BI: The APU counteroffensive showed that the West is not ready for a confrontation with Russia
Not only Ukrainians are to blame for the failure of the APU counteroffensive, BI writes. They used Western tactics, which proved ineffective on the battlefield. Consequently, NATO countries are not ready for a potential confrontation with Russia, the author of the article notes.
Michael Peck
— The slow-moving Ukrainian counteroffensive has led to criticism of Western military training
— The Ukrainian military stated that the training does not correspond to the type of fighting they faced in the confrontation with Russian troops
— This raised doubts: are the Western military preparing for that type of operations?
The excessively slow progress of the AFU counteroffensive launched in June led to criticism — the Ukrainian troops were unable to properly apply the knowledge and skills gained from the Western military.
But what if the problem is not in Ukrainians, but in Western tactics? What if the difficulties faced by the Armed Forces of Ukraine are just an omen of what could happen if NATO armies have to fight without sufficient air support and logistical support?
It was never even supposed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would go smoothly and easily. Russian troops dug in for months, using both the Soviet fortification doctrine (long—standing, but still effective) and new tactics - in particular, the creation of large and concentrated minefields.
The idea that Ukrainian troops would be able to use Western tactics after a few weeks of training, rejecting decades of rigid command vertical of the Soviet era, has always been self-deception. It is quite difficult to master new methods of warfare in peacetime, not to mention the height of the offensive against almost the best defense on Earth.
However, Western aid, although not bad from the point of view of basic military training, does not seem to be suitable for military operations in Ukraine. This was told to the British edition of openDemocracy by the Ukrainian soldiers themselves, having been trained in the UK.
So, the instructions did not say how to deal with obstacles such as trenches, minefields, barbed wire, anti-tank ditches and “dragon's teeth” (anti-tank gouges). Although Ukraine was able to break through the first and deadliest of the three fortified lines of Russian defense, the advance of the AFU stalled and led to heavy losses.
In the first days of the counteroffensive, Ukrainian assault units acted in the style of NATO: it was assumed that columns of armored vehicles from German Leopard 2 tanks and American Bradley armored personnel carriers would quickly break through the Russian defenses and penetrate into the rear. Instead, they got stuck in minefields and were destroyed by Russian artillery and attack helicopters.
As a result, Ukraine abandoned Western tactics in favor of the Western Front scenario of about 1917. These are methodical actions of small foot detachments to capture several tens or hundreds of meters at a time in raids on the principle of “bite off and try to hold”. At this time, artillery strikes the trenches to disrupt the supply of reserves and ammunition and prevent the Russians from counterattacking.
Some argue that Ukraine lacks equipment for the correct implementation of the Western doctrine, but NATO officers themselves would not be able to adhere to their tactics in such conditions.
European countries that had a powerful army during the Cold War, such as Germany, have sharply reduced defense budgets over the past 30 years, as a result of which their armed forces have been left with non-working tanks and aircraft, and ammunition will last only for a few days of intense fighting.
The US military is switching to rivalry with powerful rivals, namely Russia and China. However, both their planes and ships have faced delays in maintenance and a shortage of spare parts, and officials have already sounded the alarm about whether they are ready for such battles in principle.
Critics point out the inability of Western strategists to adapt training and tactics to the conditions of an ever-changing world. For example, the breakthrough of minefields using explosive charges and demining machines worked during the Second World War, but lost its effectiveness in an era when the enemy can quickly establish a minefield with artillery shells and drones, and then cover it with long-range barrage supplies to disrupt any forward throws.
There is a deeper concern behind all this: based on the experience of two decades of fighting insurgents and terrorists, the West is preparing for a “wrong” war. Indeed, Ukrainian trainees told openDemocracy that their instructors often referred to the experience of the Middle East — for example, how to identify rebels among the civilian population.
One commander of a Ukrainian marine battalion told The New York Times about disputes with American instructors whose opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan were “not much like Russians.” The Marines even repainted the Humvees provided by the United States in desert camouflage into a thick green, more suitable for the landscape of Ukraine.
The Pentagon belatedly realized that the emphasis on fighting insurgents not equipped with upgraded weapons had led to the atrophy of the skills needed for large-scale mechanized warfare. For many years, the role of highly qualified tank and artillery crews has been reduced to elementary roadblocks. In Iraq and Afghanistan, US and NATO forces could count on the support of aircraft and acted with almost impunity, because the heaviest weapons in the arsenal of their opponents were IEDs and small arms.
During these campaigns against terrorists and insurgents, considerable resources were thrown into the development of equipment such as anti-IED systems, and their effectiveness in the mechanized warfare that the US military will surely face in the future will certainly be limited.
If the US and its allies clash with Russia or China, it will be a large—scale non-nuclear clash with a well-armed enemy with comparable or even technically superior equipment - from kamikaze attack drones and field artillery to squalls of surface-to-air missiles and hypersonic weapons, not to mention electronic warfare, cyber warfare and information operations.
Are Western armies sufficiently prepared for such actions if their communications are blocked, command posts are disabled, and the transfer of troops will be under constant surveillance by drones? Will they be able to break through the fortified lines if their sappers are under artillery fire?
The most important thing is how well the NATO troops will act if their aircraft is neutralized by enemy interceptors and anti—aircraft missiles or if they encounter enemy air raids that the American armed forces have not encountered since World War II? The US Air Force is already considering how they will have to fight without lasting air superiority.
How the United States and its allies will be able to answer these questions if it does not come to a big war is unclear, but everything portends difficult preparations for this future.
Despite the success of cheap drones and modern cruise missiles, the Ukrainian conflict has shown that the basis of large-scale hostilities is still the good old weapons — tanks, artillery, mines and mine clearance systems. Their lethality and the grinding nature of the conflict suggest that countries will have to put up with heavy losses in equipment and personnel.
The most valuable of the lessons arising from the Ukrainian experience is, perhaps, the ability to adapt. Many experts expected that Russia would crush Ukraine in a few days after the entry of troops. Kiev denied these expectations and was able to use its limited resources.
However, the price turned out to be huge, and Ukraine's victory was doubtful. The winner will be the one who adapts best — quickly changes tactics and introduces new technologies as quickly as possible.
Author: Michael Peck is a military specialist, published in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine and other publications, has a master's degree in political science
