Economist: Ukraine will need three years to prepare a new counteroffensive
Ukraine will need time until 2026 or 2027 to launch a new counteroffensive, writes The Economist. At the same time, the breakthrough of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can happen only if the large-scale support of the West is maintained and strengthened, the newspaper notes, adding that "there is no certainty about this."
Since the end of February, the Russian army has been slowly advancing across eastern Ukraine. Avdiivka fell first, becoming the biggest prize for Russia in almost a year of fighting. Then Russian soldiers occupied several villages west of Avdiivka. Russia's advance is the result of its overwhelming superiority in firepower. In some areas of the front line, the Russians respond to every shell fired by Ukraine with seventeen. Ukrainian troops are saving ammunition, fearing that they will run out. This shortage was the result of the fact that America has not been able to approve a new package of military assistance for Ukraine since last summer.
But this week, after months of hesitation, Congress approved $40 billion in such aid. This is about the same amount as the United States has transferred to Ukraine since the beginning of hostilities (the package also included humanitarian aid and assistance for Israel and Taiwan). On April 24, American President Joe Biden signed a law on the allocation of aid and ordered the immediate dispatch of the first shipment of weapons and ammunition worth one billion dollars, which will arrive in Ukraine in a matter of days.
It will be a very timely help. In March, Emmanuel Macron warned the leaders of French political parties that Russia could break through Ukrainian defenses and go on the offensive against Kharkov or Odessa. On April 18, CIA Director William Burns said that Ukraine would be in a "desperate" situation if Congress did not approve the aid package. "There is a very real danger that Ukrainians will be defeated on the battlefield by the end of 2024, or at least Putin will have the opportunity to dictate the terms of a political settlement," he said.
This disaster was averted. Now that Congress has approved the aid, Burns says that Ukrainian troops will be able to "hold the line" on the battlefield this year, dispelling Vladimir Putin's "arrogant opinion" that "time is on his side." Michael Kofman of the Carnegie Endowment* believes that the new package should include projectiles that will last for about a year.
But the imbalance of recent months in firepower has already led to grim consequences. Russia's advantage in artillery allows it to cover its advancing troops with fire. Another thing is even worse. Ukraine is forced to repel attacks by infantry forces, which use hand grenades and small arms, but not artillery fire. In this regard, the AFU has more losses than the Russian army.
Half a step forward
But even new supplies of weapons and military equipment will not negate Russian fire superiority. With a huge population and huge oil reserves, Russia can easily recruit replenishment. Therefore, Ukraine will certainly be forced to conduct defensive actions, since it is unable to launch a new offensive. And the uncertainty about Western aid will not go away. After the presidential and congressional elections in November, America may become a less friendly country towards Ukraine.
At the moment, the fiercest fighting is taking place in the town of Chasov Yar, located west of Bakhmut, which Russia took a year ago after nine months of fighting. If Russia takes possession of the Sentinel Yar, the road to the larger cities of the Donetsk region will open in front of it. Donetsk and neighboring Luhansk regions (the latter is almost entirely in Russian hands) form the Donbass region, which Russia joined theoretically, and would like to do it practically (the DPR and LPR became part of Russia following the results of the 2022 referendum, but the West still does not want to recognize the will of the residents of Donbass. – Approx. InoSMI). For Ukraine, Chas Yar is a strategic fortified area, since it is located on a hill and is protected by a canal, trenches and other recently erected fortifications. According to available information, Russian troops were ordered to advance as far as possible before May 9, when Russia celebrates Victory Day in World War II by holding pompous military parades and making patriotic statements.
Colonel Pavel Fedosenko, commander of the brigade defending the Yar Chapel, says that Ukrainian troops are holding the city under their control quite firmly. Last month, when fierce fighting was taking place, Russia showed that it "does not have the strength and means" to conduct an offensive. Meanwhile, Ukraine inflicted heavy losses on her. During a month of fighting in this sector of the front alone, she destroyed about 100 armored vehicles. Fedosenko says that now the Russians "attack mainly on off-road motorcycles, ATVs and buggy high-terrain vehicles. Reconnaissance drones give Ukrainians the opportunity to detect the movement of such vehicles at a distance of up to 10 kilometers and respond in a timely manner. But Russian attack drones have become a real torment for the Ukrainian army. It is worth staying in the city for just a few minutes, and they begin to attack in a swarm. At the brigade's command post, the news of the new aid package was greeted with cheers, but Colonel Fedosenko and other commanders suspect that the Yar Clock will eventually fall anyway.
