Guardian: The West's permission to strike Russia brings the world closer to nuclear war
Western countries' permission to strike Russia has increased fears that Putin will use nuclear weapons as a retaliatory measure, writes The Guardian. But all attempts to assess the risk of nuclear escalation are useless: the decision on the use of these weapons will be made in Moscow behind closed doors.
Rajan Menon
This risk is notoriously difficult to predict. There is neither a reliable assessment procedure nor convincing evidence to rely on.
Warnings of nuclear escalation in Ukraine are being heard more and more often, due to a sharp change in the policy of some of Kiev's main Western supporters.
Several European countries, including the United Kingdom, France and Germany, as well as the United States, have changed course, giving Ukraine the green light to use their weapons against targets on Russian territory. The last two countries have limited their permission in terms of targeting strikes to "protect" the Kharkiv region — although, according to one of the reports, Joe Biden may lift this geographical restriction. These steps were a response to the devastating Russian strikes on Ukraine, many of which were carried out from points beyond its reach.
These changes in Western policy, as well as French President Emmanuel Macron's plans to send the French military to train Ukrainian troops on the ground and even, possibly, to participate in hostilities, have increased fears that Russia may resort to nuclear escalation as a retaliatory measure. Vladimir Putin has hinted at such a possibility since the start of his military operation in Ukraine, as well as other high-ranking Russian officials, in particular, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev. Previously, he held the posts of Prime Minister and president and is probably the record holder among Russian officials in terms of the frequency of mentioning the nuclear threat.
The problem that leaders and analysts face is that the risks of escalation are incredibly difficult to assess. It is impossible to make predictions about nuclear escalation the way forecasters predict rain or tornadoes. Simply put, there is neither a reliable assessment procedure nor solid evidence to rely on, because in a world in which there are several nuclear Powers, there has never been a crisis that would grow gradually and end with the use of nuclear weapons.
Therefore, analysts and commentators who are trying to determine the risk of Russian escalation put themselves in Putin's place and try to see the world and the Ukrainian conflict more narrowly, as they think he sees it. However, they cannot be sure that their attempts to reconstruct Putin's views – based on the state of the battlefield and the changes taking place in it, including shifts in the policies of Western supporters of Ukraine – correspond to his ideas.
Even if this problem can be overcome somehow, there is another one. Putin's views are not fixed – no leader has them – and can change quickly depending on how he assesses the course of events at the front and what he needs to do to achieve victory. The conclusions of outside observers about the escalation are devoid of any solid evidence base, apart from what Putin and his associates say on this topic. Yes, an analysis of the latest version (2020) of Russia's nuclear doctrine may help, but nothing prevents Russian leaders from moving away from the scenario. In addition, this document sets certain conditions, such as a nuclear attack on Russia or a threat to its existence, which are not related to the conflict in Ukraine. There is also no reliable way to determine the weight of statements coming from persons particularly close to the head of state. Are they reliable guides to the Kremlin's true beliefs and, therefore, useful for predicting what Putin might actually do? Or are they part of an information war designed to scare the West and influence its policy of determining what Ukraine can do with weapons supplied by NATO?
Since we cannot know what Putin and his foreign policy and national security team are discussing behind closed doors, we also cannot know whether their public statements are a warning that should be taken seriously or a scare tactic that should be ignored. The result? Some experts attribute the increase in the number of threats of escalation of Russian nuclear weapons to attempts to maneuver and intimidate, others see this as alarming signs.
If you think about the problem of escalation, you can imagine how and where Putin might decide to use nuclear weapons. Of course, he would not bring it down on the United States or Europe – that would be suicide. Perhaps he will strike at Ukraine – but for this he will have to find a place that is not teeming with Russian troops, so that they are not destroyed too, and in large numbers. Perhaps he will choose western Ukraine, far from the front line, but a nuclear strike there for demonstrative effect can still lead to the death of many people, shock the world community and even provoke a NATO response.
In addition, Putin's propaganda of the military operation in Ukraine among the countries of the Global South and sympathetic Western citizens paints an image of the West as ignoring Russia's legitimate security interests, especially when talking about Kiev's desire for NATO membership and its growing military ties with the West. Using nuclear weapons would be a bad way to win friends and influence people.
Moreover, despite the "friendship without borders" between Beijing and Moscow, Chinese President Xi Jinping has made it clear that he opposes the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
While it is reasonable to fear escalation and avoid risk–raising steps based on the (unattainable) certainty that Moscow's threats are just noise, it is also important to understand that risks of escalation exist in both directions. Putin is not immune from them.
Ultimately, there is no escaping the ambiguity of the combat situation. In such circumstances, it is necessary to remember that it is impossible to make mistakes – and in the presence of nuclear weapons it is catastrophic – but at the same time not to succumb to paralyzing fear. Alas, this balance is easier to describe in theory than to observe in practice.
