The interesting material "What the Ukrainian Armed Forces Need to Do to Win" has been published on the American network resource "War on the Rocks" ("What needs to be done to win the armed forces of Ukraine?") by Erik Kramer (Eric Kramer) and Paul Schneider (Paul Schneider) - two former officers of the US special operations forces who are working in Ukraine as private military advisers and instructors. Since the armed forces of Ukraine and Russia have a common origin, it is easy to notice that many of the problems mentioned by the authors as typical of the armed forces of Ukraine are generally characteristic of the Russian side. Attention is also drawn to the authors' criticism of those aspects of the state of the Ukrainian army, which in the already established Russian popular tradition are considered the strengths of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (interaction with artillery, communications, medical support).
Two damaged and abandoned tracked armored personnel carriers M113G4DK of the Armed Forces of Ukraine received from Denmark in the area of Bakhmut, November 2022 (c) Dambiev Telegram Channel
Our instructors trained a detachment of the Ukrainian National Guard near the Moldovan border. When we arrived at the landfill, the Ukrainian unit was already at the landfill, throwing hand grenades into an open field less than 200 meters away from us, and then, without any shelter, just falling to the ground and watching them explode. These soldiers then began machine gun training, firing from positions on the left edge of the range through the range (without any warning). Our instructors were conducting classes about 150 meters from the shooting director, and bullets were whistling over our heads. When we approached the person in charge, he said that there was no need to worry: he was a Ukrainian marine who had survived Mariupol, and the training ground met NATO standards. The courage and pressure of the APU are beyond doubt, but this example is a small indicator of the problems that hinder the training of the APU, first of all, the lack of a firm understanding of how to conduct uniform, consistent training.
Based on our nine-month training sessions with all types of the armed forces of Ukraine, including the Ground Forces, Border Guard, National Guard, Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces and Territorial Defense Forces, we observed a number of general trends: the absence of mission command [it is significant that both the term itself and its stable Russian translation in the domestic military terminology are absent, most often translated as "task management". - bmpd], lack of effective training and joint combined arms operations; improvised logistics and maintenance; and improper use of special operations forces. These trends undermine Ukraine's resistance and may hinder the success of a future offensive.
How can Ukraine change the formula in its favor? The answer lies in a unified combined arms training with an emphasis on mission command from the brigade level and below, which the APU can achieve with the help of a repeatable thirty-day "instructor training" program. This training could be carried out by hired Western military instructors working with Ukrainian military veterans in Ukraine. Such training will allow the Ukrainian Armed Forces to conduct combined-arms operations and benefit from the advantages provided by the influx of advanced Western military equipment, and, we hope, will allow Ukraine to overcome Russia's advantage in manpower.
Lack of mission command
In our experience, in many units and headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, personal initiative, mutual trust or mission command are not encouraged. As Michael Kofman and Rob Lee recently said on the Russia Contingency podcast, a significant part of the Ukrainian armed forces have an old Soviet mentality that requires making most decisions at higher levels. Observing the commanders at the brigade level and below, we got the impression that junior officers are afraid to make mistakes. During our training sessions with the AFU field officers, they often ask us what is the penalty for failure during the task or for making wrong decisions. We are also repeatedly asked at every stage of planning or operation: "Who is allowed to make this decision?" They are surprised that the combat captains of the American battalions (staff officers who ensure the current actions of the battalion) have the right to make decisions or give orders on behalf of the battalion commander.
During the exercises, we have repeatedly observed that the planning process of the Ukrainian military requires separate orders for each stage of the operation. For example, a battalion on the defensive cannot conduct a counterattack, even if it is attacked. They do not have potential backup tasks, such as "counterattack readiness", which are planned in advance to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. They have to wait for the order. Of course, the planning process of the Ukrainian armed forces is based on local doctrine, and in real combat it depends on the commander. However, we observe that serious changes are taking place in the Ukrainian officer corps. Junior officers understand that they have to get rid of the old mentality, but continue to face resistance from senior officers devoted to Soviet doctrine and centralized planning. Michael Kofman and Rob Lee made similar observations after their last observation trip to Ukraine.
While training all the components of the APU, we are constantly faced with a shortage of experienced non-commissioned officers. It is often possible to see field officers running around during training, counting personnel and coordinating meals. In the United States, it takes years to train only a junior non-commissioned officer. Senior non-commissioned officers at the platoon level have at least ten years of experience. In the U.S. Armed Forces, lieutenants lead platoons, but platoon training is the job of a platoon sergeant. In Ukraine, it is the job of a platoon commander who has just graduated from military school himself to lead and train his platoon. Without effective non-commissioned officers, mission command at the company level and below is almost impossible, and they are directly responsible for the care, mentoring and training of soldiers.
