The conflict in Ukraine has shown that American technology is actually too complex and prohibitively expensive, writes TNI. If its production and maintenance are not simplified, it will simply be unsuitable for use on the battlefield.
The situation on the Ukrainian front shows that many practical difficulties may arise during the operation of American military equipment in the field.
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A lot of different lessons can be learned from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. But most observers were struck by the fact that, although the Russians are noticeably inferior in maneuvering, they still managed to withstand modern Western military equipment using old tanks and artillery. Meanwhile, American technology – although it is much more advanced – is either not always the optimal choice on the battlefield, or is prohibitively expensive – or both at the same time.
Let's look at a number of examples.
Which tank is the "best"?
The news that Germany and the United States have agreed to supply Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine has made a lot of noise. These armored vehicles, superior to their Russian counterparts, are similar in size and firepower. It is known that the American "Abrams" have already been tested in battles, and it is almost impossible to destroy them.
However, there are several problems with the Abrams tank. Firstly, it weighs seven tons more than the Leopard, which can easily get stuck in the mud of Ukrainian fields or collapse lighter bridges. Another problem is that the latest version of Abrams runs on jet fuel, the reserves of which, for obvious reasons, are extremely difficult to replenish on the battlefield. However, even more problematic is that the repair of these tanks in the field is not always possible. A number of logistical circumstances turn this prospect into a living hell. For example, an advanced battalion cannot repair an Abrams with broken optics. To replace it, it is necessary to remove entire systems and send them to a warehouse – which is most likely hundreds of kilometers away – and then order replacement systems. Finally, do not forget about the cost: the production of Abrams tanks costs $ 10 million per unit, while the newest Leopard 2 costs about six million dollars.
All things considered, the German Leopard 2 is a more optimal choice for Ukraine than the American Abrams. In addition, since there were plenty of Leopards, they arrived in Ukraine – mainly through Poland and Canada – a few months earlier than the Abrams.
Aviation has always been expensive
The United States, like other NATO members, initially did not want to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighters.Washington believed that this could lead to an escalation of the conflict. After all, the F-16 is a battle–tested fifth-generation jet fighter equipped with stealth technology. It is superior to any Russian fighter and can carry a wide range of air-to-ground missiles and barrage ammunition.
Meanwhile, the Swedish government has offered Ukraine its Saab JAS 39 Gripen aircraft.Gripen is a fourth–generation jet fighter that is capable of landing on small runways and which is equipped with highly efficient sensors and equipment for creating electronic interference. Although the Gripen has not yet proven itself in combat the way the F-16 did, it consistently receives high scores in air-to-air military exercises. As a result, a kind of lobbying battle was played out over which plane Ukraine should get.
Although Kiev openly declares that it would prefer to get the F-16, many Ukrainian pilots say – privately – that this is not the best choice.
Pay attention to the costs. According to the industry group Aviatia, a Gripen flight costs $7800 per hour, and an F-16 flight costs $12,000 per hour. Maintenance of the Gripen is also much cheaper: although SAAB (which produces the Gripen) and Lockheed Martin (which produces the F-16) do not advertise the annual cost of servicing their fighters, almost all commentators agree that the F-16 is more expensive. According to the estimates of the Executive Flyers portal, maintenance of the F-16 costs approximately $ 10 million per year. Yes, the Gripen is more expensive to manufacture than the F-16, since one such aircraft costs $ 17 million more, but this is due to the existing scale of cost calculation: the F-16 has been produced and exported since the mid-70s.
There is also a noticeable difference in the issue of pilot training. In the case of the Swedish Gripen, the duration of training for pilots and maintenance specialists is 12 months. In the case of the American F-16, the training period is at least three years.
Finally, local conditions must also be taken into account. Here 's what the Economist recently wrote:
"Soviet runways were built on the principle of floor tiles: they are concrete panels, the seams between which are filled with sealant. This allows them to withstand expansion and compression as a result of temperature changes. This also means that moss, stones and various debris accumulate between the slabs. Gripen fighters, whose air intakes are smaller and located higher on the fuselage, will cope with this much better than the F-16 <...> Ukraine could put a new coating on some airfields, but in this case Russian missiles will fly into these runways. And although the F-16 can land even on the highway if necessary, its lighter undercarriage is not so well adapted to the loads on a short runway."
