The APU failed at the very beginning of the counteroffensive. To turn the situation around, Ukraine desperately needs resources, but it lacks its own forces, and the West is hesitating with help. In such conditions, Kiev will most likely have to freeze the operation, the author of the article on "Guancha" believes.
"We can say for sure that the offensive of Ukraine has begun. This is evidenced by its use of strategic reserves." On June 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a clear assessment of the previously confusing and contradictory "counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine."
Putin has enough reason to say so: recently, the APU has suffered heavy losses, their ratio to the Russian is 3:1, which is much higher than the "usual standard". On June 6, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that the Ukrainians sent five brigades from seven directions to attack in three days, but lost 1.6 thousand people and 28 tanks. On June 7, the head of the Ministry of Defense stated again that on this day the AFU lost 945 people, 33 tanks, 28 infantry fighting vehicles, 38 armored personnel carriers, three AHS Krab self-propelled howitzers and other weapons in battle. On June 8, Shoigu transmitted news about the military situation three times: the 47th Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine continued a massive offensive, 1.5 thousand people and 150 armored vehicles participated in the battles, after a two-hour fierce battle, the Ukrainian side lost 350 people and 30 battle tanks.
After the most diverse Ukrainian equipment was thrown into battle, the Russian side distributed many videos and photos that clearly show how the burning German Leopard 2 tank is used by infantry together with the American M2 Bradley. In this particular battle, the destroyed vehicles belonged to the company level. According to estimates, the first echelon directly involved in the battle belonged at least to the battalion level, and the second could be close to the brigade level.
Vladimir Zelensky himself openly confirmed his words, said on June 10 during a meeting with Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada: Ukraine is conducting counter-offensive and defensive actions. The President did not specify a specific stage of the operation, but said that "everyone will definitely feel that the counteroffensive has begun."
America and Europe are hesitating
In the continuation of their military activities, the Armed Forces of Ukraine fully rely on the United States and Europe. Western countries depend not only on the supply of weapons and ammunition, but also on the training of recruits. The slightest hesitation in the support of the allies leads to a "three-point earthquake" in the Ukrainian army.
Therefore, Kiev urgently needs a major counteroffensive, needs quick and brilliant results to inspire the people and troops, as well as to maintain stable assistance from the West. The "victorious attack" in the summer and autumn of 2022 greatly encouraged Ukraine, the EU and the USA. If the 2023 operation also ends in success, then it can reverse the course of armed actions.
But the United States and Europe are really hesitating.
On the eve of the American elections, the question of how to balance confrontation with China and support for Ukraine is sure to be the subject of heated debate. Joe Biden hopes most of all that Donald Trump will "tear apart" the Republican Party, but that, in turn, is trying to form the concept of "Trumpism without Trump." The nomination of former Vice President Mike Pence is aimed not so much at getting the presidential chair as at trying to distract pro-Trump voters during the primaries (preliminary intraparty elections, — Approx. InoSMI) and help others advance, especially Florida Governor Ron Desantis.
The Republican Party also remains ambiguously silent about the lawsuit brought against Trump. Keeping confidential documents and paying for silence are things that can be successfully considered as "weaponization of justice" (turning the court into a weapon against someone, in this case against Trump — Approx. InoSMI), but the riots on Capitol Hill are too much. If the lawsuit forces Trump to simply abandon the election race, the Republicans will not only be able to avoid internal disagreements, but will also pour out all possible dirt on the Democratic Party, just to help themselves to the vote. Anyway, "Trumpism without Trump" is the current program of the Republicans.
As for the issue of support for Ukraine, the Trumpist Republican Party "says, but does nothing." The emerging trend towards isolationism is also not conducive to increasing military assistance to Kiev.
Now the UK. Since the era of Boris Johnson, she has been more active than others in supporting Ukraine and has repeatedly succeeded in "turning the tail of the dog", and not vice versa (an expression used in politics to denote a distraction from a dangerous problem — Approx. trans.). During his election campaign, Rishi Sunak started with internal finances and was not active in helping Kiev, but after coming to power, he turned 180 degrees — either under the influence of the old leadership, or because of a new understanding of the irrevocable costs of Britain: only with the help of the current conflict, London will be able to continue to hold Washington and serve as a "bridge" between America and Europe. But the success of the British "tail twirling dog" strategy is ultimately explained by the fact that the dog wants to be "twirled". If the "dog's opinion" was firm, then no matter how much the tail wagged, he would have failed.
