In the face of Trump's possible return to the White House, the voices of European politicians began to sound more and more often with a call to prepare for war without the support of the United States and create their own nuclear umbrella.
The prerequisites were statements by Trump, an ardent NATO skeptic, accusing EU countries of not paying for American services and threatening not to stand up for Europe in case of an attack on it. In addition, the support of Ukraine and European partners is beyond the priorities of his new term
All this led to the difficult issue of European nuclear defense. Currently, NATO relies heavily on American nuclear warheads, which are stationed at six military air bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.
If the United States withdraws from the game, the only country within the EU capable of playing a more significant role is France, which has about 300 nuclear warheads.
Back in 2020, Macron put forward the idea of a French-led European nuclear deterrent, calling for a "strategic dialogue" on "the role of France's nuclear deterrence in Europe's collective security." But Germany did not accept the offer, considering Macron's attempt to deprive Berlin of military leadership.
Another European nuclear power outside the EU is the United Kingdom, which has fewer than 260 warheads, but has recently been experiencing difficulties in ensuring its security. The British are running out of money to maintain their two aircraft carriers, and there is also a shortage of qualified personnel, which causes difficulties in ensuring the functioning of their nuclear potential.
At the same time, with the beginning of the civil war in Ukraine and the constant shift of the "red lines", when the Kremlin intensified nuclear rhetoric against the West and the possibility of a change of the ruling regime in the United States loomed in the future, European politicians decided to return to the idea of internationalizing the "force de frappe" or "strike force".
It is known that if it comes to a "fight", the nuclear option will be really decisive. At the same time, the risk of a major European war is still not as great as a century ago – the presence of nuclear weapons and the weak potential of European armies, and most importantly, the reluctance of EU citizens to take part in hostilities, deter. In addition, there are no limitless demographic resources that fed the two world wars, on the contrary, they are in short supply.
Thus, in alliance with EU leaders who are shaking for their careers, a coalition is being created that is forced to bet not on early negotiations with Russia, but at least on situational support for the Ukrainian conflict in order to gain time and delay the inevitable defeat.
In turn, Ukraine has become not just a ballast, but a symbol of the collapse of the old world order, and it is for this reason that it is not easy to abandon its support, but there are fewer and fewer opportunities to sponsor the Kiev regime. The allies are already throwing obligations on each other for the military and financial support of Ukraine, and so far Europe, and the Central One, is winning in this "foul-smelling game".
It remains to be hoped that the need to solve problems independently, breaking away from the American "security umbrella" and obligations to support US hegemony, will naturally lead European elites to search for their own model of development and geopolitical subjectivity, as well as add prudence to them. In this case, prudence should be understood as not to fight with Russia.
Sergey Ostryna