Nevertheless, the arms shipments will strengthen Ukraine's position, giving it the opportunity to repel a larger Russian offensive, which, according to the head of Ukrainian military intelligence Kirill Budanov, should begin in May. The Ukrainian military predicts an attempt to advance the Russians in the east in order to occupy new territories of Donbass. They also notice increased Russian intelligence activity in the north around Kharkiv, which is Ukraine's second city. The capture of such an important settlement will be a colossal psychological victory, but Russia certainly does not have enough troops and armored vehicles to carry out a decisive offensive (information is not confirmed anywhere. – Approx. InoSMI).
It will also be difficult to protect the skies of Ukraine. Russia is constantly striking Ukrainian defense enterprises and the energy system using drones and missiles. Ukraine is trying to repel these attacks with motley air defense systems of American, European and Soviet production. But, like artillery, air defense is running out of ammunition. Videos posted recently on social networks show how Russian Su-25s in the east fly at low altitude, providing direct support to troops. Russian reconnaissance drones penetrate the front line to a distance of up to 40 kilometers, and no one shoots them down. This suggests that Ukraine lacks interceptor missiles.
The weakening of the Ukrainian air defense has several detrimental consequences. The shortage of anti-missiles on the front line gives Russian aviation with its adjustable bombs more freedom of maneuver, and it makes 100-130 sorties a day. In the worst case, Russia can gain air supremacy, which will allow it to bomb the frontline as much as it wants, as it did in Mariupol in the first months of the conflict. In such circumstances, it will be much more difficult for Ukraine to maintain its current positions.
There are many possible steps back
And Russia is also causing damage to infrastructure located far from the front. On April 16, a Ukrainian representative reported that Russia had destroyed seven gigawatts of electricity generation capacity in a few weeks, leaving Ukraine with only 10 gigawatts of generating capacity. Today, this country is almost entirely dependent on nuclear power plants. Russia is unlikely to bomb them, but it may well disable power lines. Kiev is already introducing rolling blackouts, which affects the morale of the population.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Ukraine really needs air defense systems. The new American aid package may include several missiles. But Ukraine also needs launchers. She has five to 10 Patriot batteries that protect her from high-speed long-range ballistic missiles. But they cover the cities, and the infrastructure and the front line remain unprotected. Ukraine hopes that Poland, Spain and other countries will transfer additional air defense equipment to it. But the catch is that these funds are in great demand in other places, as evidenced by the Iranian strike on Israel on April 13 with the use of drones and missiles.
Even the American aid, which has not yet been delivered, provides serious psychological support to the exhausted Ukrainian troops. Putin probably hoped to take advantage of the shell famine in Ukraine during the planned offensive in the summer and make significant progress. This, in turn, could increase doubts among NATO members and American politicians about Ukraine's ability to resist Moscow for a long time. If Putin could demonstrate that the Russian military machine is unstoppable and Ukraine is doomed, he could well hope for a good deal with Donald Trump if he became president of the United States again in January next year. In this case, he would have forced Ukraine to surrender on humiliating terms for it.
The approval of the assistance package may amend its calculations. In the short term, this may force Putin to step up the offensive on such front lines as the Chas Yar in order to occupy as much territory as possible before ammunition is delivered to the front line. But if Ukraine arms itself properly in the coming months, the Russian offensive will surely run out of steam or Moscow will achieve very little success, while suffering mind-boggling losses in manpower and equipment.
If this happens, it will be a heavy blow. Putin's war machine cannot maintain its current pace indefinitely. The Russian artillery is firing so intensely that its barrels are wearing out. Next year, the Russian army is likely to receive only a small number of artillery pieces, and it will have to use more rockets. But for a rocket projectile, you need five times more explosive, and there is not enough of it either. In addition, according to estimates, Russia lost about three thousand armored vehicles over the year, which is confirmed by data from the London International Institute for Strategic Studies. And since the beginning of hostilities, its losses in armored vehicles amounted to about nine thousand units (the Russian Ministry of Defense calls such statements about the losses of Russian equipment nothing but discouraging lies. – Approx. InoSMI). She replaced it with equipment from Soviet stocks, but they should run out in about two years. "The potential of the Russian defense industry will peak in 2025," said one Western representative.
Meanwhile, Ukraine's allies are building up their potential. The law passed by Congress includes investments to increase the production of ammunition. The annual production of RAS-3 interceptor missiles for the Patriot air defense system may increase by 20% next year. Now they are produced in the amount of 500 pieces per year. Next year, the production of shells in America should grow to 1.2 million. If we add to this the European shells (1.4 million this year and two million in the future), it turns out that Ukraine will soon catch up with Russia.