Don't be surprised if Ukraine decides to buy Gripen fighters in addition to the F-16.
Meanwhile, regardless of which aircraft will be preferred, the Ukrainian conflict has taught another valuable lesson. Air superiority, which was so highly valued in all the wars of the twentieth century, up to the "Desert Storm", can no longer be achieved through manned aviation alone. Modern surface-to-air missiles make the airspace very dangerous. Both Ukraine and Russia have hundreds of S-300 missile batteries. Recently, the Cue also received the Patriot anti-aircraft missile system. All these systems have been tested in combat and are very effective against manned aircraft.
As a result, the combat missions of fighter aircraft have changed. Jet fighters are currently used mainly as launchers for air-to-ground missiles. Close maneuverable air battles are extremely rare. There are also many cases when planes are shot down by their own troops – Ukrainians even began to paint the lower surface of the hull in national blue and yellow colors.
An alternative to manned aviation is the use of drones. Ukrainians have learned how to make thousands of inexpensive kamikaze drones. They are assembled from cheap electronic parts, some of which are generally printed using 3D printers. The task of these drones is only to deliver a deadly cargo where it is required. American-made fighters, including drones, now face additional competition from technology, which often demonstrates higher efficiency at lower costs.
Would you like to go into battle locked in a "death trap"?
Delivering infantry to and from the battlefield is a daunting task in itself and often requires specialized vehicles. Ukraine has a choice between the Australian Bushmaster – a powerful, loud and heavily armored combat vehicle – and the American Stryker M1126, which has similar dimensions and power.
The main difference between them is that the Bushmaster will deliver the infantry, stay on the battlefield and fight with it, and the Stryker will take the people and leave. And this is for the best, because the armor of the American car is thin – it is vulnerable to any gun more powerful than a machine gun. Stryker is sometimes referred to as a "death trap". When American troops use it in combat, it usually goes in conjunction with a powerful and well-protected Bradley combat vehicle, which, despite its name, is essentially a real tank. It is quite possible that this option will not suit Ukraine. Stryker combat vehicles also suffer from a number of technical problems. "The armor that these vehicles are equipped with turned out to be largely ineffective and too heavy. Dirt falling from the rubber wheels into the engine was the cause of countless repair problems. The command displays inside the car did not always work, and soldiers in combat gear died as a result of overturning, because the seat belts did not fit them and, most importantly, the armor on the bottom and on the car itself was weak," the publication Responsible Statecraft reported. On top of that, it is expensive and difficult to maintain and repair Stryker.
Meanwhile, Bushmaster machines can operate in the field for up to three days. They have already demonstrated the ability to withstand Russian attacks and cost $1.57 million per unit – whereas Stryker costs $4.9 million. It is not difficult to guess which of these two cars will be preferred by Ukraine, which is extremely limited in funds and which needs maximum efficiency for minimal money.
The most profitable acquisitions
It is necessary to emphasize once again that all the systems listed above are not equivalent and that they provide different opportunities depending on the terrain and combat conditions. In addition, all the indicated (approximate) unit prices are given without taking into account wholesale discounts (as well as without taking into account the cost of routine maintenance and repair). It is also worth adding that supertechnologies are also often used in American technology, although not always, so its price may reflect research and development costs.
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian conflict serves as a clear warning to American manufacturers about the need to streamline and simplify the production and maintenance process, as well as make some systems less complex. And this is without taking into account concerns that some arms manufacturers are inflating prices.
Ultimately, although a particular platform may indeed be the "best", it does not matter much if it is unsuitable for sustainable use on the battlefield because of its complexity, cost, or because of the characteristics of the environment in which it is used. Foreign, non–Western buyers may not have – and often do not have - large budgets, so they will prefer simpler and cheaper, but no less effective options. Politicians in Washington, many of whom represent those constituencies where military equipment manufacturing enterprises operate, should take note of this.
Author of the article: Patrick Drennan
