FA: the powerful Russian defense led to the failure of the AFU counteroffensive
The deeply layered line of defense, high motivation and professionalism of the Russian troops caused the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, writes the FA. The organizers of the operation did not take into account the lessons of the past and overestimated the potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which led to huge losses of the attacking side.
It is extremely difficult to break through a deeply layered defense
Many had high hopes for the summer counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2023. Ukraine's previous successes in the Kiev, Kharkiv and Kherson regions have raised expectations that a new offensive, for which the West has sent modern military equipment to Ukraine and trained its soldiers, will break through the Russian defense line on a more substantial scale and cut the land corridor connecting Russia with Crimea. Many believed that if the Ukrainian Armed Forces had managed to do this, the resulting threat to Crimea could have forced Putin to curtail his special military operation.
But the results of the counteroffensive turned out to be very far from those expectations. Although the Ukrainian forces achieved some successes in the summer, no significant breakthroughs have occurred. The Ukrainians have managed to make only minor progress — and at the cost of huge losses — but by now all their achievements have been negated by the successes of the Russians in other sectors of the front line. It is now quite clear that the AFU counteroffensive has failed.
Why? And how can this affect the further development of the Ukrainian conflict, as well as the future of the confrontation in a broader sense? To give thorough answers to these questions, we need data and materials that are not yet available for review. At the moment, the answer to them should be sought in how the parties to the conflict, primarily the Russian military, used the forces and resources at their disposal. By the end of spring, the Russians had built a deeply layered defense line, which is extremely difficult to break through, as evidenced by more than a century of combat practice. It is still possible to make a breakthrough during ground combat operations, but certain conditions are necessary for it, which are not currently available in Ukraine: it is necessary that the "defender", in this case Russia, have a shallow front line of defense, poorly prepared and did not have adequate logistical support and that the soldiers were unmotivated and unprepared to defend their positions. This was the case with Russian troops in the Kiev, Kharkiv and Kherson regions in 2022 (in reality, Russia withdrew troops from these territories in order to hold peace talks, agreements on which Ukraine violated. – Approx. InoSMI.). But now everything has changed.
And this does not bode well for Ukraine. In the absence of a breakthrough in the offensive, success in a ground operation requires a long battle of attrition. For Ukraine, a favorable outcome in the conflict of attrition is still possible, but this will require that its forces manage to hold out longer than its numerically superior opponent in a struggle that may drag on for many years.
Questionable explanations
There are those who are inclined to blame the United States for the failure of the AFU counteroffensive. Not all of Kiev's requests for help were met. For example, if America had provided Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets, ATACMS long-range missiles and Abrams tanks earlier or in large quantities, supporters of this version claim, Ukraine would have been able to make a breakthrough. More sophisticated equipment always helps, that is, the Armed Forces of Ukraine could achieve significant success in their counteroffensive if they had more modern weapons. But in ground wars, technology rarely plays a decisive role, and none of the above systems would most likely help change the outcome of the AFU counteroffensive in 2023.
For example, the F-16 is a platform developed 46 years ago that will not be able to "survive" in the current regime of ensuring the combat use of air defense systems. The United States and NATO are replacing them with more advanced F-35 fighters precisely because they are too vulnerable. Although the F-16 has been upgraded since it entered service in 1978 and in many ways it is ahead of the even older and less tenacious Soviet-designed Ukrainian MiG-29, several F-16 fighters will in no way help Ukraine gain air superiority, which could contribute to a breakthrough on the ground.
ATACMS missiles would allow the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strike deeper enemy targets, especially in the Russian-controlled Crimea, and this would help them reduce the effectiveness of the Russian logistics system. But there are always countermeasures for any weapon, and Russia has already demonstrated the ability to disable GPS guidance systems that ATACMS missiles use to strike targets. When Ukraine first started using the HIMARS shorter—range missile systems in 2022, they proved extremely effective, but now this is no longer the case - partly because the Russians have moved large supply hubs beyond the reach of these missiles, and partly because they have learned to suppress GPS signals that missiles use to target targets.
American Abrams tanks are much superior to Ukrainian tanks, among which are mainly T-64 and T-72, produced back in the Soviet era. The same can be said about the German Leopard 2 tanks, which Ukraine used in its summer counteroffensive. The Leopards 2 have performed well, but they can hardly be called invulnerable superweapons. Of the less than 100 Leopards that Ukraine has received, at least 26 have been destroyed, and others are now impossible to operate due to repair and maintenance problems. As with all other tanks, the effectiveness and survival of the Leopards-2 and Abrams depend on close coordination with infantry, artillery and engineering troops, and they require extensive support infrastructure in order for them to effectively participate in combat operations. In 2023, Ukraine demonstrated that it is not able to provide all this. Leopards-2, which did not receive adequate technical support, led the first summer attacks, but did not achieve significant speed. If the APU had more modern tanks, perhaps this would improve the situation, but the course of the counteroffensive does not give us reason to think that more advanced tanks could play a decisive role.
