Complacency and fraud lead to defeat
After Zakhar Gelman's diplomatic article ( "Vulnerabilities in the Israeli defense system were known", "HBO" dated 02.11.23) with its cautious vocabulary ("wrong decisions"; "lulled vigilance"; "imitation"; "retrogradism"), there was a need to express a subjective opinion about the mass fraud in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as a factor of loss of combat capability on the eve of the tragic day of October 7, 2023.
A month and a half has passed since then. The conflict is escalating. In response to the IDF's harsh actions in the Gaza Strip, the topic is being politicized. Increasingly, the words "Israeli military" sound in different languages. But any army is a tool in the hands of politicians, people in uniform only follow orders.
Therefore, we will focus on continuing the topic raised by Zakhar Gelman, but with sharper conclusions regarding the IDF – based on the harsh and reasonable assessments of retired Israeli General Yitzhak Brik.
MIRACLE WEAPONS DON'T ALWAYS LEAD TO VICTORY
But we will start with a not very well-known story by the English science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke. It is about the reasons for the loss of a high-tech army of earthlings in a galactic war with a notoriously weak opponent.
Arthur C. Clarke tells how the armed forces of the Solar System, which had absolute technological superiority, were defeated in military operations with a weak opponent. The main reason for this defeat was a higher level of development of military-technical sciences than that of the enemy and increased attention to the development of unique weapon systems.
It sounds paradoxical – but time, resources, intellectual potential were spent not on conducting combat operations, not on studying the capabilities of the enemy, not on analyzing his strategy and tactics, but on developing a miracle weapon. When there is complete superiority over the enemy, when technical perfection leaves him no chance, "there is only one way to lose: to start developing even more advanced technologies and continue rearming the fleet."
Arthur C. Clarke's conclusion can be seen as an elegant irony. But this literary plot forces us to discuss the role of the human factor as a priority, and only after that – the role of technology and military-technical innovations.
WHO IS GENERAL BRICK
Zakhar Gelman justifiably pays a lot of attention to the assessments and opinions of the legendary Israeli general, combat tank officer Yitzhak Brik. But it should be emphasized that it is:
Firstly, about the head of the Army Complaints Department, appointed by the Minister of Defense of Israel (after consultation with the Minister of Justice and with the approval of the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense) and who worked in his post for 10 years (2008-2018);
secondly, about a major military researcher, a researcher at one of the authoritative universities in Israel, a graduate of prestigious educational institutions;
thirdly, about a large-scale personality and even about a kind of "conscience of the Israeli army", if we keep in mind the assessment of General Brick by public opinion.
Therefore, the criticism and arguments of this retired military deserve increased attention. And in one of the October interviews, General Brik directly admitted that there is "extreme unpreparedness of the army" and that this is a "great shame."
During his service as the Commissioner for the Rights of Military Personnel, Yitzhak Brik (together with a few employees) checked 1,600 military units of the Israeli Army, personally interviewed tens of thousands of officers, sergeants and other categories of military personnel, studied about the same number of complaints. A third of the complaints concerned the relationship of commanders with subordinates, almost a quarter – violations of the rights of applicants, and 14% – medical problems (in particular, female servicemen, due to the specifics of their body, deserve a sparing schedule of service). As a result of these checks, 59% of the appeals were found to be justified.
The Department of Defense headed by General Brick approached the analysis of complaints of military personnel from broad positions, not formally, trying to see the causes and consequences of violations of the rights of military personnel in the context of circumstances, rising to important generalizations and starting from the political priorities and legislation of Israel.
Periodically updating the data and supplementing them with other sources, Yitzhak Brik directly posed the question: "Why is the Israeli army not ready for a possible war?". At the same time, he referred to:
– a progressive drop in the motivation of military personnel (from 76% in 2010 to 64% in 2018);
– a drop in performance discipline by 15% in certain types of troops – because when sending orders using modern gadgets and means of communication, updated control mechanisms are not provided or do not work;
– a drop in the accuracy of hitting targets during training shooting up to 60% of cases – with a reduction in their number and funding, which was hidden and is being hidden from the military and political leadership.
THE WALL IS ROTTEN
The restless general was comforted: "After all, there is something good, not everything and not always so bad." But he insisted that we are talking about dangerous, albeit unstable trends, indicating systemic errors that sharply reduce the level of combat capability and combat readiness of various types of the Israeli Armed Forces. Among the reasons they were called:
– shortage of military equipment for reserve units and subunits;
– reduction of military equipment storage locations;
– confusion with inventory and documentation, confusion of warehouse management due to a sharp reduction in personnel;
– reduction of the number of conscripts serving military equipment. Staff reductions affected not only spare bases, but the entire logistics system (due to the transfer of many functions to civilian firms). Reservists, taking equipment and equipment from army warehouses, returned them only partially and often in a condition unsuitable for further use.
