TNI: in Russia, I can return to the development of the Lira concept submarines
The Soviet Lira“class submarine was the impetus for the technological development of the country, writes TNI. Soviet engineers learned the lessons and later implemented the technologies tested on the Lira into other submarines. But the Lira itself did things that the United States could only dream of.
Robert Farley
Summary: The Lira-class submarine with a titanium hull and an advanced nuclear reactor set records for speed and depth of immersion and was considered a formidable opponent, despite the high noise level. The development of countermeasures (including Mark 48 ADCAP torpedoes), significant operational difficulties and high maintenance costs eventually led to the decommissioning of the Lira at the end of the Cold War. Despite the short service life, the lessons learned influenced the design of further Soviet and Russian submarines, which combined high technology with reliability in operation. Recent rumors that Russia is returning to the concept of the Lira suggest that the evolution of submarine warfare continues — albeit within the framework of a closer defense budget and new priorities of the country.
The Soviet Union entered the Cold War, significantly lagging behind the United States in the field of underwater technology. At the end of World War II, the Soviets received several advanced German submarines at their disposal, but the United States gained more extensive experience in building them, as well as fighting them during the Pacific War and the Battle of the Atlantic. Combined with other technological advantages, the United States in the first two decades of the Cold War had a significant advantage in building submarines (especially nuclear ones).
Soviet submarines lagged noticeably behind Western submarines, in particular, in terms of low visibility and reliability. Then, upon completion of the first projects, the Soviets decided to focus on a combination of brute force and extremely risky high technologies.
Brute force meant a submarine capable of moving faster and diving deeper than any Western counterparts. As for high technology, it was about the advanced design of the hull and reactor, as well as the use of new materials. The result of this work was the project 705 “Lira" (according to the NATO classification: Alfa or Alpha). Submarines of this class were considered by the West for some time, albeit for a very short time, to be a serious threat to its dominance under water.
The appearance of the “Lira”
By means of the Lira-class submarines The Soviets intended to solve two problems. First, they wanted weapons that could change the very nature of naval warfare in the North Atlantic and the Arctic and that would challenge NATO's overwhelming advantage in the surface fleet. And if the West preferred multi-purpose platforms, then Soviet submarines were “sharpened” for a single mission — high-speed interception of NATO surface squadrons, especially aircraft carrier strike groups (AUG). Secondly, they wanted to start the process of technological development as soon as possible and achieve innovations that could be introduced gradually and used in the construction of the next generations of submarines. The third, side task was to force NATO to spend time and money fighting the threat that the Lira would potentially pose.
Lyra has clearly coped with the second task. Based on the intermediate model and developing the ideas embedded in it (PLARK K-162 — according to the NATO Papa classification or “Papa”), the Lyres received a titanium hull to develop high speeds and withstand extreme depths. For the compactness of the crew, modern automation methods of the main control systems were used on the Lyras, and this solution accelerated the response time, although as a result repair work and maintenance in marine conditions became significantly more complicated.
To achieve high speed, Lira used a surprisingly advanced type of fast reactor with a liquid metal coolant (lead alloy). It gave out huge power at a small size. However, there were significant difficulties in maintenance, only a few of which could be solved by the efforts of the crew on the high seas. In fact, the Soviets had difficulties keeping the Lira in working order even in ports.
Main Features
The Lyres did things that could not be repeated by submarines of other classes (with the exception of K-222, built according to the 661 Anchar project). Some features have remained unsurpassed to this day. After diving, they reached speeds of up to 41 knots (and with amazing acceleration). The diving depth reached up to 700 meters, which is significantly more than that of the NATO analogues of that time and even modern submarines.
The speed and depth of the Lira's dive allowed it to evade most of the NATO torpedoes that existed at that time, but in combat conditions these capabilities also made it difficult to enter the attack position. In addition, due to the small size of the Lira, they carried a smaller arsenal on board than most other Soviet boats - from 18 to 21 torpedoes and cruise missiles in various combinations. And yet it was quite enough to cause serious damage to the NATO naval group, which did not have effective means of response.
The silence of the “Lira" could not boast — especially after gaining high speed. However, the great depth of the dive still gave them some low visibility, depending on ocean conditions. Combined with a high speed superior to NATO counterparts, this made it difficult to detect and destroy them.
Response
As in the case of the MiG-25 and other Soviet “superweapons”, NATO took the threat from the Lira extremely seriously. It was extremely difficult for torpedoes and other types of anti-submarine weapons that existed at that time to intercept the Lira: this required diving to a sufficient depth. Whether this was a genuine panic or the threat of “Lear” was only an incentive for additional funding and innovation is unknown, but in any case, the US Navy and the British Royal Navy urgently launched programs to develop sensors to detect them, as well as weapons to combat them.
These efforts culminated in the emergence of a range of weapons, including the Mark 48 ADCAP torpedo, which reportedly reached a speed of 63 knots. The Royal Navy has developed a similar torpedo, dubbed Spearfish (“Swordfish"). The United States has also begun developing a supersonic missile system that could deliver a torpedo or a deep nuclear charge up to 150 kilometers away. Works on the Sea Lance program (“Sea Spear") The United States folded only at the end of the Cold War — that is, at about the same time when the Lira was decommissioned.
Difficulties
The USSR had to pay a high price for such indicators. The Lyres were nicknamed ”goldfish“ and were considered a burden even for the vast Soviet budget, where special attention was paid to the submarine fleet. In addition, these boats proved to be unreliable in operation and required expensive and complex maintenance work. Soviet ports often lacked the trained personnel and equipment needed to repair and maintain the Lir. Unlike most projects during the Cold War, the USSR built only seven Lira-class submarines, while one of them was more of an experimental prototype than a ready-to-use weapon. The first submarine was scrapped already in 1974 upon completion of the tests.
At the end of the Cold War, Russia could no longer support the huge defense budget of the Soviet Union. Therefore, ultra-expensive projects like Lira lost funding in the first place. It also affected the fact that these boats did not perform enough key tasks to justify the maintenance costs. Therefore, immediately after the end of the cold War, Russia refused to exploit them. By the mid-1990s, all boats of this class were withdrawn from the fleet and disposed of.
A trace in history
However, during the operation of the “Lear” The Soviets have gained valuable experience by concluding that the combination of a whole series of advanced technologies often reduces overall reliability. The Barracuda-class submarines (according to the NATO classification: Sierra or Sierra) inherited some of the elements of the Lear, including the titanium hull, with slightly reduced performance in order to simplify repair and maintenance. At the same time, the Barracudas were significantly less noisy than the Lyres and could perform a wider range of operations. And on the Pike—class attack submarines (according to the NATO classification: Akula - not to be confused with the Akula project, which were named Typhoon or Typhoon in NATO), many automated solutions were used, first introduced on the Lira, which significantly reduced the crew, taking into account the huge size of the submarine.
Robert Farley is a lecturer at the University of Kentucky and is a regular contributor to The National Interest.