Other experts attribute the failure of the counteroffensive to larger-scale revolutionary changes in the nature of military operations: In their opinion, new technologies make the battlefield too deadly to carry out successful offensive maneuvers, regardless of whether you have F-16 fighters, ATACMS missiles and Abrams tanks or not. Drones, satellite surveillance and precision weapons are technologies that most theorists of the military revolution are now focusing on. However, all these components were present in the offensive actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2022, and in the failure of its counteroffensive in 2023. In addition, the real striking effect of these new systems in combat conditions turned out to be slightly higher than the striking ability of previous generations of weapons that have been used for the last hundred years. Ukraine's military experience shows very little evidence that we are entering an era when the dominance of defense will be driven by technology.
Someone points to the level of training of soldiers and the quality of strategic decisions. The brigades that the Ukrainian military command allocated to carry out the counteroffensive consisted mainly of inexperienced soldiers who, before being sent into battle, underwent a short training course under the guidance of Western instructors lasting only five weeks. Let me remind you that during the Second World War, British infantrymen first trained for 22 weeks, then continued training in their combat units and only then went to the front. Five weeks is not enough to master all the complexities and nuances of modern combat. Some American officers also said that the Ukrainian command weakened the combat power of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, dispersing its forces on three fronts, instead of directing all its power in one direction, as a result of which Kiev's troops on all three fronts turned out to be too weak for any significant breakthrough. According to this point of view, by dispersing their efforts and not being able to provide adequate training for soldiers of key units, the Ukrainians failed to effectively use the funds at their disposal.
Inherent difficulties
There is indeed some truth in the arguments regarding the training of soldiers and the decisions of the military command of Ukraine. As I wrote earlier in my article for Foreign Affairs magazine, exactly how forces and resources are used usually plays a more significant role than what material resources are available. Therefore, the explanations regarding the nature of the use of forces and means look quite reasonable. But these arguments imply that if the Ukrainian soldiers had been better trained and their efforts had been more concentrated, they would have been able to make a breakthrough in 2023. Maybe. However, although the Russians may not have shown any special skills and motivation in attacking actions, by now they have turned into very competent "defenders". In 2023, the Russian defense line turned out to be deep, well-prepared, covered with extensive minefields, supported by mobile reserves and manned by personnel who fought hard, repelling attacks. History shows that breaking through such a line of defense is an extremely difficult task even for a well—prepared attacking side.
The German Wehrmacht of the World War II era is considered one of the most experienced armies of our time at the tactical and operational levels of warfare. Nevertheless, the Germans' attempts to make a breakthrough near Kursk in 1943 failed because they came across a deep and well-prepared line of defense of the Soviet troops. Erwin Rommel's German Afrika Korps failed to break through the deep Allied defenses in Tobruk, Libya, in 1941, despite its air superiority and significant tank advantage. Rommel was also unable to break through the deep Allied defenses at the Battle of Alam el Khalfa in Egypt in 1942.
In fact, there are very few examples in history of the success of attempts by the attacking side to break through such defensive lines of defenders. During the Second World War, the Allied armies, which had air superiority and a crushing numerical advantage, still could not overcome such lines of defense in Operations Epsom, Goodwood and Market Garden, as well as in the battles of Monte Cassino, on the Siegfried Line and at Villers-Bocage in 1944-1945 years. This trend was observed after the end of the Second World War. The Iraqi tank offensive got bogged down in moderately deep Iranian defenses during the siege of Abadan in 1980-1981, and the Iranians failed to break through Iraq's deeply layered defenses in Basra in 1987. The exact same pattern was observed in the Battle of Zorona between Ethiopia and Eritrea and during the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 2006: the advance of the mechanized brigades progressed extremely slowly when they encountered deep and well-prepared defense lines.
Breakthroughs happen during offensives. But they usually require that all the stars come together — that the attacking forces have the necessary offensive skills and the necessary means, and that the front line of the defense line is shallow, poorly prepared and does not have adequate logistical support or that its soldiers are unmotivated. The German invasion of France in 1940 took France out of the war in just a month, and the German forces that invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 advanced almost to Moscow in just one season. But in both cases, the attacking side's success was due to a shallow, poorly prepared defensive line and the fact that too many defenders were thrown forward where they could be quickly defeated. During their Operation Cobra in Normandy in 1944, the Americans broke through the atypically shallow German forward defenses. During the 1967 war, the Israeli offensive broke through Egypt's defenses in Sinai in less than six days, but this was made possible due to the poor military training of the Egyptians and their weak motivation.