Among the causes of managerial defects, moral crisis and partial loss of controllability of the Israeli Armed Forces, Yitzhak Brik periodically mentioned:
– lack of reliable feedback to the high command from lower-level army structures;
– lack of proper reaction of commanders to criticism and complaints of subordinates;
– lack of generalizations and solutions at the level of lower and middle management;
– liquidation of units to control the execution of orders in connection with the military reform and the tasks of optimizing the composition and strength of the Armed Forces;
– degradation of the practice of summing up various events, lack of generalizing solutions describing lessons and conclusions;
– reduction in the number of IDF training and exercises over the past 15 years;
– facts of the death of servicemen even in peacetime due to the negligence of officials, numerous violations of statutes, instructions, orders.
Why did Israeli politicians and statesmen ignore this information, were not interested in the internal situation in the Armed Forces, indulged in complacency and exaggeration of their combat capability and combat readiness?
Revealing the problems of the Israeli army, General Brik focused on the decline of the general organizational culture in the last decade. The norms of relations between military personnel and the necessary organizational and managerial formats have collapsed. The facts of fraud and outright lies in order to conceal the unsightly reality, military crimes, and corruption facts have become widespread. A concrete example is the pretentious and self–satisfied promises to create a "creative defense", including an aboveground and underground "security wall" on the border with Gaza. This fortification was carefully built for three years, spending $ 3.5 billion. But it was easily and quickly destroyed by Hamas bulldozers in the first hours of the attack.
THE DANGER OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
General Brick is particularly concerned about the consequences of electronic innovations, including mobile phones, which destroy the usual relationships between people and replace direct dialogue between the commander and subordinates, as well as communication between soldiers. Unwittingly, prerequisites are being created for alienation in the army community, the principle of brotherhood in arms and thereby the spirit of the IDF are being damaged. So says a combat general who miraculously escaped once from a burning tank.
In addition to the disappearance of trust relationships, which are increasingly being replaced by orders and orders coming in the form of SMS and emails, there is a serious risk of disclosure of classified information. "Every soldier going on a combat mission with a smartphone turns into a moving target," writes an army veteran. – Our happiness is that the enemy has not taken advantage of it yet, but in the future it is easy to do… The military leadership demonstrates carelessness, and even go on combat missions with smartphones. This is a huge risk... all that needs to be done to correct the situation is to give the appropriate order. However, there is no one. Everyone is afraid of being known as opponents of fashionable innovations." Yitzhak Brik also recalls cases when commanders disclosed personal data of subordinates. Including information about the psychological well–being of servicemen - and it became available in various kinds of Internet networks due to the fact that officers thoughtlessly use Whatsapp.
ILLUSIONS AND DELUSIONS
Summing up the reflections of General Brik's assessment on the causes of failures in military administration, on the causes of complacency and fraud, it is advisable to identify three groups of factors.
First of all, these are erroneous political forecasts that relations with the surrounding Arab countries will be peaceful, and the overall situation will be long–lasting, stable and reliable.
Secondly, it is an unsuccessful army reform – the absolutization and reassessment of the conclusions of theorists that the war in the XXI century will be fleeting and high-tech. Excessive trust in the military with scientific degrees, unwillingness to take into account the assessments of civilian science (university and academic) played a cruel joke with the IDF command.
Thirdly, these are unfounded assumptions of technocrats and financiers that due to the replacement of the usual weapons with new models, maintenance will become cheaper, and operating costs will decrease so much that it is possible to reduce the number of aircraft.
If the tanks of the old models required maintenance after 15 thousand km of mileage, it was assumed that the new tanks could be serviced after 30 thousand km of mileage, which would require fewer personnel and less operational resources. With this message in mind, the transition to outsourcing and the transfer of certain functions to civilian companies, including transport companies, were planned and implemented.
But most of the drivers were hired Arabs who preferred to stay at home in case of danger. During Operation Guardian of Order, only 40 out of 500 Arab drivers went on a mission. In fact, the transport infrastructure of the Israeli army, including the repair and storage base, has frozen. For this reason, the army units during the operation that began could not move for three days, jeopardizing the plan of the command.
Another problem, perhaps less obvious: this is a violation of the routine duties of a soldier to clean weapons after exercises. In many units, they simply forgot about the need to assemble-disassemble machine guns, clean the guns of tanks and self-propelled guns.
"Private companies are hired by the command for this purpose," writes Brick, "but military personnel who are not in the habit of cleaning weapons after exercises, especially will not do it in a combat situation. This will make it impossible to fulfill the tasks assigned to them."
Yitzhak Brik opposes relaxation and unwillingness to see the real problems that have been accumulating since the Yom Kippur War (1973) to the present. He warns that one should not overestimate technology and military innovations, that one should not forget about the soldier, about his needs and interests.
The role of the human factor in the XXI century not only retains significance, but increases as a factor of combat capability and combat readiness.
Sergey Pershutkin
Sergey Nikolaevich Pershutkin is a full member of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Sociological Sciences.