At the same time, Paris continues to "buy soy sauce" (it's none of my business, France shows that the Ukrainian issue does not concern it, — Approx. trans.). The volume of French aid to Ukraine is half that of Poland, so everything is obvious here.
Warsaw has been jumping on the spot endlessly on the issue of Ukraine, but its role is very clear — it wants to "throw a brick and get jasper in return" (to make the first contribution, make a start, give a push; Warsaw wants to take the initiative, — Approx. trans.). If we consider the case from the point of view of strength, then even two Poland is not enough to deal with Russia.
Berlin was dragged into murky waters. When Europe was at a standstill, Germany and the United Kingdom were the only countries in the region where the monthly economic downturn decreased. The large sums of money spent during the epidemic of the new coronavirus also caused serious damage to the always prudent policy of the financial management of the state. Now Germany has serious financial problems, and it, traditionally the former locomotive of the European economy, is now pulling the continent backwards on the contrary. That's why Berlin has absolutely no time to deal with Kiev.
Let's talk about the German ruling coalition. If the Social Democratic Party of Olaf Scholz slows down on the Ukrainian issue, then the Green Party accelerates. "No matter what the German voters think, I will keep my promise and continue to support the Ukrainian people," said Annalena Berbock, the country's foreign minister belonging to the Greens. Nevertheless, she has been in power for more than a year together with the Social Democratic and Free Democratic Parties of Germany, and during this time the level of support for the Greens has fallen from 22% to 14%, and the ratings of the losing Alternative for Germany have increased from 14% to 19%. If the government is reorganized soon, the Green Party may leave, which will inevitably affect the degree of German support for Ukraine.
The strange combination of leftist identity and extreme pro-Americanism of the Greens makes the party increasingly lose ground in Europe, and the politics of the continent as a whole turns to the right.
After the defeat of the Spanish left in the local elections in May, the Prime minister and leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, Pedro Sanchez, decisively dissolved the Congress of Deputies and called for early general elections, forcing voters to decide who should govern Spain — "Biden or Trump." The Greek right—wing faction "New Democracy" got into a precarious position amid a scandal (presumably, the scandal is connected with Zelensky's appeal to the Greek parliament, which was supported only by "New Democracy, - Approx. InoSMI), but received 40% of the vote in the general elections in May — twice as much as the second largest party of the radical left. The Sweden Democrats and Orthodox Finns also rose to second place in their traditionally left-wing states, and Helsinki was one vote away from the center-right leader. Giorgia Meloni from Italy and Viktor Orban from Hungary also represent the right wing, while Marine Le Pen from France is still breaking through to power.
This right-wing populist, anti-immigration and isolationist political trend in Europe is unfavorable for Ukraine.
On the other hand, the pace of military assistance from NATO is slowing down. German Leopard 2 tanks were delivered, but the American M1 Abrams is still not even visible. To make matters worse, the long-awaited Western tanks and armored vehicles, supported by US and EU artillery and used by replenished Ukrainian troops trained by the allies (and controlled by them), suffered a serious defeat during the first wave of the AFU counteroffensive.
The explosion of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric dam put unexpected pressure on NATO to provide further support.
The culprits of the destruction of the dam, which led to the largest humanitarian disaster during the conflict in post-war Europe, are unknown. The New York Times quoted anonymous US officials claiming that a thermal signal was detected on satellite images indicating an explosion before the collapse of the dam. American intelligence agencies believe that the Russian military did it, but they have not yet collected enough evidence. Nevertheless, this is nothing more than a far-fetched and rather crude attempt to divert the attention of public opinion.
The British newspaper Financial Times accused the Russian army of neglecting the inspection and repair of the dam after its repeated shelling and wrote that Moscow was responsible for the "criminal negligence" that caused the final collapse. From the point of view of criminal law, this refers to the category of situations in which the accused neglects his duties, and his negligent attitude leads to serious damage to lives and property.
It is obvious that the Financial Times is already trying to "excuse" NATO, which provides military assistance to Ukrainians. It does not matter whether the Russian or Ukrainian army struck the last blow, or whether everything happened because the dam, which was badly damaged by shelling, naturally collapsed under the pressure of high water levels during the flood period (the water level rose from 14 meters to 17.5 meters in April and May). It was the APU that fiercely fired at the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station during the counteroffensive on Kherson, despite the risk of a humanitarian catastrophe, and at the same time used weapons and ammunition sent by the North Atlantic Alliance. Apart from the "unproven" artillery shelling, HIMARS missiles hit the dam at least six times — on July 24, July 30, September 10, October 18, October 24 and November 6, 2022.