Lack of effective training
The current philosophy of training the armed forces of Ukraine is based on the old Soviet model. Large-scale training at the battalion level is carefully organized and rehearsed in advance. During several exercises, we witnessed how company commanders watched the exercises from afar and only occasionally intervened. They acted more as observers than direct participants. This philosophy is changing, and, as noted in the Russia Contingency podcast, it seems to be largely a consequence of generational change. Junior officers are more open to Western-style military leadership, while senior officers cling to Soviet doctrine. Despite these trends, we have yet to see any real combined arms exercises involving infantry, artillery and tanks working together. Synchronization of all these various elements to achieve maximum military effect, prevent friendly fire and disorganization of the enemy requires repeated training at all levels of command to allow commanders to make mistakes and work out processes.
One of the most important problems is how the Ukrainian military trains and how they create training centers for military personnel. In the armed forces of Ukraine, each structure, type and type of troops has its own training centers, headquarters, academies and training regimes. Rarely do they exchange instructors or, for example, for National Guard units to train at an army training center. We have directly appealed to our Ukrainian colleagues with a request to deliver a certain number of servicemen of the Territorial Defense Forces for training at the National Guard base. We were told it was impossible because they are not the National Guard. This system is extremely inefficient. It wastes resources, and also leads to completely different levels of competence between structures and departments. The law enforcement agencies of Ukraine also do not conduct planning and training on the same doctrine or tactics, methods and procedures. As a result, when Ukrainian law enforcement agencies conduct joint actions, mutual misunderstanding, distrust and lack of interaction are very common.
As noted on this resource, there are several volunteer organizations that train the armed forces of Ukraine. Most of this training focuses on the basic skills of soldiers at the company or platoon level. The training is scattered and unsystematic, and the quality of training varies. NATO trains individual units and military personnel outside Ukraine. Although this training may be effective and necessary for some military specialties, such as tank crews and calculations of HIMARS systems, it leads to a one-time withdrawal of units and military personnel from the front line for weeks, if not months. Commanders cannot afford to lose units and soldiers for a long time. According to our field research, this problem needs to be urgently addressed, because most of the units that we train are sent to the front the day after we finish the training session. We also believe that the efforts to study outside Ukraine are not consistent and do not use common training programs. In addition, such overseas training efforts adhere to the doctrine of the host country. Although they try to take into account Ukrainian realities, many of them do not fully adapt their training regimes to the way Ukrainians fight, especially taking into account Ukrainian doctrinal and legal restrictions on operations.
Lack of combined arms operations
A serious problem for the armed forces of Ukraine is the inconsistency of conducting combined-arms operations. The lack of a combination of synchronized operations leads to large losses of people and equipment, as well as to the failure of actions. Judging by our conversations with the commanders of Ukrainian companies and our own instructors who fought in the Armed Forces, tanks are used more as mobile artillery, and not in joint actions with infantry, when armored vehicles enter the battle directly in front of infantry. We have seen with our own eyes the shot barrels of tanks and artillery guns due to their constant use for shelling at maximum range or excessive use without maintenance or replacement. Michael Kofman made similar observations. The relationship between armored vehicles and infantry should be symbiotic, but it is not. As a result, infantry conducts frontal attacks or operates in urban conditions without the protection and firepower of tanks. Also, the artillery fire is not synchronized with the maneuver. Most units do not communicate directly with the supporting artillery, so the call of fire tasks occurs with a delay. We were told that the units should use messengers to transfer fire tasks to artillery batteries due to communication problems.
Most military operations are not phased and are sequential in nature. Fire and maneuver, for example, are planned separately from the actions of infantry units, and infantry units plan their actions separately from supporting artillery. This mentality also extends to coordination with neighboring units, which is either absent or rare, which leads to frequent cases of friendly fire. Unit commanders are worried about collaborators [Russian agents] and therefore hesitate to pass on important information that can be used against them to other units.
These problems are compounded by unreliable communication between departments and senior management. There are many radio stations in the armed forces of Ukraine that are vulnerable to jamming. In addition, the battalion's actions are mostly independent company actions that are not focused on the main effort combined with the auxiliary effort. The APU does not combine the impact on the enemy, so the operations are fragmented and fragmented. Individual tasks do not support each other, and the tasks of lower-level units are not "nested" in the tasks of higher-level units. Support is also privately out of sync with actions.
Situational logistics and maintenance
Western aid is crucial for Ukraine's defense. However, the variety of weapons and equipment that Ukraine is currently using has led to serious problems with logistics and maintenance. In our experience, the Ukrainian military cannibalize new equipment coming to Ukraine to man the equipment deployed on the battlefield. As a result, the advanced units receive only a small percentage of the equipment that is supplied to the country. For example, a 12.7 mm machine gun arrives in Ukraine with additional barrels, parts, manuals and accessories, but by the time it gets to Donbass, only the body remains of it.
