Colonel Khodarenok: continuation of the armed struggle is hopeless for Ukraine
Vladimir Zelensky has recently changed his rhetoric and allowed negotiations with Russia. This is happening against the background of the lack of success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the fronts. Why did they talk about peace talks in Kiev and whether Ukraine still has a chance to reach the borders of 1991, the military observer of the Newspaper investigated.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.
There is a feeling that the military and political leadership in Kiev believes that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are gaining the upper hand in the confrontation with Russia, and therefore it is necessary to demand a cease-fire from Moscow. At the end of June, Vladimir Zelensky declared his unwillingness to prolong the conflict and prepare a plan for its completion this year.
In addition, he recently said that Kiev is not against mediation talks with Russia. Moreover, for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, the Ukrainian leader began to recognize the large irretrievable and sanitary losses of the Armed Forces during the fighting.
Some experts associate the radical revision of Zelensky's rhetoric with defeats at the front and less and less support for the country's political leadership from outside and inside Ukraine.
"Is there any point in running to attack?"
As for the situation on the front line, for many months now, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have not been able to boast even minor tactical successes. The Russian army firmly owns the initiative and attacks the enemy in almost all directions. The APU surrenders one settlement after another. And this has a very disastrous effect on the moral and psychological state of the personnel of the Ukrainian army.
If the army carries out successful offensive operations, goes from success to success, then in this case the forces and capabilities of the personnel are doubled and tripled. The exact opposite situation is now observed in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Zelensky's latest statements will not have the best effect on the mood in Ukrainian units and formations. If the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine talks about peace, then a simple ordinary soldier of his army has a thought: "Am I bragging too much here? And does it make sense for me to run into the attack with foam on my lips and a bayonet at the ready?"
It should be borne in mind that any battle for an ordinary infantryman can end either in death or severe injury. And after such statements by the president, a significant part of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine may have thoughts: "Now the most important thing for us is not to attack the enemy headlong and not sacrifice ourselves in battles with the enemy, but to wait for the signing of peace agreements and return home alive and well."
What happened to Kiev's goals?
And now let's ask ourselves the following questions - what might the political goals of the armed confrontation look like for Kiev at the moment and are they achievable militarily today?
Previously, the strategic tasks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine looked like this - repelling the offensive of the land groups of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and their defeat in the theater of military operations, defeating the strategic reserves of the Russian army, disrupting their regrouping and subsequent entry into the borders of Ukraine in 1991. Quite recently, in Kiev, all this was considered an absolutely real matter.
However, today the achievement of such goals looks like a completely impracticable undertaking. And that's why. Let's consider only two conditions (in fact, there are many more) under which a victorious end to the conflict and access to the borders of 1991 would be real for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
- The first thing any army should do in any armed confrontation is to achieve air superiority. Without this, successful offensive operations are impossible by definition.
What does the Ukrainian Air Force need for this? According to the most approximate estimates, at least 200 multifunctional F-16 fighters, 15-20 long-range radar detection and control aircraft, at least 20 electronic warfare (electronic warfare) jamming aircraft operating in combat formations of strike group aircraft, at least 20 electronic warfare aircraft jamming from the barrage zones. Finally, just mountains of aviation weapons are needed.
Image source: Alina Dzhus/"Newspaper.Ru"
When will all this be part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine? Maybe it will be in the historically foreseeable future, but not in the next six months. But here it should be added that all such weapons cost absolutely unthinkable money, and Ukraine is not going to pay for supplies in principle. And this is also taken into account in the West.
- The second condition. After gaining air supremacy, in order to inflict decisive defeat on the enemy, it is necessary to conduct offensive operations on an operational and operational-strategic scale.
To do this, the Armed Forces of Ukraine needs full-fledged combined arms armies and army corps, which have divisions staffed by wartime states (at this stage, the Armed Forces of the country do not have a single division at all).
What is a combined arms army in a nutshell? This is by no means a mechanical consolidation of several divisions into its composition. There is also a so-called army kit. That is, combined arms formations (divisions) should include a missile brigade, one or two artillery brigades, a rocket artillery regiment, an anti-tank artillery regiment, two or three separate helicopter combat regiments, an engineering and sapper brigade, communications and electronic warfare units, an army material support brigade. And this is not a complete list of parts and formations of the army kit. In fact, there are many more of them.
And to solve the problem of a hypothetical exit to the borders of 1991, the Armed Forces of Ukraine need to have 5-7 full-fledged combined arms armies. Even if a decision is made in Kiev on their formation, they will not appear as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine earlier than six months later. And this, we note, with the uninterrupted supply of appropriate amounts of weapons and military equipment from the West. But the most important problem for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the formation of such associations will be personnel. After all, it is necessary to find hundreds of well-trained officers to staff only the management bodies - headquarters (mainly operational departments).
In short, to solve only these two tasks, the political and military leadership of the country needs a lot of time and even more funds (and where to get them in the required amounts is a big question). And without them, the continuation of the armed struggle for Ukraine is absolutely hopeless, and simply suicidal from a demographic point of view.
During the period of implementation of only these two tasks (yes, we still need to figure out in detail how achievable they are in principle) The Armed forces of Ukraine may suffer very heavy losses in personnel, weapons and military equipment. There will also be further losses of significant areas of the country. And the mobilization resource of the state, it should be noted, is not only far from unlimited, but is already close to exhaustion. It may happen that these losses of the male part of the population of the republic (at the most able-bodied age of 18-50 years) They will have a disastrous impact on the future of Ukraine. And there will simply be no one to build a new country in the near future.
Apparently, it is these circumstances that underlie the statements of the President of Ukraine. Therefore, it is quite possible that the volume of talk about peace will only increase in the near future. But the best way to force any negotiation process is the success of the Russian Armed Forces at the forefront.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
