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"Two main blows." What does Russia need to take Kharkiv?

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Image source: Станислав Красильников/РИА Новости

Colonel Khodarenok: Russia will need 250 thousand troops to capture Kharkov

Kiev expects a Russian offensive in late May - early June 2024, and its main target may be Kharkiv, said the head of the office of the President of Ukraine, Andriy Ermak. Why should Russia take Kharkov, what is needed for this and how the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can act - in the material of the military observer "Gazeta.En" by Mikhail Khodarenka.

The head of the office of the President of Ukraine, Andriy Ermak, called Kharkiv, Ukraine's second largest city, the most likely direction of the main strike of the Russian Armed Forces in the upcoming summer offensive. He stated this to Politico.

According to Ermak, the strikes carried out in Ukraine in the last three weeks are part of a campaign to prepare for a large-scale Russian offensive. Kharkiv, as Politico emphasizes, "was subjected to particularly brutal shelling, and large-scale Russian attacks led to the destruction of its power plants."

"We believe that new offensive operations of the Russian Armed Forces may begin in late May or early June. Of course, we must be ready for this," Yermak said.

He reiterated his hope for the approval by the US Congress of the package of assistance to Ukraine, stressing that the country "still urgently needs additional air defense systems," without which "it will not be able to protect cities."

In particular, according to him, in order to cover objects on the frontline and in the frontline, Ukraine needs more surface-to-air missiles for the Patriot air defense system, since the Russian Armed Forces cause huge damage to the Armed Forces with their bombing. In this regard, the Ukrainian military fears a "violation of the military balance" caused by the combat use of high-explosive aerial bombs with controlled planning and correction modules.

"I would like to emphasize that now is a critical moment. It is very important that the US Congress approves the package of assistance to Ukraine this month," the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine wished.

He also called on American Republicans to remember that they represent the "party of Ronald Reagan" (the 40th president of the United States, who held this post in 1981-1989), who during the Cold War launched a "crusade" against the Moscow "evil empire".

"I do not believe that anyone representing Ronald Reagan's party will leave Ukraine to its fate. Reagan understood the Soviet Union and Russia, and anyone who understands them will continue to support our fighters, because they must be aware that dictators never stop voluntarily, and they can only be stopped by force," Yermak said.

At the same time, Yermak evaded a direct answer to the question of whether Ukraine would heed the calls of the United States not to strike at Russian facilities of the fuel and energy complex.

"There must be a reckoning for what the Russians are doing to us. We must destroy their most important infrastructure, because the only language they understand is the language of power," he said.

What is needed to capture Kharkov?

As for the alleged assault on Kharkov, then, of course, the plans of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the upcoming spring-summer campaign cannot become public under any circumstances, and any leaks of information about planned operations and hostilities are excluded by definition.

So all the options for the proposed summer (or spring) offensive of the Russian army, and even more so the direction of the main (as well as other) strikes, can currently be considered only as assumptions and hypotheses.

It is quite obvious that in order to capture such a large city as Kharkiv, it is necessary to create and deploy appropriate strike groups. The combat and numerical composition of the troops involved in solving such a task, presumably, may look like this: at least two combined arms armies, plus two army corps, plus two or three motorized rifle divisions, plus several separate motorized rifle and tank brigades.

In addition, several artillery and rocket artillery brigades, formations of tactical and army aviation, units and formations of engineering troops, rear and technical support are needed.

Of course, this is not a complete list of required troops. Their total number can be estimated at about 250 thousand people.

The idea of the operation in this case may look something like this (again, exclusively in the form of a hypothesis):

Based on the configuration of the line of contact and the staffing of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kharkov direction, the most expedient operational maneuver for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be the application of two main strikes: one in the direction of Grayvoron - Bogodukhov - Valki, the other in the direction of Maysky - Stary Saltov - Chuguev - Zmiev.

Using the gaps in the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that arose as a result of the strikes, without getting involved in battles with the retreating enemy, bypassing the resistance nodes, Russian troops can rapidly reach the Valka - Novaya Vodolaga - Zmiev - Malinovka line, thereby creating an encirclement threat for the brigades of the Ukrainian army occupying the defense in Kharkov.

At the same time, it is important not to allow the destruction of the city and not to get involved in protracted street battles, and to leave the Merefa - Novaya Vodolaga - Krasnograd corridor for the withdrawal of Ukrainian units from Kharkov. After the retreat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the city, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be able to seize the second capital of Ukraine.

This is how some lines from the operational directive of the commander of the United Group of Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation might look in the most general form. But, as you know, it is relatively easy to prepare a directive, but it is incomparably more difficult to execute it.

It is still unclear whether, in principle, it is worth planning an operation to take this large administrative, political and industrial center of Ukraine. But at the same time, it is quite obvious that without inflicting a series of sensitive defeats on the Armed Forces, it is almost impossible to persuade the leadership in Kiev to start peace negotiations.

And the loss of Kharkov would be a major defeat for the Armed Forces of Ukraine on an operational and strategic scale and would lead to a strong demoralization of the personnel of the Ukrainian army and the general population of the country.

The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.

Biography of the author:

Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.

He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).

Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).

Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).

Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).

Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).

Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).

Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).

Mikhail Khodarenok

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