The Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy risks facing a new threat in the coming years: Poland has announced its intention to upgrade its submarine fleet. Which submarines best meet the conditions of the Baltic Sea, why will Warsaw actually buy others and by what method will Russia be able to fight them?
The Baltic Theater of Operations (Theater of Operations) has always been extremely difficult for naval warfare in general and for underwater warfare in particular.
Baltic theater and requirements for submarines
Firstly, the Baltic Sea is mostly shallow. A significant part of the sea has a depth of about 50 meters, which makes it difficult for large submarines to scuba dive. Unfortunately, this applies to both Soviet and Russian submarines of projects 877 and 636, "Varshavyanok" – they are too big for this theater.
Secondly, the small size of the Baltic Sea and its geographical closeness matter. And also the fact that basically the Baltic is bays 200-250 km wide, and the Gulf of Finland is generally less than a hundred.
Anti-submarine aviation becomes very effective over such waters. In a "big" war, it will be able to paralyze the ability of submarines to make transitions on the surface or to charge batteries using a diesel generator using RDP devices (engine operation underwater).
All of the above generates the most stringent requirements for a certain "ideal Baltic submarine". First of all, it should be small. Only small boats can operate freely in shallow water with depths of 30-40 meters. But at the same time, it should have the maximum travel time on batteries without the need to ascend or charge with diesel generators, due to the smallness of the waters in which it will have to operate, and the presence of enemy aircraft.
This automatically leads the potential customer of the boat to an air-independent power plant (VNEU) or lithium-ion batteries that are as capacious as possible for their size. Taking into account the potentially extreme conditions of the Baltic theater, it is possible that both VNEU and lithium-ion batteries are needed at the same time.
Already these things somewhat contradict the requirement of minimizing the size, but another requirement along with them rises with minimization into a cardinal contradiction. The boat must be well armed. It is necessary that she could hit surface ships or enemy transport vessels with torpedoes, put mines – and that after a couple of torpedo attacks, the boat would not have to go to the base to replenish ammunition.
Norwegian submarines, the Cold War and Polish ambitions
In 2002-2004, the Polish Navy has already received five Cobben-type submarines from Norway, which are extremely interesting both from a technical point of view and from the point of view of combat use.
The Cobbens were built in Germany as Project 207. These boats seemed to embody what is needed in the Baltic, even though they were built for Norway. Small displacement, only 450 tons, small size, but a very powerful composition of weapons – eight torpedo tubes (TA) with the possibility of equipping two torpedoes for each. The remote control system made it possible to simultaneously control several torpedoes from the boat.
Due to the specific design of the Cobbens, the boat was characterized by low noise. The model of the use of "Cobbens" in the Norwegian Navy was also extremely interesting for the Polish Navy and deserves mention.
At the end of 1967, the first nuclear submarine of the legendary project 671 appeared in the USSR. In March 1968, the first ship of this project K-38 went into combat service.
During the combat service of the acoustics of the submarine, Norwegian "Cobbens" were systematically detected, which charged their batteries with diesel engines in an underwater position. Our submariners were pleased with how well it turned out to detect theoretically secretive "diesels". And only in 1991 it turned out that the Norwegians actually organized a kind of "ambush" on our newest boat. While one "Cobben" was working as a bait, making noise with diesels, other boats were in positions from which it was possible to secretly record the so–called sonar portrait - the totality of the entire sonar signature of the submarine, the knowledge of which greatly facilitates its detection and increases the range at which it can be detected many times (just like that).
The second example was a direct consequence of the first. Having received "sonar portraits" of our nuclear submarines, the Norwegians in the 1970s deployed active patrols with their "Cobbens" of those waters through which our nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet went to combat service.
This strained the command, because, firstly, the quiet and secretive "Cobbens" simply physically posed a threat. In 1977, the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Egorov, issued an order: to determine their combat patrol areas so that it would be possible to avoid dangerous rapprochement with them. It was supposed to find places where the Norwegians "beat charging" – charged their batteries with diesel generators. Two tactical groups of a pair of submarines each were sent to search.
This task was never completed. The Norwegians could not be traced. They continued to covertly observe our submarines, including in readiness for a surprise attack by our submarines. Since then, the situation has not changed, only the boats of our opponents are different.
