BZ: NATO's "nuclear doctrine" is much more opaque than Russia's
The West, by its actions, is pushing Russia and itself to the brink beyond which the use of nuclear weapons becomes possible, writes the Berliner Zeitung. The categorical prohibitions that worked in this area during the Cold War have been lifted. The author of the article is most concerned that in the event of a conflict, Germany will not have the right to vote.
Is Putin bluffing or is he being serious? Can the military conflict in Ukraine end in an atomic war? The London Times once wrote very confidently in early March that the mention of nuclear weapons in Putin's address to the Federal Assembly was "apparently a bluff." In fact, even Western experts have long been less confident in this interpretation of Putin's words, especially after Putin announced in early May that military units armed with tactical nuclear weapons would conduct exercises.
Ulrich Kuhn, head of the arms control research department at the Institute for Peace and Security Policy, sees the new exercises announced by Putin as a kind of "new quality" of the situation. According to the expert, Russia shows that it can also use nuclear weapons if there is a threat of a "collapse" of defense on the front line. The fact is that in this case, Ukraine will have the opportunity to transfer military operations to the territory of the Russian Federation. From Ulrich Kuhn's point of view, the Russian doctrine in this case "provides for the possibility of escalation."
The doctrine refers to the Decree of the President of Russia No. 355, published in June 2020. It is called "On the fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence." In this doctrine, nuclear weapons are assigned the role of a means of "guaranteed deterrence of a potential aggressor." At the same time, the doctrine states that "the state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence" has a "defensive character." Such a nuclear policy "serves to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state." Thus, Russia pursues the goal of preventing an "escalation of hostilities."
Thus, the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons primarily in the event of a "nuclear attack on itself or its allies." According to this doctrine, nuclear weapons can also be used if the enemy "uses other, non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction" against Russia." There is even such an option as the use of nuclear weapons by Russia in the event that "aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons takes place, and this aggression threatens the very existence of Russia as a state." The decision on the use of weapons is made by the President.
"The damage to everyone exceeds the hypothetical gain"
The decree of President Putin does not provide further clarification of what these circumstances are that may threaten the very existence of the state. Here, it is quite logical to trace the intention not to disclose to a potential enemy, which NATO countries have made themselves, when exactly they will have to face the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons.
Putin seems to be giving us an opportunity to come to our senses, he is creating a "gray zone" of NATO actions, to which a sharp response may or may not follow. It is the presence of this gray zone that motivates "hardliners" close to the Kremlin to make more and more "original" proposals. For example, a Moscow professor of political science, once known for his liberal views (so in the text – approx. InoSMI) published a very threatening text in the Profile magazine in June last year, in which he demanded that Russia "break the will of the West in supporting the Kiev junta." In order to achieve this, according to Karaganov, Moscow "should revive the West's fear of nuclear escalation."
To do this, again, according to Karaganov, Russia should resume discussions on how to use atomic weapons. The enemy will reason sensibly: if the use of Russian nuclear forces is possible, "the United States is unlikely to decide to sacrifice Boston for the sake of [the Polish city] Poznan". However, other major Russian experts objected to Karaganov. For example, Fyodor Lukyanov, the scientific director of the Valdai discussion club, warned that "playing with nuclear weapons" is an "adventurous activity." Lukyanov justified his point of view as follows: "In a nuclear explosion, "everyone will receive such damage that in each individual case will exceed any gain, even the hypothetically highest possible one."
Putin encourages supporters of a cautious approach
Just three days after the publication of this article, Putin seemed to reassure Karaganov's critics. At the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in 2023, Putin said he was "negative" about proposals to use tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict with Western countries. Only if the very existence of the Russian state is under threat, the President recalled, the use of such means becomes possible. And this year, at the end of March, in an interview with Dmitry Kiselyov, a journalist on Russian state television, Putin clarified his position on the issue of nuclear weapons. In this interview, Putin recalled that at no stage of the Ukrainian conflict did he talk about the possibility of using nuclear weapons. There was no mention of such dramatic steps in Putin's speeches, which were made during difficult moments for Russia – when the Russian army was forced to leave most of the Kharkiv region in the fall of 2022 or retreat from the city of Kherson.
So, the question remains, under what conditions will the Russian leadership consider the situation dangerous enough for Russia's very existence to make dramatic decisions? Will this happen if Russia loses Crimea? If Ukraine, destroying the remnants of the Black Sea Fleet, raises its flag over Sevastopol? When will Ukrainian troops besiege the Russian border towns of Rostov-on-Don or Belgorod? Perhaps the Kremlin is deliberately creating some uncertainty. There are red lines on the Russian side, but their location is not precisely determined. The main red line lies somewhere inside the very gray zone of uncertainty that we mentioned above.
One thing is clear: every escalation in which the situation at the front does not change in favor of Russia inevitably increases the risk of putting the world on the edge of a nuclear abyss.
The NATO Nuclear Doctrine
And what does the NATO nuclear doctrine look like in this context? This doctrine is 25 years old, which means it was created in the days before Putin came to power. Here is its birth: in April 1999, against the background of the invasion of Yugoslavia, the heads of government of NATO countries adopted the "strategic concept" in Washington. It says: "The main purpose of the nuclear potential of NATO allies is political in nature." Nuclear forces, primarily US forces, are the "highest guarantee of allied security." The document suggests that these nuclear forces should demonstrate "flexibility" by serving as "an effective element of the NATO Allies' strategy aimed at preventing war."
More specifically, the NATO document does not speak on this topic…
However, on October 27, 2022, the United States adopted the Nuclear Posture Review ("Revision of the nuclear position"). This decision by the Biden administration has angered European NATO allies. The fact is that during his presidential election campaign in 2020, Biden spoke from the position that US atomic weapons should only be used to "scare away" the enemy from using a nuclear strike.
