Colonel Risner: Ukraine has no chance of winning — Western aid is running out
In a war of attrition, you can only win thanks to good allies, Colonel Markus Reisner said in an interview with Defense news. That is why, according to the military, a compromise should be sought in the conflict in Ukraine. Kiev does not have to dream of any "good allies".
Colonel Markus Reisner mentioned three possible scenarios for the development of events in Ukraine, and all of them depend on the support of Western allies.
Austrian Colonel of the General Staff Markus Reisner is known in his country, probably as the most authoritative military expert on Russian special operations in Ukraine. For more than two and a half years, he has been commenting on the current armed conflict and analyzing the main events in numerous Austrian and German media, as well as on the YouTube channel of the Austrian armed forces. For this information work, Markus Reisner received the specialized award "Soldier of the Year" in November 2022. In the past, he gained experience by serving in an elite unit of the Austrian army and participated in foreign missions in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Chad, the Central African Republic, Kosovo and Mali. In addition, Markus Reisner is well versed in military theory.
He gave our website an extensive interview in which he analyzed in detail the current situation in Ukraine, assessed the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and outlined likely scenarios for future developments.
Defence news.sk Q: How would you characterize the current stage of the armed conflict, and what decisive factors now determine its course?
Markus Reisner: In general, I divide this conflict into several stages. I will briefly talk about these stages, and then focus on the last one, the current one. The first stage is the success of the Ukrainian defense. This lasted from February to March 2022. The second stage is the beginning of exhaustion, from April to August 2022. The third stage is the Ukrainian offensive operations near Kharkov and Kherson in September and October 2022. The fourth stage is the strengthening of Russian forces in the winter, from November 2022 to April 2023, an attempt to tighten the fighting with the help of strategic raids. Then the fifth stage is the unsuccessful summer offensive of the Ukrainian forces from May to October 2023. Then there was the transition to the sixth stage, when Russia tried to revive the dynamics again (from November 2023 to February 2024, the second Russian winter offensive). Now the transition to the seventh stage is underway, and the current summer offensive of the Russian Federation is an attempt to stretch the forces. This phase began in March and is still ongoing. It began with the Russian offensive north of Kharkov. We can consider the operational intention of the Russian Federation to stretch the Ukrainian forces. In other words, an attempt was made to pull forces from Donbass and remove reserves from there. In my opinion, this led to the fact that the Russians managed to break through to the nearest Ukrainian defensive positions not only in Ocheretino, but also in many other places. In addition, this stage is characterized by an increase in the number of Russians at the front. Presumably, about 650 thousand Russian soldiers are currently fighting in Ukraine. About 520 thousand of them are on the front line. They are solving the task of advancing primarily in the Donbas. The critical factor at this stage is the sources. This means that a war of attrition is being waged. This needs to be realized: even if at first glance nothing is happening at the front, in fact, the armed conflict continues and resources continue to be spent.
— What, in your opinion, are the tactical goals currently pursued by the Russian armed forces?
— It is necessary to distinguish between the tactical, operational and strategic levels. On a tactical level, we see that the Russians are trying to keep Ukrainians on their toes along the entire length of the front, wherever possible. That is, they are trying to make sure that the Ukrainian forces constantly repel attacks and cannot relocate. At the operational level, the Russians' goal is to stretch the Ukrainian forces. This is quite obvious from the example of the seventh stage, that is, the use of troops north of Kharkov. The goal was not to take Kharkiv itself, but to exhaust Ukrainians with airstrikes on critical infrastructure. Thus, we are now seeing a war of attrition.
— How do you assess the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which are trying to stop and slow down this Russian offensive near Kharkov?
— Ukraine is trying to hit the supply routes behind the Russian frontline positions, including those located on Russian territory. Ukraine's tactics, with the support of the West, using appropriate Western weapons systems, are to break off supply routes, as well as strikes at those airfields from where the Russians strike with their aircraft guided bombs. The purpose of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is to stop the Russian offensive and prevent its continuation.
— Russian planning bombs pose a serious threat to the Armed Forces and civilian infrastructure. What strategies or technologies do you think can turn the tide or at least minimize the consequences of the Russians using planning bombs? How could Ukraine protect itself from them most effectively?