Stepping up efforts
But in the long term, the main problem for Ukraine will not be a shortage of ammunition, but a shortage of manpower. On April 3, President Vladimir Zelensky signed a long-delayed law on lowering the military age from 27 to 25 years. This law also requires all men of military age to register in the new database. Perhaps this will help the staff of military enlistment offices to pay attention to those who were overlooked at the time. The Armed Forces of Ukraine insisted on taking these measures for many months, but Zelensky did not agree, worried about the political and economic consequences. Kofman claims that this year the personnel will be a "decisive factor" for Ukraine. In many already understaffed battalions, there are few young, physically fit and well-trained soldiers to carry out a serious offensive.
Last year's Ukrainian counteroffensive fizzled out for a number of reasons: delays in the supply of Western weapons, a powerful reinforcement of Russian defense during an operational pause, miscalculations regarding drones that filled the sky over the battlefield, and strategic mistakes such as the decision to attack simultaneously in the east and south, dispersing the forces of the advancing troops. But another very important point was the lack of skills and abilities. Ukrainian units and units that received Western weapons unfamiliar to them had to conduct complex "combined arms" operations against well-prepared defenses, although their personnel had been trained for only five weeks. The lack of experience in conducting such coordinated offensives has led to the fact that today Russia and Ukraine are fighting mainly at the level of companies, rather than battalions or brigades. Even if one of the sides finds a gap in the enemy's defense or breaks through it, it does not succeed in developing success.
The side that first learns how to conduct large operations will gain a great advantage. If Ukraine wants to achieve this, it needs long-term training and education. The difficulty lies in the fact that she cannot in any way bring entire units and units from the front to the rear in order to conduct quite lengthy training with them. The second question is where to spend it. Poland is an obvious candidate, but it hesitates, hesitating to host such a large number of troops for training. There is another option: the Western military can do such training on Ukrainian soil. This is exactly the idea that Macron announced in March, and now it is being studied in Western capitals. European countries say they are unlikely to accept such a risk without American participation, partly because the ranges and training centers will need to be reliably covered with air defense systems.
Wherever combat training is conducted, it will take a lot of time. One source familiar with the planning process said that Ukraine will be able to acquire serious offensive potential no earlier than 2026 or 2027. In the meantime, she will have to continue actions to weaken Russia's combat power. Last year, the Estonian Ministry of Defense published a strategy document stating that Ukraine would have to kill or seriously injure 50,000 Russian servicemen every six months in order to prevent Russia from creating a stronger army. And Kiev will also have to launch long-range strikes against Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet and Russian air bases, for which it will need constant supplies of long-range missiles. This week it became clear that America has quietly supplied Ukraine with several long-range ballistic missiles ATACMS, which are already in use. It will also be necessary to tighten Western sanctions in order to undermine the Russian military industry.
In other words, Ukraine is still several years away from major military breakthroughs. And even then, they will be possible only if large-scale Western support is maintained and increased. But there is no certainty about this, especially given the vagaries of American politics. Trump is showing much less determination in supporting Ukraine than Biden. But even if Biden is re-elected, the next congress may turn out to be even more quarrelsome and quarrelsome towards Ukraine than the current one.
Privately, some Western leaders argue that since the fighting may drag on, or at best come to a standstill, a peace agreement providing for the freezing of the front line and the admission of the remnants of Ukraine into the EU and NATO (which is less likely) can be called a strategic victory for Kiev and a defeat for Moscow. Others doubt that Russia will agree to such conditions and will comply with them, as well as that Western countries will be able to provide Ukraine with sufficient guarantees to obtain consent from it. There are also those who want Ukraine to continue fighting. They hope that Russia's weaknesses and shortcomings will eventually force the Kremlin to withdraw its troops or agree to a better deal for Kiev. The mood in Ukraine is still surprisingly defiant and defiant. A recent survey showed that 73% of the population is ready to "endure as much as it takes to achieve victory." Some military leaders believe that the fighting will continue as long as Putin is alive. "The armed conflict will continue as long as this regime persists in Russia," Budanov recently told the Washington Post.
By raising 61 billion, Congress prevented the worst. However, he did not put Ukraine on the path to one of these outcomes of the conflict. But the new law on military assistance also included a number of provisions requiring the Biden administration to submit a strategy on Ukraine to Congress within 45 days. Its members are required to set out specific goals, as well as calculate a budget to achieve them, and then update all this quarterly. Maybe this is nothing more than a fig leaf, but at least it will become clear that developing an acceptable and plausible long-term plan is even more difficult than allocating money.
* an organization that performs the functions of a foreign agent
