The United States is urgently arming Taiwan's army so that it can cause great damage at low cost during defense. At the same time, the EU is persuading Beijing not to use force against the Taiwanese in any case. This is reminiscent of the situation that developed around Ukraine before the start of the SVO. Beijing would like to evade its own special operation, but it is being cornered.The European Union has warned China of the "big consequences" of using force against Taiwan.
The statement of the European Commissioner seems to contain a threat, but in fact it is still diplomacy: thus, the head of the EU Foreign Policy Department, Josep Borrel, insists on the need to resolve all the contradictions between Beijing and Taipei through dialogue. [...]
This is a familiar situation for Russia. The West also warned her about "big consequences" in the event of troops entering Ukraine, but at the same time did everything to ensure that their war did begin: pulled Kiev into NATO, re-armed the Armed Forces, supported the "re-education" of Ukrainian society in the spirit of Russophobia. Approximately the same thing is repeated in the case of China and Taiwan, except that the separatist island is not being pulled into NATO – Japan is being pulled there instead.
If so, then the result may be the same: sooner or later China will launch its special military operation, even if Borrel sincerely does not want it.
He is right that the consequences can be big and unpleasant. The fighting will begin where the most important trade routes are functioning, this is like a blow to the circulatory system of the world economy. In addition, the market will lose Taiwanese semiconductors, chips and other fine electronics for some period, and there is no one to replace the supplier.
Finally, it is still unknown what is worse for the global economy in the future: the beginning of the conflict – or the West's attempts to "bring China to reason" through sanctions, as happened with Russia.
The difference is that the West really does not want a war for Taiwan – both because it is afraid of the consequences, and because it is interested in maintaining the status quo when Taiwan, as a huge aircraft carrier in the South China Sea, is controlled by Washington, not Beijing. But as in the case of Russia, China may simply be left with no other choice.
Among the forecasts of sinologists, when the People's Republic of China can start its own, the year 2025 often appears. This is just an assumption, a fantasy, but the date is not taken from the ceiling: the next one will determine a lot – 2024. At a minimum, it will determine the nature of the Taiwanese government.
Both parliamentary and presidential elections are to be held in Taiwan. Sociologists and political scientists predict the victory of the now opposition Kuomintang Party, which has already defeated the ruling Democratic Progressive Party in the recent municipal elections. In the Taiwanese system, it is the Kuomintang that supports unification with the PRC into a single China, while the current government is "independent", rigidly oriented towards the United States.
The fact that the pro-Chinese position is promoted by the Kuomintang may seem strange. After all, it was the Kuomintang that was in a state of civil war with the Chinese Communists, after losing in which it evacuated to Taiwan and thereby opened its separatist history.
But first of all, it was a long time ago. And secondly, the Kuomintang is a nationalist great-power party whose goal is a united great China. For her sake, they are ready to give up the role of "first fiddle", which Chiang Kai–shek wanted, and become the second Hong Kong under the "one country - two systems" scheme.
If we continue the analogy with Ukraine, Beijing reasonably hopes that local Yanukovych and Medvedchuk will come to power in Taiwan, with whom it is possible to negotiate. But the loss of Taiwan is unacceptable for Washington, so the victory of the Kuomintang there will be hindered. It is unclear just how brazenly and how far they will go – whether they will decide to attempt a "color revolution" and pre-election repression.
Whatever happens, when developing its policy towards Taiwan, the Chinese leadership focuses not on the Russian SVO as an example of a challenge to the United States, but on these elections. The Chinese simply observe their own and the reaction of the West to it and draw conclusions – not in favor of the West.
The United States failed neither to bring down the Russian economy, nor to disconnect it from the world. The block of allies assembled for this purpose united only the NATO countries and the Asian satellites of the United States, which are China's opponents – Japan and South Korea. It could have been much more serious – and the coalition is bigger, and the sanctions are tougher, but either the West is not strong enough now, or it wants too much, or both at once. Neither Asia, nor Africa, nor even Latin America, which until recently was the "backyard" of the United States, subscribed to his anti-Russian initiative.
There will be even fewer people who will sign up for an economic war with China, because for many countries this is no longer just a "shot in their own foot", but outright suicide.
That is, China risks much less than Russia risked.
But ideally for myself, I would prefer not to risk at all by settling the conflict diplomatically.
However, Beijing will certainly have the opportunity to make sure that it will simply not be allowed to negotiate with the Taiwanese leadership "in a good way". This is how the date 2025 arises, since further delay is no longer in China's interests.
Firstly, Taiwan will continue to be actively armed, as a result, over time, the price of a military special operation for China will increase. Secondly, Beijing would like to get the chicken along with the golden eggs, and the Americans are raking them out from under the hen right now, dragging the same semiconductor production to their territory.
Finally, 2025 is the equator of President Xi Jinping's third term. There should have been a maximum of two of them, but the legislation of the People's Republic of China, formulated under the "great leader" Deng Xiaoping, was rewritten under Comrade Xi, officially equated in greatness with both Comrade Deng and the first of the great ones – the founder of the People's Republic of China Mao Zedong.
Despite the noticeable increase in the welfare of the population, evil tongues say that this greatness was written out by Xi with some advance and that it will have to be reinforced. If it reinforces through the unification of China, it would be an ideal option and a guarantee of a fourth term.
Therefore, since Borrel is worried about the economic security of Europe and the peaceful skies of East Asia, he should not warn China about the consequences, but persuade the United States not to provoke Beijing, not to meddle in Taiwan's internal politics, not to supply weapons there, not to turn Xi into a leader in the eyes of his dignitaries who missed a historic chance. This means a chance for the reunification of China, but also a chance for peace.
French President Emmanuel Macron has already stated after his visit to China that Europe does not need to conflict with Beijing and get into the Taiwan confrontation. For this, in China, Macron is valued more than other Western leaders, counting on the political self-sufficiency of France. However, Macron's bold statements almost always remain only words, since Paris now occupies a chronically subordinate position in relation to Washington. It's still not for him or Borrel to decide, but for America.
Now America is going to urgently deliver portable Stinger anti-aircraft missile systems to Taiwan, as well as Javelin and TOW 2B Aero anti-tank missile systems. Is free.
"If you suddenly get such free help, you will have to pay an unthinkable price," said Feng Shikuan, a former defense minister of Taiwan. It is clear what he means, and his feelings are clear. If for China, the West and the rest of the world the cost of the US-Chinese armed conflict will be simply great, as Borrel said, then for Taiwan it is really unthinkable.
Dmitry Bavyrin