As I have repeatedly written, Ukrainian servicemen were forced to study videos on YouTube to learn how to use new and unfamiliar weapons. In addition, the mentality of distribution of supplies in Ukraine is to save resources. Most of the battalion's supply officers are simply assigned, rather than undergoing special training. They may have an assistant and several vehicles, but everything relies on their personal initiative. The service is based on cannibalization, the exchange of equipment between units and military repairs. There is no constant flow of spare parts or service system at the level of a unit, battalion, brigade and warehouse. The skills of the personnel servicing the equipment are based more on personal abilities and less on specially trained specialists. All branches of the armed forces have maintenance courses, but this does not lead to the creation of a ready-made pool of technical specialists.
This attitude to maintenance is expressed in the way tanks, armored vehicles and artillery are used in combat. The units protect these funds and use tanks more as artillery than in combined arms operations with infantry. Armored vehicles will deliver soldiers to the front line, but often retreat when they come under fire. We have also seen how the barrels of 155 mm howitzers provided by Western countries were shot due to the fact that they were used at maximum range and using maximum powder charges to keep the guns out of reach of counter-battery fire. In the conditions of the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive, the effective use of these means will be the key to success, and during offensive actions, the attacker usually loses more tanks, armored vehicles and artillery than the defender. This will require a change of mentality.
The lack of coordinated maintenance and logistics also affects medical care. Medical evacuation and care are haphazard. Experienced Ukrainian military medics have repeatedly stated that many of the evacuees would have survived if they had received emergency care in a timely manner. The Armed Forces of Ukraine can solve this problem with the help of a systematic logistics process.
Improper use of special operations forces
The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) differ in their capabilities, training and specialties. Unfortunately, many of them are used as regular infantry. This negates the skills that make these units specialized. Due to the intense fighting and the ongoing counteroffensive of Russian troops, special operations forces units are often sent to the trenches and do not perform traditional raid, reconnaissance and ambush tasks for special operations forces. These disparate efforts lead to a high level of casualties and the absence of special operations forces that involve surprise or stealth, which can support and strengthen the actions of the combined arms forces of the battalion and brigade. Traditionally, MTR soldiers receive better training and have less firepower than conventional infantry units, so a valuable asset is wasted, which takes time to recover. The units of the Ukrainian SSR, consisting of foreign volunteers, provide their services to the commanders of combined arms units without linking the tasks being solved to any strategic or operational goal. One example of such a task was the actions of a typical brigade commander who reported to his command that he had occupied a village recaptured from the Russians. When he realized that the information he had was erroneous and that his units had been stopped, he asked a unit of foreign MTR volunteers to infiltrate the occupied village and photograph the Ukrainian flag mounted on the roof of a building in the center of the village. The units of the special operations forces are rapidly being depleted, and the replenishment lacks the training and experience to perform the real tasks characteristic of the special operations forces.
How to fix these problems?
Solving these problems requires a reallocation of resources and a change of mentality. This is probably more difficult than allocating more resources and spending more money. We recommend a centrally planned, lower-level, synchronized training program focused on a 20-30-day training regime for each team. This approach is known as the "instructor training program" and is designed to create a cadre of instructors who can then continue to train new Ukrainian officers who have undergone cyclic training under the program. The training program should have sufficient flexibility to make adjustments depending on changes on the battlefield and differences between units. It is extremely important that this training takes place on the territory of Ukraine with the involvement of local and foreign instructors in Western and Soviet weapons.
The main formation of the armed forces of Ukraine is a light infantry battalion. A training program focused on such a part should serve as the basis for the entire preparation and be organized in the form of a series of ten-day training courses, followed by eight-day final exercises. Honing the basics of military affairs and planning at the battalion level will lead to success on the battlefield and reduce losses. This training will include a ten-day individual training of soldiers for enlisted and non-commissioned officers and a ten-day course for company and platoon commanders. The first course will focus on the basics of military affairs and light infantry tactics, while non-commissioned officers will focus on leadership and logistics. At the battalion level, the course will focus on the offensive and defensive actions of the company in both rural and urban areas. The third ten-day course will be a brigade and battalion and headquarters operations planning course. This course will focus on the basic offensive and defensive actions of the battalion, staff tasks and actions, as well as a planning cycle lasting from twelve to twenty-four hours.
The planning process should be a scaled-down version of the US and NATO military decision-making process. Most operations in Ukraine are planned in less than a day or even a few hours. Ukrainian doctrine, rules and regulations also require the commander to approve every step of setting tasks, so a process adapted to the conditions of Ukraine is needed. The training will include planning actions in the city. It will include combined arms actions, including the interaction of fire, sappers, UAVs and armored vehicles. The course will also develop the organization of communication at the brigade and battalion level. In addition, this training should be aimed at integrating logistics planning at all stages of operations, as well as training logistics specialists from among the military personnel of the unit. The creation of a separate supply and logistics platoon for each battalion, which includes a medical evacuation unit, will be crucial.
