How the APU drones were able to fly to Pskov and what to expect from Kiev next

Colonel Khodarenok believes that the APU will try to attack Russian thermal power plants in winter

On August 29, Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles carried out a number of strikes on targets in many Russian regions. This attack is regarded as the largest in all 18 months of its existence. How this became possible, what are the further trends, what to do to prevent such incidents, the military observer of the Newspaper was investigating.En" Mikhail Khodarenok.

Drone flights on the evening of August 29 were recorded over the territory of the Oryol, Kaluga, Bryansk, Ryazan, Pskov and Moscow regions. At the Kresty airfield near Pskov, four Il-76MD military transport aircraft of the 334th military transport Berlin Red Banner Aviation Regiment received damage of varying severity.

Where did the drones come from?

It is not yet clear where the attack on the Kresty airfield, which is located more than 600 km from the Ukrainian border, could have come from. In other words, the exact flight route of Ukrainian UAVs has not yet been established. In the discussions that have arisen, the APU is looking for a drone take-off site on the territory of Estonia and Latvia, even union Belarus is called among the options.

In fact, most likely, the situation looks like this. The flight range of 600 kilometers or more is not critical for Ukrainian UAVs. As the newspaper wrote earlier.Ru", the same Iranian UAV Shahed 136 has a flight range of 1000 km, and it uses a clone of the German Limbach L550E aircraft engine as a motor. With the original power plant (such as the Austrian Rotax or the German Limbach Flugmotoren), the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle will fly even further. And getting hundreds of engines from these companies is not a big problem for Ukraine at the moment.

The APU has guidance systems for its unmanned aerial vehicles. For these purposes, either Starlink (a global satellite system deployed by the SpaceX company, since 2022, the APU has been used to guide UAVs) or NAVSTAR GPS (Navigation Satellite Time and Ranging, Global Positioning System) can be used. Do not forget about inertial guidance systems, which are used in many modern UAVs. That is, the Ukrainian drones had no problems with the coordinate information and the accuracy of the output to the object.

Now we will answer the question why the AFU UAVs were not detected by means of radar reconnaissance, and the country's leadership was not subsequently presented with a map of the radar wiring of these air objects. The fact is that for timely detection and subsequent wireless wiring of Ukrainian drones, a radar field with a lower boundary of 60-100 meters is necessary. It is quite possible that there is not one on a number of sections of the western border of Russia yet. In addition, there is no doubt that the enemy (with the help of US intelligence) is aware of the grouping of radio-technical troops of the VKS of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Therefore, taking advantage of the gaps in the radar field and bypassing the positions of radar companies and battalions, Ukrainian attack drones reached the outskirts of Pskov unhindered. Local residents along the way of the drone flight might not notice them, since the UAVs carried out their flight at night, and the sound from the drone engines is not so loud.

Most likely, that's how it really was.

Why weren't the drones shot down earlier?

There is one more important circumstance. As objects of radar reconnaissance, small UAVs are characterized by an EPR value (effective scattering surface) of the order of 0.05-0.5 sq. m. In most cases, the EPR of small unmanned vehicles is only 0.1 sq. m. And this is very small for conducting radar RTV and effective SAM firing at targets of this type.

It is quite possible that in the near future we will receive an aircraft-type UAV with an EPR of about 0.01 sq. m. Which means that the traditional airspace reconnaissance radars currently in service will practically be unable to effectively detect small-sized low-speed air targets with the specified EPR values. As for the SAM radar, the vast majority of them will not detect drones with an EPR of about 0.01 sq. m and less.

It cannot be ruled out that in addition to radar companies and battalions, visual observation posts will have to be deployed on the approaches to the most important objects in the near future. Of course, not like during the Great Patriotic War, where binoculars and a telephone were the main equipment of the observer, but on a completely new technological basis.

The question arises - why were no active air defense systems such as anti-aircraft missile systems or anti-aircraft machine-gun installations (or MZA - small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery) used at the Kresty airfield to combat UAVs?

To begin with, we note that the grouping of air defense forces and means (combat and numerical strength) at the Kresty airfield is not known to us. Eyewitnesses on August 29 noted shooting from 23-mm guns of the ZU-23-2 type. However, in order for this fire to be effective, timely notification is required, qualitatively different sighting devices, appropriate lighting equipment (because it is not entirely clear how to use a conventional optical sight to fire at aerial targets at night).

There is another significant problem - very good guns (with simply excellent ballistic characteristics) developed by Gryazev, Shipunov and Grabin require programmable detonation ammunition (and in very large quantities). The use of such projectiles is one of the effective ways to increase the probability of hitting an aerial target such as a UAV. Such ammunition is detonated at a given point of the trajectory, closest to the target, and hits the object with the maximum possible number of striking elements.

Similar projectiles, for example, are equipped with a promising anti-aircraft artillery complex ZAK-57 "Derivation-air defense". Again, it's not so much about "Derivation" as such. The problem is in the number of these ZAKS (and similar ones) located both in the zone of their own, and on the cover of the most important facilities in the European part of the country.

What kind of APU attacks to expect in winter?

This is how, in the most general terms, the problems of combating UAVS currently look like. It remains to answer one of the main questions - what do the trends in the field of combat use of UAVs by the enemy look like?

There is no doubt (there is simply no doubt about it) that the scale of such strikes will only increase, and with the onset of the winter period, the number of attacks by Ukrainian drones on critical infrastructure facilities of the country will increase dramatically. First of all, strikes will be inflicted on power plants, power transmission lines, heating mains, transformer substations, thermal power plants, etc. The situation can significantly worsen if the winter in the coming year is frosty.

There is no doubt that similar plans are already being developed by the Ukrainian side. The task is to cause large-scale power outages on the territory of the European part of the country, create difficulties with the supply of heat, cold and hot water, and thereby cause discontent among the widest segments of the population.

Therefore, it is necessary to prepare for such a development of events. Conduct exercises of the appropriate orientation, create the necessary stocks of material resources, have action plans in critical situations.

The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.

Biography of the author:

Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for the newspaper.Ru", retired colonel.

Mikhail Khodarenok