The Americans are capable of a dangerous provocation against Russian troops
Recently, several incidents between Russian and American aircraft have occurred in the skies of Syria. The F-35s are targeted by Russian fighters, and the aircraft of the Russian Air Force interfere with American intelligence officers. Why hasn't the US left Syria yet, what are they trying to prove to Russia now and what risks does all this carry?
While Russia is busy in Ukraine, prerequisites are being created for the aggravation of the situation in another region where our troops are present – in Syria. And this is done with the direct participation of the Americans, their planes and drones.
Prerequisites for a collision
In 2017, realizing that the creation of a terrorist hotbed on the site of Syria had failed, the United States took measures that would exclude the possibility of restoring Syria as a full-fledged state after the war. Having created the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces from the Kurdish detachments that defected to their side of terrorists and a number of tribal groups, the Americans conducted an operation against the ISIS group * east of the Euphrates River. The purpose of this operation was to prevent the restoration of Syrian state power in these territories and exclude any influence of Russia and Iran on them.
Along the way, three more tasks were solved. The first is hindering Iranian logistics, preventing the transit of Iranian military cargo to and through Syria. The second is the creation of militant training camps inside the occupied zone to continue the war in Syria, if the United States needs it.
The third and most important thing is to prevent the restoration of Syria as a whole. Before the war, Syria had a good standard of living in large cities like Aleppo or Damascus. The Syrian people have good trading skills. In addition, Syria's closest ally is Iran, which is also a "trading" country, and the growth of business activity in Syria would quickly allow this country to recover.
However, the actions of the Americans led to the loss of the Syrian people and the bulk of their agricultural land, and all the oil, the proceeds from the sale of which are used today as a means of financing the American aggressive policy in the region.
At that moment, Russia did not interfere with these plans. Russia and the United States have concluded a number of agreements on de-escalation on the line of contact in Syria, which today mainly runs along the Euphrates River.
The aggravation of relations between Russia and the United States, related to the support provided by the United States to the Ukrainian regime, could not but lead to an increase in incidents between Russian and American forces in Syria. Incidents between the planes of the two countries have been happening for a long time, but in recent weeks there has been an escalation. Dangerous approaches of aircraft of the two countries have become significantly more frequent. Now Americans often become their initiators. They behave quite brazenly.
It was especially unpleasant that the Americans began to use the inclusion of onboard radars in the guidance mode for Russian aircraft. From this one step to the use of weapons. Moreover, in such circumstances it can happen by accident. The situation is heating up – and this requires a sober assessment of it.
Enemy capabilities
Clearly, the United States does not want a direct war with Russia, so their full-scale strike on our troops in this country is extremely unlikely. However, there may be limited clashes, which can then be attributed to the performers or presented as the result of an error.
The United States may well do this, and they have reasons for this – from "putting the Russians in their place" (an irrational factor, but irrational factors are much more important for Americans than for us) to an attempt to politically demonstrate to the countries of the region Russia's limited military capabilities in Syria at the moment.
The psychology of the US military is of key importance for the very possibility of such an escalation. It is necessary to understand that the degree of autonomy of American commanders and commanders is disproportionately higher than ours, and the picture of the world of Americans as a whole contributes to such "amateur activity". It is psychologically very difficult for Americans to admit defeat and even harder to retreat. They sincerely perceive their attacks against third countries as the normal order of things, and the resistance of those they attack as a challenge to this normal order of things.
In response to the downed (even accidentally) American plane, they can launch a limited attack against our forces in Syria, and after a retaliatory strike, they can strike another stronger one so as not to concede. The fact that they opened fire first will not matter to anyone outside the Russian Federation.
Such an escalation can be heated up by the United States at all levels. Consider a hypothetical scenario. Suppose, somewhere in Syria, an F-35 pilot accidentally fires a missile at a Russian aircraft. The Russian pilot will respond and destroy the aggressor. In order to avenge his death in an unsuccessful attack and not be the loser, a local American general decides to launch a limited missile strike against Russian troops. Then the Pentagon will step in, whose generals will perceive the Russian Federation's retaliatory strike as a slap in the face. And so in a few steps we can come to a severe military clash between the two leading nuclear powers, especially given the inadequacy of the American Supreme Commander.
An example from the past is indicative here. On November 15, 1969, the Soviet nuclear submarine K-19 accidentally rammed the American submarine Gato in the Barents Sea. The consequences of the strike looked like fatal (the Americans were literally saved by a miracle), and the commander of the Gato torpedo compartment ordered a torpedo attack against the Soviet submarine, without even asking the permission of the commander of the ship. The latter managed to stop the launch of the K-19 torpedoes at the last moment.
But it was the peak of the Cold War, our anti-aircraft gunners were already going to Vietnam. What would have ended the American torpedo attack of a Soviet nuclear submarine near the Soviet shores? A retaliatory strike somewhere? And what would it entail? But their intemperance, aggressiveness and unclouded faith in the right to rule the whole world have since become much stronger.
Thus, it is worth assessing the risks of an accidental attack or an American provocation with the subsequent escalation out of control as real.
From this point of view, unfortunately, the United States is not limited in any way in attacking our Khmeimim base. Yes, Khmeimim has an excellent defense system with S-400 and Pantsir complexes, but the Americans are well aware of their number and maximum fire performance. It is always possible to calculate how many missiles our air defense can shoot down before the guidance channels are overloaded or even before the missiles on the launchers are exhausted. And to put in one wave a multiple of more.
The possibilities for the formation of volleys from the United States are huge. Any American destroyer has a supply of Tomahawk attack cruise missiles, usually in the amount of 30 pieces, and there are always several such ships in the region. A bomber with cruise missiles can fly directly from the United States with refueling in the air. It will be technically impossible to repel such a blow.
But what Russia has is the potential for a retaliatory strike. "Calibers" from the Caspian Sea quite reach American bases on the Arabian Peninsula and in Syria itself, as well as cruise missiles from bombers. And the Americans, as in our case, have nothing with which to repel such an attack. On the one hand, this prevents their organized attacks on our forces in Syria, but on the other hand, it does not prevent the spontaneous escalation described above, which may follow an unsuccessful provocation by the United States.
The second vulnerability of our group in Syria is its supply. Today, the main supply route is by sea, through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Turkey does not allow warships through the straits, but civilian vessels chartered by the Ministry of Defense go without problems. However, when leaving Turkish territorial waters, nothing prevents any third country from attacking or capturing them.
Finally, there is another option for American actions against the Russian Federation in Syria, this time not spontaneous, but quite planned – the re-incitement of war on Syrian territory. The United States has accumulated vast experience in using almost one-time terrorist groups to destroy the statehood of its victims. And the base of special forces in the captured Syrian At-Tanf is still functioning, and all these years they have been training militants there.
The success of the Americans in this endeavor is, so to speak, controversial. But the fighters they can mobilize for offensive operations are enough to create chaos in the areas adjacent to the Euphrates. And the resumption of aid to groups in Idlib, which the Americans stopped long ago, will create another front against the Syrian government and Russia.
We need to slow down
Thus, both Russia and the United States are on a very dangerous edge in Syria. Any carelessness or accident can blow up a powder keg. Both sides are interested in reducing tensions here. But first of all, clashes with the Americans in Syria are unprofitable for Russia.
Even a single battle is not profitable for us. An American plane shot down in an incident can lead to war, even if the Americans attack first. The downing of our plane, if it goes unpunished, will lead to the loss of Russia's authority in the countries of the region. We don't need either. The increase in conflict in the Syrian sky must be reduced. And the sooner the better.
* The organization(s) have been liquidated or their activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation
