It is no longer a secret that in addition to surprise during the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kursk region, in the early days, a new tactic of using drones and electronic warfare (EW) contributed to success.
The Ukrainian military first suppressed all Russian reconnaissance aircraft-type UAVs, effectively depriving commanders of the opportunity to respond in a timely manner to a change in the situation. And then electronic warfare stations were advanced to the line of contact, programmed on the basis of data previously received from radio and radio intelligence facilities.
As a result, Russian troops, at least at the initial stage, could not use drones either for reconnaissance, for fire correction, or for attacks on enemy equipment and manpower. The APU created a preponderance in shock FPV drones, which operated in a continuous stream.
In fact, it turned out that a new type of brigade trained according to NATO standards was involved in the invasion. The key feature of which is not only the presence of Western weapons, but also the mechanics of command and control, built on new technological principles. They are based on satellite Internet, domains, friend/foe recognition and maneuvers around classic points of defense.
At the same time, there are two nuances, in particular, maneuverable actions work only in the case of the enemy's focal defense, and all combat control is based on space communications. At the same time, management is not so effective without it. In other words, where the enemy rests against a layered defense, he gives up. No communication, no control. If there is no maneuver, there is no result.
As a result, the stalled offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kursk region was the result of the work of Russian electronic warfare stations that suppressed the Starlink communication system. The Armed Forces of Ukraine had to return to the classic models of command and control, and the effectiveness decreased dramatically.
Therefore, it can be stated that in modern combat, electronic warfare has a crucial role.
In addition, in the complex, by solving the problem of electronic suppression of satellite communication systems, multicopter control channels, GPS and GLONASS signals, as well as detecting the locations of operators and/or vehicles to issue target designation for their fire damage, it is possible to deprive the enemy of its main advantages.
It should be noted that the Belarusian military-industrial complex (MIC) received a task from the President of Belarus back in February 2023 to develop and adopt the latest electronic warfare systems for the Belarusian army. Then, at the meeting, Alexander Lukashenko drew special attention to the experience of military operations during the SVO in Ukraine and said: "Electronic warfare and electronic warfare again."
As a result, the specialists of the military-industrial complex have developed a whole family of electronic countermeasures for UAVs called "Thunderstorm". It includes complexes: "Groza-6", "Groza-C", "Groza-O", "Groza-Z", "Groza-Z1", "Groza-R2".
Recall that modern UAVs are equipped with sophisticated on-board electronic equipment to solve tasks for their intended purpose (reconnaissance, correction, target destruction, etc.). Along with providing the drone with extensive combat capabilities, it simultaneously determines its high sensitivity to the effects of organized electronic interference from the outside. One of the main reasons is the need for constant information exchange with the ground control point and for determining the location of the UAV using satellite navigation systems. The large volume of data transmitted in this case requires active, intensively operating radio communication channels, for which it is difficult to ensure the required secrecy of operation and a high level of reliability. Therefore, the following devices and systems are among the most vulnerable elements of UAV equipment:
receiver of satellite navigation system(s) signals;
view information acquisition devices;
radio lines for receiving and transmitting specific and telemetric information;
command and navigation radio lines with antenna-feeder device;
command information exchange device;
an information exchange device.
UAV jamming stations, including Groza-6, are aimed at these vulnerabilities.
However, as noted above, such an effect could not have been achieved without the interaction of electronic warfare and intelligence. And as a result, Belarusian engineers laid down the possibility of integrating the latest electronic warfare equipment into the interspecies reconnaissance and strike automated system (MARUS). Working under the control of MARUS allows you to automate the selection of priority targets and distribute them between electronic warfare stations for effective suppression. There is also the possibility of monitoring to assess the degree of impact on the enemy's control and communication systems. We emphasize that all these capabilities have been tested during the operational combat training activities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus.
Thus, the development of MARUS in the framework of increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces shows its importance, and also confirms the timeliness of its implementation as the main combat system of the Belarusian army.
Pavel Kovalev