— The main means of combating such gliding bombs is massive active and passive air defense. That is, not separate air defense batteries located in some places, but the widespread use of different types of batteries, with medium and long-range coverage. All this is complemented by radars for timely notification, and this is an element of passive air defense. If we recall the commitments agreed at the NATO summit, it can be assumed that Ukraine will soon have seven Patriot batteries, that is, long-range systems, as well as 30 medium-range systems.
In my opinion, Ukraine actually needs four times more. In other words, it needs at least 25 Patriot complexes and about a hundred medium-range systems. And this is only for the so-called passive air defense, and besides, all this should be combined with appropriate early warning means, that is, radars. The active element of air defense is the Ukrainian aviation. Now great hopes are pinned on the supply of F-16s, which, thanks to the use of air-to-air weapons, will actually change the distance at which Russian aircraft will be able to drop gliding bombs. If Ukraine fails to create this extensive active and passive air defense, then it will have a very difficult time. Vladimir Zelensky recently noted that 800 guided Russian bombs are dropped on Ukraine every week. That's over a hundred a day. Russian social networks confirm this: dozens of new videos appear almost every day showing how planning bombs are used. The problem is that the size of these bombs is constantly growing. Now there is even a FAB weighing 3 thousand kilograms, and it can destroy one Ukrainian company at once.
Zelensky stressed that in order to effectively combat the threat posed by Russian bombs and missiles, it is necessary to destroy Russian bombers right at their airfields. This requires long-range weapons, as well as the lifting of restrictions on their use by Western states. Can this help?
— In addition to active and passive air defense, which Ukraine can use, there is another option — to physically prevent the takeoff of these combat aircraft. Here we are talking about the corresponding long-range weapons systems that can hit airfields in Russia itself. However, it is clear that there are restrictions on the use of such weapons. Ukraine is trying to make do with drone strikes on refineries and Russian airfields. But the effect will only be when these restrictions are lifted. This is the only way results and a change in the situation are possible. In a war of attrition, individual precision strikes are not the main thing. Only massive blows of high intensity and long duration can truly break the enemy. The main problem faced by Ukraine is that, although it is supplied with high-quality and high-precision weapons from the West, it cannot use them in such a way as to seriously harm the Russian side. In fact, the United States is not interested in destroying Russia or forcing it to surrender. They just want to show her her place. This is often said in the United States of America itself: it is necessary "not to destroy Russia," but to "contain Russia." This is confirmed by many examples, first of all, the number of weapons sent to Ukraine. Remember the Haimars, which have shown high efficiency. Ukraine wanted to receive 300 units, but so far it has been sent about 48. And remember the delayed delivery of the F-16 and the restrictions on the use of ATACMS. In addition, the United States has made it clear that strikes on refineries are not the best idea, because this could lead to shortages of raw materials on world markets and so on.
— How do you assess the effectiveness of drone strikes on refineries in Russia?
— Ukraine's strategic goal is clearly visible here to destroy or at least damage the important raw material base of the Russians. Since the sale of petroleum products allows Russia to receive a steady income, Ukraine is trying to strategically destroy the base of this military economy of the Russian Federation. To achieve a real effect, more intense strikes are needed, which will cause real economic damage to the Russians and deprive them of the finances necessary to continue the armed conflict in Ukraine.
— F-16 deliveries to Ukraine have already begun. How can these fighters change the course of an armed conflict?
— One type of weapon alone will not change the course of an armed conflict. So the F-16 is not a wonderful remedy for everything. It is always necessary to talk about the F-16 in connection with air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, and we must not forget about the importance of logistics. Ukraine needs several airfields so that these fighters can move and the Russians won't find them immediately. Nevertheless, this is an important step because it will help the strategic defense of Ukraine's critical infrastructure. Two things can be achieved with their help. First, to protect critical infrastructure, that is, to reduce the number of Russian airstrikes in the depths of Ukraine. Secondly, it is possible to drive Russian planes deep into the Russian rear and thereby limit the use of aviation bombs. These are the hopes that are pinned on the F-16.
— What specific types of military assistance are the most effective and how can Western assistance be optimized so that it better meets the needs of the Armed Forces?