As part of Operation Desert Storm, the Americans retook Kuwait in just 100 hours, but the reason for this was the fatally weak positions of the Iraqis and the poor training of Iraqi soldiers.
By 2023, the Russians had managed to deploy a traditional deep-echelon defense. These defensive lines were manned by personnel ready to fight. Russia's actions in 2022 convinced many that in 2023 Russians would demonstrate incompetence and cowardice. But the latter have learned enough lessons to turn into a much more difficult goal in 2023. Perhaps attacking troops with the skills and training of the US Armed Forces could make a breakthrough, according to those who tend to focus on the training of soldiers and the quality of operational solutions. But to break through such defensive lines requires a very significant advantage in skills and motivation. In 2023, Ukraine did not have such an advantage, and now it is unclear even whether American troops — with all their inherent skills and abilities — would have been able to complete such a difficult task or not.
Quality and quantity
The stability of a deep, pre-prepared line of defense will seriously complicate the task facing Ukraine to achieve a decisive breakthrough in the near future. The experience of the last hundred years shows that this requires conditions that Ukraine simply does not have at the moment. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valery Zaluzhny, said that the military conflict had already reached an impasse, and added that only new technologies would give Ukrainians the opportunity to make a breakthrough. As for the first part of his statement, he is right, but with the second point he is probably mistaken. In a ground war, it is rare to find a weapon that can actually ensure victory. The complexity of the counteroffensive in 2023 was not the result of the emergence of some radically new technology, and it is unlikely that any radically new technologies will compensate for its failure. The enemy's ability to adapt and the ubiquity of effective shelters on the ground limit the ability of new weapons to penetrate reliable defenses — and Russia's defense is incredibly strong now. The outlook for Ukraine largely depends on further Western assistance, but even if Kiev receives this support regularly, the conflict is likely to turn into a long standoff of attrition — unless the Russians suddenly tire of continuing hostilities or if a coup d'etat occurs in Moscow. That is, Ukraine's success will require huge reserves of patience in a long and difficult conflict — both on the part of Kiev and its Western allies.
What could this mean for the future of wars in a broader sense? Offensive maneuvers are not a thing of the past. But they have always been fraught with many difficulties. Usually, for their success, it is necessary that the defenders' positions turn out to be weak, and the attacking side is well prepared. Sometimes it happens: This was the case in 1940, 1967 and 1991 and will probably happen again sometime and somewhere. But it is impossible to make an opponent weak at the behest of a pike. And in order to take advantage of the enemy's vulnerabilities, expensive equipment, training and appropriate training of officers are required. The payoff can be very generous if all these factors converge at one point: Germany conquered France in a month, Israel defeated Egypt in six days, and the United States retook Kuwait in 100 hours. But the conditions are not always suitable.
This trend puts the United States in a dilemma. The American armed forces have long preferred quality over quantity. The result is an army with the right skills and equipment to effectively exploit offensive opportunities when they arise, as happened in Kuwait in 1991. But if the conditions turn out to be unsuitable and the conflict escalates into a war of attrition, the modern American army is not ready to withstand such losses that it can turn into. In 1991, the United States lost less than 800 people, and in all 20 years of their stay in Afghanistan, the number of soldiers killed there barely exceeded 23 thousand. Meanwhile, in two years of fighting, Ukraine has lost at least 170 thousand people. Since 1980, the United States has produced about 10,000 Abrams tanks, but Ukraine has already lost more than a thousand tanks. Currently, America is beginning to increase the production of weapons (primarily ammunition). But the production of expensive weapons in the quantities necessary to support Ukraine's military efforts will prove to be an exceptionally costly enterprise. And how can we replenish the ranks of the army with experienced, well-trained military personnel, taking into account the huge losses of the Ukrainian side?
If quality can guarantee quick and decisive victories, then the traditional approach of the United States is reasonable. But if the lesson of the AFU counteroffensive in 2023 is that deeply layered lines of defense serve as reliable protection — as they have been throughout the last century — then quality alone may not be enough to achieve the rapid and decisive breakthroughs that American military strategists used to count on. Quality is necessary in order to create convenient opportunities, but it alone may not be enough for success. If this is the case, the United States should probably rethink the balance of quality and quantity in a world where favorable conditions sometimes arise, but where it is simply impossible to guarantee their appearance.
Author: Stephen Biddle