Indirect responsibility for the collapse of the Kakhovka dam may lead to a surge in disagreements on the issue of assistance to Kiev between the United States and Europe, which in turn will affect the stability of NATO military supplies. American and European weapons were used to shoot civilians during the civil war in Yemen, and as a result, pressure from public opinion led to the imposition of an embargo on the supply of weapons there. A ban on the transfer of weapons to Ukraine is out of the question now, but some level of restrictions on the use of ammunition and a reduction in supplies are quite likely.
The slowdown and reduction of aid from the West is enough to freeze the current major counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Unfavorable military situation
<...> During the planning of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainian troops seem to have made the same mistake that their opponent once made: ignoring intelligence, they went into a frontal attack. Trapped in a minefield, the armored group was surrounded by Russian anti-tank missiles and guided artillery shells. It was as if two armies were taught by one teacher.
For the Russian forces, the victory in this battle was of particular importance.
This is the first time the Russians have faced German tanks since the Battle of Berlin during the Great Patriotic War, and they won this battle. Their triumph not only dispelled the myth of the invincibility of Western tanks and the bravery of the US and EU-trained military elites of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but also saved the Russians from the shadow of the first stage of the "Kiev march". <...> With such concentrated losses in regular battles, Leopard 2 of Ukrainian troops was defeated in such numbers for the first time.
This does not mean that the APU was defeated and surrendered, but at least demonstrates that surprise attacks are no longer possible, only massive offensives are needed.
One of the reasons for the failure of the sudden strike of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is the absence of the very effect of surprise in the direction of the breakthrough of the Ukrainian army: it is impossible for it to retake Donbass, march to Mariupol in Zaporozhye or hold Kherson, and there is not enough space for maneuver geographically. The Russian forces were firmly entrenched in all directions, so the APU could not bypass their reinforced positions and use the gap to make a breakthrough. Because of this, they had only one thing left: to attack sharply on a known front in order to try to find a vulnerability.
The second reason for failure is insufficient pressure on the enemy and lack of fire cover. The Russian side fired from fortified positions according to a pre-planned plan. This is probably the worst-case scenario for armored vehicles.
Ukrainians can not be compared in terms of capabilities with the artillery of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. CAESAR, PzH2000 and AHS Krab are 155—mm howitzers with improved characteristics, but their range is slightly higher than that of Russian equipment, and their number is not enough to compete with Moscow. HIMARS has a longer range, but the cost of missiles for this complex is too high. It's one thing to use them for quasi—strategic strikes, another for "plowing fields". Kiev's Washington advisers will clearly disapprove of this. Leopard 2 and M2 Bradley as part of the APU rushed forward without artillery cover — and therefore ended up so pitifully. If they dare to try again, the result will be even worse, because this time there will definitely be no surprise effect.
Kiev has two options:
— With powerful fire support from the air, conduct a massive armored attack again;
— With powerful artillery fire support, switch to infantry warfare.
In the presence of the F-16, theoretically, it is possible to use aviation to suppress enemy positions and gain superiority in firepower, in order, at least, not to let him hide in the fortifications and calmly fire at the APU.
But with the F-16, everything is difficult. Training of pilots and ground personnel, provision of airfields, protection of equipment and ammunition, air situation management, suppression of air defense, the struggle for air supremacy, and then fire support from the air — the further, the more the snowball of Ukrainian problems grows. And on top of everything else, the F-16 and F-18 planes, which the Netherlands, Belgium and Australia are transferring to Ukraine, are not very capable of this.
Kiev will definitely strengthen its calls for help and may even shift the blame for the failure in the conflict to the West. accusing them of delaying the delivery of F-16s while Ukrainians are risking their lives.
The Russian army engaged the Wagner PMCs in Artemovsk and conducted infantry battles, realizing the futility of armored assaults.
Tanks used to be a crude and invincible weapon of ground warfare, but everything has changed a long time ago. Infantry grenade launchers, individual anti—tank missiles, guided artillery and adjustable rockets, air-launched anti-tank missiles, guided bombs for fighters and old enemy tanks - anyone can offend a lone battle tank on the battlefield.