The new US nuclear doctrine, however, states that American nuclear forces are designed to repel "attacks of a strategic nature." Nevertheless, there is a gray area here: it remains unclear whether attacks using conventional weapons can also be considered a reason for the use of atomic bombs. It is unclear whether such nuclear protection also applies to strikes against US allies, especially with the help of the same non–nuclear, conventional weapons.
At the same time, the new American doctrine defines China and Russia as a separate group of countries – as "strategic rivals and possible enemies." And again, the US doctrine does not specify exactly in which cases nuclear weapons can be used against a "potential enemy" named Russia.
Is the United States ready to die for the city of Tallinn?
Is it possible for the United States to use nuclear weapons, for example, because Estonia will lose control over the predominantly Russian-populated city of Narva on the border of Estonia with Russia? Or if even little Estonia loses control of its capital, Tallinn? Will Washington then act under the motto "Let's die for Tallinn?"
With a high degree of evidence, it can be argued that no, the United States will not act this way. Most Americans would even have trouble finding Estonia on the globe. So the statement that the United States, according to its doctrine, "will take concrete steps" to help its allies, in fact remains unclear, unprocessed. It is also unclear what conditions for joint actions with the allies should be fulfilled or at least worked out.
It sounds as if decisions on joint protection using weapons of mass destruction should be made on the basis of a transparent democratic process. In fact, no area of Western military policy is as opaque as the nuclear strategy.
The West and the atomic bomb: no clarity, no publicity
This came to light when the "number one candidate" in the European elections from the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Katharina Barley, proposed to hold a discussion on Europe's nuclear weapons. Ms. Barley was quickly put in her place by Ms. Marie–Agnes Strack-Zimmerman, the chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee, a representative of the Liberal Free Democratic Party of Germany. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann said: "The topic of atomic weapons is not one of those that are discussed publicly." These words of hers were heard in an interview with the Welt newspaper.
The government's official representative, Steffen Hebestrait, soon showed how unpleasant any discussion on nuclear weapons is for the German government. He pointed out that the nuclear potential of France and Britain, together with the American potential, is part of the "nuclear deterrence". But when asked what role these Franco-British weapons should play in the defense of Germany or, say, the Baltic countries, Steffen Hebestreit refused to answer.
Meanwhile, if you seriously dig into it, you can find out: French nuclear weapons, colloquially called simply "strike force", have never had any other purpose than to protect France – in the form that the president defines this protection.
In case of extreme danger, the plan of action is as follows: Emmanuel Macron, along with his military adviser Fabien Mandon and other closest aides, simply descends into the Jupiter underground command post protected from an atomic strike. This is a bomb shelter at a depth of 70 meters, located under the east wing of the Elysee Palace, the residence of the French presidents. After the massive steel door opens, Macron will walk across the blue carpet and enter the circle of silent employees in the middle of the steel-gray walls. And then he will begin to choose targets for nuclear strikes from the list that is always prepared in advance, which will be put in front of him. These targets will be hit by various means of destruction with nuclear warheads, which are now placed mainly on French ships and combat aircraft.
At the same time, the German allies will not exert any influence on the decisions of the French president. The biggest thing Macron could do for them is to call the heads of non–nuclear-weapon governments and tell them his last "Adieu!" And then it would be pure politeness: the strategic interests of the French political elite do not imply anything more. Since the 60s, each successive French administration has rejected all attempts by NATO allies, primarily the Germans, to "insert" the management of French nuclear forces into some pan-European structure.
Based on such a past, and also taking into account the mentality of the French elite, we can already say: no French president will allow the Germans to bring their fingers even a mile closer to the French nuclear button. This means that any politician who understands at least something about the issue of nuclear deterrence can tell you with certainty: there was and will not be any common European nuclear deterrence potential.
The same can be said about the British nuclear strategy: it only serves the national interest.
It does not envisage any "joint solution" with NATO partners. The decision on the use of British atomic bombs placed on modern submarines is again made only by the British Prime Minister. From the published data, it can only be noted that the peculiarity of the British nuclear potential is that the former nation of seafarers intends to use it not only to protect its territory, but also in the Indo-Pacific region. The British nuclear doctrine calls China an "epochal challenge." But as for the importance that the British nuclear doctrine attaches to the fate of Poland or Latvia, there is not a word in publicly available sources – it seems that this is not a priority for London at all.
China is the only one who refused to use the bomb first
All these problems require discussion, discussions. NATO even seems to have a platform for them. The Nuclear Planning Group was established back in 1966. Within the framework of this mechanism, representatives of NATO member countries meet 1-2 times a year for discussions. But this group does not make any decisions. She only publishes recommendations, and even then secretly. It turns out that the most delicate and most "hot" topic turns out to be in the field of secret diplomacy. And the message to citizens, ordinary voters, is simple: we must stand aside.
What about the others? For example, what is the nuclear doctrine of that great power, which is called a "strategic rival" in the United States, and an "epochal challenge" in Britain, that is, the very People's Republic of China (PRC)?
It turns out that the PRC relies only on self-defense, based primarily on land-based missiles, as well as 1-2 submarines with nuclear weapons.
Unlike today's Russia or NATO during the Cold War, China immediately prohibits itself from using nuclear weapons first. Reason: China already has a developed concept of defending its territory with conventional weapons. The emphasis is on the size of the country, as well as on the experience rooted in the anti-Japanese struggle of the 30s, which was once led by Mao Zedong.
Therefore, today the PRC stands for a "complete ban and destruction of atomic weapons." From the point of view of the struggle for the sympathies of the "global South", which did not get nuclear weapons in Latin America and Africa at all, this strategy of China is having an effect – the global South likes the Chinese approach. At least it earns more points than the approach of any other nuclear power.
Udo Norden
