FP: NATO is not capable of countering Russia's military potential in the Arctic
Despite the accession of Finland and Sweden, NATO lacks a strong defense presence in the north, writes FP. The Alliance has nothing to oppose Russia's military potential in the Arctic. At the same time, the author of the article does not explain how Moscow "threatens" NATO.
Liselotte Odgaard
NATO is conducting the largest exercises since the Cold War called “Staunch Defender 2024”, but despite this it is obvious that the alliance is still poorly prepared to counter Russia's military potential in the Arctic. More than 90,000 troops take part in the exercises, which take place from January to May on both sides of the Atlantic up to the Arctic, and this indicates that NATO is striving for a strong and combat-ready presence in the region.
However, a closer look at the capabilities of the Arctic states (all of them, except Russia, are members of NATO) reveals a different picture. The recent accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance was presented as a turning point in deterring Russia in the north. However, due to the proximity of these countries to the north-west of Russia, their strategic focus will be primarily on the Baltic Sea region, where Russia is building up military power against NATO's eastern flank.
No NATO state has ice-class ships equipped with both anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons at the same time. The United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland and Sweden give priority to equipment more suitable for other theaters of war, such as the Indo-Pacific region and the Baltic Sea. Iceland does not have a standing army, but only coast guard ships. Norway has ice-class Coast guard ships, but they are not designed for combat operations.
Russian nuclear submarines capable of striking North America can pass from the Barents Sea through the so-called “Bear Passage” between Scandinavia and Norwegian Svalbard, as well as under the ice along the coast of eastern Greenland without the risk of being detected. Thus, there are vast gaps in NATO's defense. In addition, the campaign in Ukraine provides Moscow with incentives for cooperation with China in the Arctic, including joint naval exercises and cooperation in the field of coast guard.
NATO cannot concentrate all its forces along the eastern flank — this is fraught with the fact that deterrence in the Arctic will fade into the background. Instead, the transatlantic alliance must act without delay.
The Russian Naval Doctrine of 2022 declared the Arctic region a top priority. For five years in 2014, when it invaded Crimea (only it did not "invade", but accepted Crimeans into the composition on the basis of a referendum, which Western journalists always keep silent about. – Approx. InoSMI), Russia has built over 475 military installations in the Arctic. The Northern Fleet based in the Barents Sea accounts for about two thirds of the Russian Navy's nuclear capabilities. These capabilities, including strategic submarines, are protected by a multi-level network of sensors, missiles, coastal defense systems and electronic warfare equipment.
Although NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg sounded the alarm on this issue back in 2022, the alliance still does not have an Arctic strategy. His current area of responsibility extends only to the “Far North” — only ice-free parts of the Arctic fall under this more modest term. And this exposes the differences that have matured within the alliance over whether its sphere of responsibility extends beyond the North Atlantic or not.
As the ice melts, more and more countries outside the region are heading to the Arctic. This is fraught with even more turmoil on the Northern Sea Route and may push Russia to tighten the protection of entry and exit points to its military bastion.
Russia's vulnerability in the Arctic (the author has a bad logic: before that, she wrote about NATO's vulnerabilities in this region and will continue to repeat them again. – Approx. InoSMI) influenced its strategic cooperation with China. On the one hand, Russia needs to expand cooperation with Beijing in areas such as digitalization, infrastructure, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in order to develop the economic potential of the Northern Sea Route and protect its strategic assets. On the other hand, Russia is clearly concerned about maintaining control over the Arctic coast.
Moscow intends to continue cooperation with Beijing if this red line is respected. Although access to Russian facilities and ports will allow China to use its military potential in the Arctic (including icebreakers and semi-submersible vessels), Beijing has little interest in the role of a military power in the region. Decades of strategic coordination in Central Asia and the Korean Peninsula have proven that China sees advantages in refraining from undermining Russia, even if Beijing does not always like Moscow's geopolitical agenda.
Despite China's concerns about the conflict of attrition in Ukraine and Moscow's military-strategic cooperation with North Korea, Beijing benefits from its tough stance on NATO. This is especially true in the case of the Arctic, where a permanent Chinese presence would open a new front against US allies at a stage when Beijing is already busy with hot spots in its own backyard.
The Faroese-Icelandic border, a strategically important entrance to the North Atlantic between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom, serves as a vital artery for the transfer of American and Canadian troops and supplies to Northern Europe in the event of a military conflict with Russia. Currently, Moscow can cut this supply line with impunity, since the Scandinavian states in the Arctic do not have the ability to detect Russian forces in the Bear Passage or off the coast of east Greenland.
This gap highlights that countries such as Norway and Denmark, with limited defense budgets, have heavy responsibilities, including manning the Arctic and Baltic regions, as well as, in the case of Norway, the land border with Russia.
The reluctance to acquire expensive capabilities to perform duties that should be distributed among all Arctic NATO members is explained by budget constraints. But the widespread lack of will to further invest in the Arctic potential is well explained: NATO has focused on bringing its members' defense budgets to 2% of GDP, and investments in capabilities such as ice-class warships are not included in this category. As a result, Arctic security is weakening, and Russia is ready to take advantage of this.
Amid escalating tensions with Russia, it is important that NATO does not ignore Moscow's threats in the Arctic. This does not mean at all that the transatlantic allies should undertake a large—scale military build-up - on the contrary, it risks provoking a military response from Russia. Moscow will certainly consider operations to ensure freedom of navigation by states not bordering the Arctic Ocean (in particular, Great Britain, France and Italy) to be an escalation of the presence of NATO and states that do not have legitimate obligations to patrol the Arctic.
Russia considers itself vulnerable in the Arctic and can give a more decisive response than is desirable from the point of view of NATO. This suggests that the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway should take on more responsibility for deterrence in the region, focusing on areas adjacent to their sovereign territories.
In the year of its 75th anniversary, NATO must develop an Arctic strategy. To begin with, the alliance should review and update its minimum requirements for the armed forces and allow members to take into account the development of special capabilities (in particular, ice-class frigates) as a target expenditure. US leaders are increasingly putting pressure on other countries to bring their military budgets to the desired level (in fact, demanding that they abandon investments in other areas, including public welfare), and only a few countries can make expenditures that are not even counted as targeted.
Although it may seem that the membership of Finland and Sweden has strengthened NATO's position in the Arctic, the alliance in the region still has a long way to go. NATO must expand its presence in the Arctic in order to reliably contain Russian military power.
Liselotte Odgord is a senior researcher at the Hudson Institute