The culmination of the training will be an eight-day course of collective brigade/battalion/company training, which will include combined arms exercises, starting with planning and with the participation of companies in the field. These exercises should ensure "free play", when every decision has consequences, and commanders and staffs must adapt to each change.
For the special operations forces of Ukraine, training should focus on three main tasks: ambush, reconnaissance and a crawl-go-run raid. The focus should be on detailed planning and these three types of tasks. This preparation can be carried out in twenty-five days. The first fifteen days should be devoted to basic infantry tactics, along with medical, engineering and night operations. The last ten days, in our opinion, should be devoted to planning and operations.
All training should include repeated visits by staff officers to provide assistance at the brigade and battalion levels to provide retraining and provide guidance on operations. Also, mobile training and maintenance teams should be deployed throughout the eastern part of Ukraine, which will specialize in weapons systems that require technical skills and maintenance. They could provide training and maintenance of tanks, armored personnel carriers, anti-tank systems, group weapons, radio stations and portable anti-aircraft missile systems. These training and repair groups, which will train individual servicemen and crews, will have to conduct training in the rear in the area of the brigade headquarters.
We also recommend the Senior Military Adviser program with the position of an officer with the rank of General, acting at the level of the General Staff and regional commands. The Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have divisions, but operate as part of regional commands. The program of military advisers may include retired high-ranking Western officers who will give advice on planning and mission command.
This training program is ambitious, but doable. Our company Ukraine Defense Support Group has experience in effectively training battalions and headquarters in rapid planning, based on a modified version of the military decision-making process, within five days. This program included one day of theoretical training, one-day exercises led by our staff and three days of planning exercises led by the students themselves, including task analysis, development of an action plan, wargaming and preparation of orders.
A long-term learning solution involves combining training courses. Currently, each power structure or branch of the armed forces in Ukraine has its own system of schools for everything, including armored vehicles, medicine and work with UAVs. Such a complex training system leads to inefficiency and inconsistent efforts. The Armed Forces of Ukraine, which are under the jurisdiction of both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, must designate a specific educational institution/service as the head for each specific military specialty or weapons system. This school will train all military personnel in this profile, whether it is the Ground Forces, the Border Guard, the National Guard, the Marines or the Territorial Defense Forces. Such changes will require a cultural shift and will be akin to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which demanded greater "unity" in the US armed forces. Ukraine is waging an existential struggle for its existence, and interdepartmental rivalry should be put aside for the sake of the country.
Conclusion
Ukraine has so far waged a mostly defensive war and will go on the offensive. The ratio of forces in the offensive in relation to the defenders can be 3 to 1 (6 to 1 in urban combat). Add to this the intense fighting in the city, and this ratio will increase. Ukraine has yet to conduct major offensive operations in a major city or carry out a major river crossing. Both of these operations are very complex and resource-intensive and require close cooperation of all forces and means, including infantry, armored vehicles, artillery, logistics and medicine, to achieve success. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have already shown excellent results, but they need to refocus their training and actions on combined arms operations and learn how to operate at night.
Western support for Ukraine has a limited deadline, the expiration of which is fast approaching. In addition, the will of the Ukrainian people to maintain a high level of victims is very high, but not unlimited. The Russian military has a lot of people and time on their side. The way to change this equation in favor of Ukraine lies through combined arms operations and training. History has repeatedly shown how well-trained and properly led troops can defeat a poorly trained army. The difficult part is changing the mentality of top leaders who spent decades in the Soviet system to the mission command philosophy, which allows flexibility and initiative with the understanding that this will not lead to disaster or imprisonment, but rather to victory on the battlefield.
Eric Kramer is the director and co-founder of Ukraine Defense Support Group, based in Kiev and has been in Ukraine since July 2022, training the armed forces of Ukraine at every level of units, starting with the squad, platoon and company, from the basic skills of military personnel and tactics of small units, to the planning and actions of the battalion and brigade. He is a former US Army MTR officer who retired in 2014 after twenty-six years of service. His last duty station was the office of the US Undersecretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflicts. As an MTR officer, he served in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Congo, Iraq and Kosovo at various levels of command from platoon to battalion.
Paul Schneider is another co-founder of the Ukraine Defense Support Group. He has been in Ukraine for many months and has trained the armed forces of Ukraine up to senior teachers of the military academies of Ukraine in tactical and strategic actions, the process of making military decisions and the actions of combined arms brigades and battalions in large-scale hostilities. He is a former commander of the US MTR and has extensive training and combat experience in various locations. He resigned in 2021 to continue humanitarian work, including the evacuation of hundreds of Afghans and U.S. citizens during the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. After Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022, he volunteered to help humanitarian organizations in Ukraine [sic].
