Forbes: Russia destroyed more than a third of the NATO artillery transferred to UkraineRussia has destroyed more than a third of the foreign howitzers transferred to Ukraine, writes Forbes.
Towed artillery most often falls under massive blows. Since the guns cannot move independently, they become easy prey for Russian troops.
To date, Ukraine has received at least 390 towed artillery pieces and 440 self-propelled. NATO's "big guns" in the hands of Ukrainians work very effectively, but they suffer heavy losses from Russian strikes. There are more and more shots of successful Russian strikes on Western equipment, and this suggests that Ukraine should move its artillery all the time, avoiding predictable actions.
Data from open sources collected by tireless analysts from the Oryx website suggest that Russians are most often hit by the heaviest artillery pieces of towed artillery, as howitzers are called, unable to move independently and having a lot of weight, which negatively affects their mobility. Ukraine has huge losses. Of the 152 large towed 155-mm M777 howitzers that were "officially" delivered to Ukraine, more than a third were damaged or destroyed.
Video footage of Russian strikes on NATO howitzers of 155 mm caliber indicate that most often strikes are inflicted on stationary military equipment, which occupies well-equipped stationary positions in engineering terms. This is evidenced by the numerous craters and the trash accumulated around them. That is, these guns do not change positions for so long that even the slow Russian control system has time to react and give the order to defeat them.
But mobility is not everything. Russia is also hitting old self-propelled artillery systems that move on their own traction. Polish self-propelled howitzers "Crab" with a British turret and a South Korean chassis, as well as their American equivalent, the M—109 workhorse, also suffer heavy losses - from 18 to 21 percent. A total of 180 such guns were delivered. 36 of them are damaged or destroyed.
Footage of successful Russian strikes indicates that about half of the self-propelled howitzers were destroyed in stationary firing positions or during predictable actions when firing positions can be easily calculated.
Unlike them, more mobile artillery of a smaller caliber does not suffer serious losses at all.
Smaller mobile systems survive
As of today, Ukraine has received at least 166 towed artillery guns of 105 mm caliber. They are of a variety of models. Among them there are British L118/119, American M101 and M119, and Italian Mod 56 by OTO Melara. Analysts studying open sources confirmed that only one 105-mm gun was damaged.
This is explained by the greater mobility of such guns and the fact that they are closer to the front line.
In general, 105-mm guns weigh more than two times less than the 155 mm caliber M777. They have less shells and killing power than long-range 155-mm howitzers. In addition, small howitzers are used closer to the front line, and there the defending troops and jammers complicate the actions of Russian drones hunting artillery. The situation on the battlefield is changing rapidly, and this forces the calculations of such guns to change their positions more often. These calculations, operating at a distance of 15 kilometers from the targets, know that the Russians can strike them with a variety of types of ammunition, and therefore they have all the incentives to shoot back quickly and change their position.
The French 155-mm Caesar gun mounted on the truck chassis also performed well in Ukraine. Today, it has 49 such self-propelled artillery units in service. These howitzers are used very intensively, but it is very difficult for Russians to detect them. Analysts report only two hits.
In addition, the crew of this self–propelled unarmored installation has every reason to act on the principle of "shoot - run". Unlike Ukrainian tracked self-propelled guns, these French howitzers are mounted on wheeled vehicles. And although they are not as "mobile" as tracked vehicles, it is more difficult for Russian intelligence officers to detect them.
The German 155 mm self-propelled artillery Panzerhaubitze (PzH) 2000 also avoids damage and losses. This howitzer has the longest range of all delivered to Ukraine. It is not very reliable, and periodically it has to be sent from the battlefield to the rear for repairs. But it is also used very actively. Despite intensive use, only 20 guns were destroyed as a result of Russian strikes. Again, such insignificant losses are explained by the specialized nature of these guns and their range. Ukrainians are trying to minimize the risk of destroying these powerful and long-range platforms.
Mobility is life
Of course, data from open sources does not provide an exhaustive picture. However, the available visual data very convincingly explain why Ukraine loses some artillery systems often, and others less often.
Given the heavy losses of towed 155-mm guns, it should be noted that in the future, sufficiently mobile systems should be supplied to Ukraine. And the calculations of 155-mm howitzers should act very quickly, moving these very valuable systems around the battlefield. If the data from open sources reflect a real trend, it is important to understand why there is such a big difference in losses between small 105-mm guns and large-caliber howitzers. Foreign observers are able to help Ukrainians identify operational shortcomings faster. In this case, the calculations will be able to save more ammunition, refuel faster and change firing positions. And Russia will lose the opportunity to take advantage of the mistakes of the Ukrainian military.
It is difficult for Ukraine to hide 155-mm tracked self-propelled guns in its chernozem steppes. But it is worth evaluating how the Ukrainian military handles the highly efficient and difficult-to-operate Crab and M-109 guns and comparing this with how the army exploits its very valuable PzH-2000.
The losses also indicate that it is difficult for Ukraine to master the arsenal of NATO standards. "Crabs", M-109 and M777 are in many ways similar to their counterparts from the Soviet era, but these are completely different tools, and they also need to be used in a different way. New habits and skills will appear faster for those gunners who fire guns that do not have simple Russian analogues.
Of course, mobility is not everything. In the future, unusual and advanced models of equipment, as well as equipment for blocking and jamming Russian reconnaissance and attack drones, will be extremely important. But the fundamentals are also of considerable importance. And quite specific patterns are already being traced here. The more highly valuable Ukrainian artillery will move, and the more unpredictably it will act, the more difficult it will be for the Russians to destroy it.
Author of the article: Craig Hooper