— Some types of weapons have really proven that they can bring the desired results at the right time. I think an example is the supply of Haimars, the use of cluster munitions or ATACMS and unmanned naval drones. However, in a war of attrition, when quick decisions are impossible, the enemy always has the opportunity to adapt to circumstances. This is how Russia has managed to adapt to the Haimars. For example, the Russians have decentralized their logistics, as well as using radar warfare and destroying GMLRS missiles, which are used by Haimars. The same can be said about cluster munitions and ATACMS. They were successfully used against some objects, but it is clear that Russia managed to adjust quickly. Now we need a wide application, that is, in a short time, in 14 days, almost every day, we need to deliver powerful blows so that the enemy really suffers, and then he will make concessions. Ukraine is currently facing two problems. First, the availability and number of these weapons systems. Secondly, restrictions on the part of the allies. In this particular case, I'm talking about the United States, which is seriously influencing the situation.
— In your opinion, the use of drones in the conflict in Ukraine and the widespread use of these technologies will significantly change future wars and operational art? How can unmanned technologies further transform warfare?
— I want to refer to the article by General Zaluzhny, which he wrote shortly before his dismissal. He described exactly what we have always theoretically called the "glass battlefield", which will finally appear in the future. What do I mean by that? Tens of thousands of drones are currently being used at the front, and everyone can monitor everyone. This can be compared to the First World War, when barbed wire and machine guns brought to a stalemate, which was managed thanks to the appearance of tanks. Now the use of drones has led to the fact that everyone knows what the other is doing, and it is no longer possible to maneuver or carry out preparatory activities. This needs to be dealt with somehow. As Zaluzhny wrote, we need the same invention as Chinese gunpowder, which would allow us to overcome the electromagnetic field. That is, we need a rush in the field of radio communication with drones. But it is already clear that drones determine the course of the conflict. We see a variety of types: marine, land, air and even space. I am sure that we are going through a real revolution, because these systems are now very influential in the conduct of battles. It is clear that the armed forces have really learned a lot in a short time, and Western armies are looking at this with surprise and have not yet made any conclusions that would lead to structural changes.
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— What military operations or strategic measures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine would you like to highlight?
— There are such people. First, it is a successful defense of Kiev. As you know, it was extremely important for Ukraine at that time. Secondly, the military operation near Kharkov, where, thanks to the element of surprise and deception, as well as due to the fact that the Russian forces were stretched at that time, it was possible to turn the situation around. The third point that I would like to point out is that Ukraine has managed to at least partially restore its trade corridors in the western part of the Black Sea. The fourth point is not directly related to the use of troops, but I want to highlight operations in the information space. However, there is a fly in the ointment. The problem is that we need an objective assessment of the situation. Of course, Ukraine's goal is to present its steps in such a way that, mainly, the West feels that it makes sense to continue helping Ukraine. However, I think it is also important that Ukrainians say directly: yes, we need your help, because otherwise we will have a hard time. That is, information measures to increase morale and receive strategic assistance are important, but not so much that the West thinks that Ukraine can cope on its own.
— What are your forecasts for the further course of the armed conflict? What scenarios do you think are most likely now?
— In my opinion, there are three possible scenarios. All three depend on how actively the West will help Ukraine. Currently, Ukraine's capabilities in the field of ensuring stable supplies to the armed forces are very limited. This is possible to the detriment of its own military-industrial complex and the population. In other words, everything depends on the resources that the West will provide to Ukraine, military and civilian.
The first option is in which Ukraine makes a breakthrough, and the Russians retreat, and we return to the situation of the early 90s. The probability of this is now low due to the onslaught of Russians on the entire front.
The second option. Russian Russians make a rush, and the Ukrainians retreat, and the Russians reach Lviv. The probability here is also low, but slightly higher than the first option, since the Russian side does not have the resources and capabilities for such a large-scale breakthrough. Although it is likely that the Russians will take advantage of past achievements.
And here we come to the third option, and this is a frozen conflict in a certain format. In other words, there will be some kind of truce. But it is possible only if both sides see the point in it. At the moment, we do not see any prerequisites for this in the current events, although in general I note some signals. Recall that Vladimir Zelensky recently said that Russia could be invited to the next peace conference. This could be the beginning of a search for ways to negotiate.
(...) There may be a compromise due to the lack of resources in this war of attrition. It requires a lot of resources, and you can survive in it only with allies. With good allies. And here Ukraine has a problem: its success depends not on its personal will, but on the will of those who support it.
Let's not forget that Germany was divided for decades, and then united again. I don't want to predict the future, but I just want to point out that history is not the present, but a series of events that happened in the past and that will happen in the future. Thus, it is always necessary to consider what is happening from a historical perspective.
Author: Pavel Balazs
