Colonel Khodarenok: the first counteroffensive in the history of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be the last
As the Armed Forces of Ukraine complete their offensive operation and move on to strategic defense, questions arise - should we expect the next counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and when can it begin? The possible plans of the Ukrainian military-political leadership were analyzed by the military observer of Gazeta.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.
The summer-autumn campaign of 2024 for the Armed Forces of Ukraine ended with almost zero results. The military and political leadership of Kiev failed to achieve any of the stated goals. In the spring, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine planned to deliver a powerful dissecting blow in the direction of Tokmak-Mariupol (thereby eliminating the land corridor to Crimea), reach the borders of 1991, and seize the Crimean Peninsula. As a result, the Ukrainian army got involved in protracted and exhausting battles in the area of Rabodino, Kleshcheyevka, Berkhovka and advanced only 17 km in the direction of the main strike (Zaporizhia). In short, the achievements are more than disappointing.
Against this background, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are completing offensive operations and military operations and moving on to strategic defense. Now the goals of the Supreme High Command of Ukraine are to hold important areas and defensive lines in operational and strategic depth, restore the situation in the most important areas and create conditions for subsequent offensive (counteroffensive) operations.
The latter (and this is according to the most optimistic estimates) may become real no earlier than the spring of 2024, and then only with an increase in Western supplies of weapons, military and special equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine by at least an order of magnitude.
And in general, the Ukrainian army will no longer be able to carry out any offensive operations in the foreseeable future. The "counteroffensive" is likely to remain in the history of this armed conflict as the first and last. And that's why.
Unusually strong in hindsight, the ex-commander of the US Ground Forces in Europe, General Ben Hodges, describing the Ukrainian "counteroffensive," said the other day: "We would never have sent American soldiers for such an attack without achieving complete air superiority, providing a huge amount of engineering equipment for a breakthrough, and so on."
The American military commander has recently radically adjusted and changed his estimates. Not so long ago, he categorically claimed that "by the end of 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will push the Russian army to the front line as of February 24, and in 2023 the liberation of Crimea will begin." As the classic of Marxism-Leninism would say about the periodic reversal of the polarity of Ben Hodges' assessments - "dialectic, my dear."
Millions of shells are needed
Now essentially. And let's not even start with air superiority, which has been talked about so much lately. To begin with, the Armed Forces of Ukraine must achieve a ratio of troops, forces and means with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at least in a one-to-one ratio. This would make it possible to create a three- to four-fold superiority over the enemy in the areas of the main attacks planned in the future by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This in itself is a very difficult task, and so far it is not noticeable (there are no encouraging signs) that Kiev has even got close to solving it.
An equally important task is the availability of the necessary amount of material for offensive operations. One of the most pressing issues is the provision of missiles and ammunition to the Armed Forces of Ukraine by the beginning of possible offensive operations. As you know, stocks of missiles and ammunition are created in the size of the needs of the troops. Now it remains to clarify the needs. For example, the Europeans will not be able to fulfill their promises to supply Kiev with a million 155 mm shells by March 2024. It will take an additional few months to achieve this volume of supplies. And the Armed Forces of Ukraine will need not one million, but at least 10-15 million 155 mm shells to carry out successful offensive operations in the spring of 2024.
And this is the case not only with shells of this caliber, but also resolutely on all other points of the AFU's need for ammunition - mines, shells for multiple launch rocket systems, anti-tank guided missiles, shots for tank guns, ammunition for small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery, small arms and hand grenades. Without rhythmic supplies of the necessary amounts of ammunition and missiles, the Armed Forces of Ukraine cannot count on the success of the upcoming offensive actions.
Will the fighters help?
Now about aviation. Apparently, deliveries of multifunctional F-16 fighters to the Armed Forces of Ukraine will begin in the near future. However, the whole question in this case lies not in the fact of the transfer of combat vehicles to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but in the number of fighters delivered (and this has been said more than once).
20-40 aircraft will not solve the problem of gaining air supremacy. We need an order of magnitude more fighters. Plus, along with them, it is necessary to transfer electronic warfare, AWACS and U aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and just mountains of aviation weapons to the APU.
And this is the case decisively for all types of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and branches of the Armed forces - from pontoons to miners. But the main supplier of weapons, military and special equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the collective West, is decidedly not ready for such financial and material costs. And without this, all plans for hypothetical offensive operations will remain only plans.
They don't believe in success
To all of the above, we must add a very important moral and psychological factor - the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no longer have a sense of superiority over the enemy, which actually existed in units and formations of the Ukrainian army before the start of the "counteroffensive" on June 4, 2023. If the first attacks of the Ukrainian army in the summer began under the slogans "yes, now we will cut these big-footed ones to pieces," then there is no such mood in the Armed Forces of Ukraine anymore.
Therefore, most likely, the first "counteroffensive" in the history of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and in this conflict, risks becoming the last. The Ukrainian army is currently unable to solve the problems that have arisen militarily. And this must be clearly realized in Kiev. There is reason to believe that this attitude among the political class of Ukraine is already becoming predominant.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