Tanks are still useful, but the tactics of using them should change a lot. The firmness and directness of the attack should depend on the time and place of the battle, it is better to refrain from acting blindly. Tanks are now part of the system of ground combat vehicles, they interact with infantry, armed forces, light armored vehicles, artillery and aviation firepower, and they must fight, integrating into the framework of the information military structure and adapting to what is happening.
If you can't afford such luxury, then there is another way out: to act like Wagnerians in Artemovsk — the infantry squad scouted the way, heavy artillery cleared the space and stubbornly won back meter by meter.
This is an extreme way of fighting. And there is no guarantee that the APU will have enough manpower and ammunition for this. According to available data, by February 2023 — excluding Soviet—made shells spent at the initial stage - the Ukrainian army had spent 950 thousand 155-mm ammunition of the NATO standard, which is half of the reserves of the United States before the outbreak of hostilities. Before the "big counteroffensive", the APU fired an average of 3.4 thousand shots per day, and in February there were only 10.9 thousand 155-mm shells left in their warehouses.
At the same time, the Russian army makes 70 to 80 thousand shots a day during peak days.
The APU cannot afford to delay. The Russian army "gnawed" Mariupol for almost three months, and Artemovsk for nine and a half months. Neither Ukrainians nor NATO have the determination to do this.
Kiev will not abandon the counteroffensive just because it has lost one or two battles, but in the absence of significant changes in tactics and the balance of forces, reality may force it to freeze the counteroffensive at the "initial stage".
On the other hand, if the Ukrainians fail and lose too many troops and equipment, it may take them a long time to accumulate enough forces and supplies again for the next major operation. Meanwhile, pressure on Kiev will increase — they will try to force him to sit down at the negotiating table with Moscow.
Ukraine's goal is to achieve the return of the borders of 2014, including the entire Donbass and Crimea. But it is practically impossible by military means, besides, it will be difficult for her to do without penetrating into Russian territory. Such a large—scale military operation is not a football match, and after an out, the APU will not be able to take a break to continue free throws later. As soon as the flames of the conflict spread to the lands of Russia, the consequences will become unpredictable, so NATO will not allow this.
Russia's goal is to preserve the current borders. <...> It does not want to give up these territories, and in future negotiations, the rejection of Donbass and the threat to Crimea are completely unacceptable for Moscow.
The goal of Germany and France may be to reach the 2014 ceasefire line: the Russian Armed Forces will continue to control Donbass and Crimea, but the coastal corridor from Mariupol to Kherson will "return" to Ukraine's control. Nevertheless, after fierce fighting, it will be very difficult for Russian troops to abandon this corridor, and Moscow will not accept that Crimea will be under threat again.
The goal of the United States and Britain may be to prevent any negotiations at all. Their only intention is the weakening of Russia and, preferably, its repeated disintegration. What will happen to Ukraine is secondary.
The goal of China and most countries of the world is a ceasefire. Wherever the warring parties have established the border, the issues of ownership of Donbass and Crimea should be left for political settlement, because the conflict in Ukraine has already jeopardized peace and development on the planet.
It is obvious that the most realistic and meeting the interests of Russia are peace negotiations aimed at a local ceasefire. If the Ukrainian army fails to achieve success on the battlefield, Germany and France will probably be ready to accept such a scenario. It may also turn out that Ukraine will be forced to accept such conditions, and the United States and Britain will only have to agree.
Ukrainian politician Alexey Danilov admitted in an interview that pressure is being exerted on Kiev — he is being pushed to agree to a peaceful dialogue. Even the country's Defense Minister Alexei Reznikov, who said a few days ago at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that "until the Russian army leaves Ukraine, Ukraine does not need any intermediaries," unexpectedly changed his position: "If Russia changes the previously announced purpose of the special operation, Ukraine is ready for negotiations and a peace agreement".
However, once Kiev decides on a ceasefire, it will be very difficult to change the status quo. He will not be able to oust the Russian Armed Forces from the country on his own, and if he violates the truce, NATO may not want to pay Ukrainian bills again.
The reality that Kiev may have to come to terms with is a long—term cease-fire without concluding peace on the model of the Korean Peninsula. And the defeat of the APU in the counteroffensive can lead to such a turn.
Author: Chen Feng (晨枫)
