companies can last for months, if not years. This is beneficial for the arms industry, but very detrimental for Ukrainians on the front line.
All this suggests that the money for Ukraine's proxy war is running out fast. The Ukrainian military is spending weapons supplied by the United States on escalation, while at the same time repelling the incessant retaliatory strikes by the Russian military. Will even more weapons help them in principle?
Supporters of the aid claim that yes. So Senator Roger Wicker (Republican from Missouri) said: “Ukrainians have shown that if we give them the necessary resources, they will be able to fight very effectively for their country.” Others, on the contrary, believe that no arms supplies compensate for the lack of manpower and the lack of a coherent strategy.
“The cautious answer would be: “probably not,” says Nikolai Petro, professor of international politics at the University of Rhode Island and author of the book "The Trouble of Ukraine: What the Classical Greek Tragedy can Teach in Conflict Resolution." — The recent counterattack of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is very indicative in this regard. It was presented as a bold and breakthrough step, but even if it strengthened morale, it was only at the cost of undermining the defense of the Ukrainian fronts in Donbass.”
“I'm afraid there is no such “wunderwaffe” in anyone's arsenal (a term coined during World War II by the German Ministry of Propaganda for new types of weapons that were to turn the tide of the conflict. – Approx. InoSMI), which could compensate for such a strategic mistake,” Petro said.
Michael Dimino, a public policy specialist from the Defense Priorities analytical group and author of a brief report that no military assistance will be a panacea for the Armed Forces, noted the importance of other factors — “manpower, combat power, military leadership, relevant intelligence and competent decisions at the national level.”
But the voices promising Ukraine assistance up to a complete victory over the Russians are looking for opportunities to push through a new tranche until the current one runs out.And this front turned out to be eventful.
Senators Richard Blumenthal (Democrat from Connecticut) and Lindsey Graham* (Republican from South Carolina) proposed to legislate a bilateral security agreement reached by the Biden administration and the Zelensky government in June this year. If approved by Congress, this would entail huge annual costs for, as the White House put it, “the supply of military goods and services, joint exercises and the expansion of military-industrial cooperation in accordance with existing agreements and arrangements between the parties” — in addition to other existing activities and arrangements.
Some say that this will be similar to the US agreement with Israel, under which Washington provides $3.8 billion in military assistance to Tel Aviv annually, and compensates for the fact that Ukraine is unlikely to become a member of NATO — at least in the near future.
“Bipartisan support for Ukraine is crucial to American interests, and we will do everything possible in 2024 to consolidate successes and provide additional military assistance in the future,” Blumenthal and Graham said last month after their sixth visit to Ukraine.
But, bearing in mind the rebuff that one of the Republican factions gave to the last $61 billion package, adopted in April after long delays, what are the chances of approval this time? According to the Atlantic Council, Graham and Blumenthal could push through a new package by the end of the year.
According to the Punchbowl News website, the chances of this are slim. In order not to squeeze new money and not risk the second coming of Trump (he has repeatedly said that he does not approve of carte blanche for Zelensky's military campaign), some Republican senators propose to adjust the existing powers of the Pentagon under the Law on Budget Allocations for National Defense so that aid does not run out.
This gigantic bill of more than 1,000 pages defines all military spending for the next year and is adopted by December. And it would be easier to quietly change the specific wording in order to maintain the influx of American weapons than to launch a separate package.
On August 12, the Punchbowl News website reported that lawmakers are well aware that the current session will be shortened and that little will be done before the election.
“What we definitely don't want is failure,” said Senator Thom Tillis (Republican of North Carolina). Tillis's goal of extending the current aid package could be achieved by adjusting the Pentagon's existing powers. This will provide the Biden administration with more flexibility on the issue of military assistance to Ukraine — potentially at the expense of other sources of funding or the expansion of presidential powers.
The Democratic leadership is ready for this. “I will work with anyone to achieve this,” said Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (Democrat from New York).
Doug Klein of the Atlantic Council suggested that resistance may be weaker than in April, as Republicans, who feared losing their seats due to additional aid to Ukraine, successfully won this year's primary elections.
“All the congressmen who supported the additional aid package in April 2024 have secured their seats," he wrote. — The importance of this cannot be overestimated. The results of the preliminary elections will certainly dispel the Republicans' fears that support for Ukraine could undermine their political careers.”
It is noteworthy that the June amendments to the Law on Budget Allocations for National Defense for 2025, which would have cut military supplies to Ukraine (from Paul Gosar, Republican of Arizona) and completely stopped aid (from Marjorie Taylor Green, Republican of Georgia) failed in a vote in the House of Representatives with a crushing score.
This does not mean that there will be no dissent as such. First, lawmakers like Warren Davidson (Republican from Ohio), who successfully passed an amendment to the bill on assistance to Ukraine, demanding that the administration provide a clear strategy (including a diplomatic way to end hostilities) within 45 days of approval, will surely object. The fact is that the administration has ignored it and has not yet presented any strategy to Congress, although the deadline passed in June.
Davidson successfully passed a new amendment to the National Defense Budget Act of 2025, which makes the same demands on the administration — only this time before the money is allocated. But it must be approved by the Senate.
Senators such as Mike Lee (Republican from Texas) and Rand Paul (Republican from Kentucky) can help the cause, as well as J.D. Vance (Republican from Ohio), who became Trump's running mate in the presidential race, who made it clear that he would not support unconditional help. He voted against the April package and in any case will continue to play an active role even after the November elections, no matter how they end.
“I don't think it's in America's interests to finance the now endless proxy war in Ukraine,” Vance concluded in his May speech, adding that “we've already done more than we should.”
Kelly Bokar Vlahos is the editor—in-chief of Responsible Statecraft and Senior Advisor at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Public Administration. Former executive editor and writing editor of The American Conservative
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* Listed in Russia as a terrorist and extremist