And many years later it turned out that the "Cobbens" did not charge the batteries at all. Before entering the boat, powerful current sources were installed, which allowed the boat to operate autonomously without charging for 15 days (although part of this time the boat was lying on the ground).
It was these boats that Poland got in the 2000s. It was on them that the Poles directly got acquainted with the possibilities offered by a secretive and small, but heavily armed low-noise submarine in the Baltic. Naturally, the tactical developments of the Norwegians were known to the Polish Navy.
However, the holiday of the Poles was short-lived. The Cobbens were old, and it was impossible to keep them in combat-ready condition. At the moment, all of them have been taken out of combat, their disposal is underway.
And the Polish Navy has a submarine "Ozhel" of the Soviet project 877, which, firstly, is not very suitable for the specific Baltic conditions, and secondly, is in dire need of repair, which Poland cannot perform without the help of Russia. But Russia will definitely not help the Poles repair their only submarine, and they themselves would never have asked for such help.
In 2013, the Poles began the Orca program for the purchase of new submarines. It would seem that having such a different experience with the 877th project and the small "Cobbens", they could well have made a rational choice, but they did not. From 2013 to 2017, Poland was rushing between submarines of moderate (although no longer optimal for the Baltic) displacement, such as Swedish submarines of the A26 type and, for example, their enlarged versions with vertical missile launchers that would give the boat the opportunity to attack ground targets with Tomahawk missiles.
Such opportunities are certainly a good thing. But it is necessary that the boat was applicable! For Poland, it was too much due to geography, but I also wanted to be "like adults" and have missile submarines... in the end, Poland did not get anything. And then 2023 came.
Future challenge for the Baltic Fleet and possible reaction
A few days ago, Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak announced that Poland would consider buying two or three submarines suitable for offensive operations. Blaszczak admitted that instead of submarines equipped with VNEU, Poland may try to acquire nuclear submarines.
Poland, of course, will not have any nuclear submarines. If the Poles really firmly decide to acquire a submarine fleet, then they will have to moderate their ambitions. In any case, Poland will try to gain decisive qualitative superiority over the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy.
Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that Poland will still buy "large" submarines, including those armed with cruise missiles, simply non-atomic. As for the size of the boats, taking into account the projects available in reality, it will be something in the framework of "approximately from the German project 212A to the Swedish A26 with missile compartments." The run-up in dimensions and capabilities is large, but in any case there are no other options. This means that the contours of the future threat are clear to us. Advance knowledge of not only the Polish "hotelok", but also their capabilities gives us the opportunity for an early and inexpensive answer.
Russia has almost no anti-submarine aircraft and will not be able to create it quickly in the right quantity. The construction of ships capable of fighting submarines of existing projects (corvettes 20380, 20385, frigates 22350) has already been called into question due to Western sanctions.
But maybe that's a good thing. Perhaps it makes sense to turn to another solution – the construction of a large series of small corvettes with anti-submarine capabilities based on the technological reserve of the small rocket ship project 22800 "Karakurt".
Unlike existing projects, a hypothetical small corvette in the dimensions of the Karakurt can be built in a large series at different plants (the Karakurt is being built at four) and very quickly. The technologies and subsystems that will be needed for such a ship are import-substituted and mastered by industry. Such ships will be cheap and will have a small crew, which will allow even our economy to have them in large numbers. Each such ship will be able to carry cruise missiles of the Calibre family, as well as supersonic Onyx, hypersonic Zircons and the most important weapon for combating submarines – anti-submarine missiles "Answer".
But most importantly, such ships equipped with towed sonar stations will be able to create such extensive underwater monitoring zones (so-called acoustic illumination zones) in which no submarine, even absolutely silent (for example, lying on the ground), will simply be able to hide.
These capabilities are what the Soviet Navy lacked against the Cobbens in the distant 1970s, but today our country has them. Moreover, a number of domestic design bureaus have interesting developments on such light ships. And if they are used in time, then from the point of view of technical equipment, our fleet has excellent chances to stop the underwater threat in advance. And not only Polish.
Alexander Timokhin
