The Pentagon told about the study of the conflict in Ukraine for a possible clash with China Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States Kathleen Hicks said that the Pentagon learned a number of lessons from the conflict in Ukraine for a possible future armed confrontation with China.
These lessons are no less relevant for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but at this stage they can only be considered preliminary.
Kathleen Hicks stressed that despite the continued supply of weapons, military and special equipment to Ukraine, the main attention of the United States is still focused on competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region.
Hicks called the most important lessons learned for the confrontation with China the awareness of the need to increase the production of missiles and ammunition and ensure their accelerated delivery to the battlefield, as well as accelerate the implementation of the American military space program.
A very acute situation has developed practically for both warring parties with the consumption of ammunition for barrel and rocket artillery, anti-aircraft guided missiles, anti-tank missile systems, portable anti-aircraft missile systems.
For example, in just the first few months of the armed conflict, the armed forces of Ukraine spent 13 years of production in the United States of the Stinger MANPADS (1,400 units) and 5-year-old Javelin ATGM (5,500 units).
All previously established norms for the consumption of ammunition and missiles in combat operations and operations during a special military operation were exceeded, if not by an order of magnitude, then many times for sure.
And this brings to a completely new level the requirements for the creation of ammunition stocks in the troops and central bodies in possible conflicts of the future, as well as for their separation.
Accordingly, views on the development of domestic industry, conventional weapons, ammunition and special chemicals are subject to a significant revision. In the 1990s, production in this industry collapsed, and, according to the most cautious estimates, by more than 10 times. There is no doubt that the enterprises of ammunition and special chemicals need radical modernization, appropriate investments and production growth, if not tenfold, then approximately in this range.
Of course, the problems revealed during the SVO do not concern only the production of ammunition. For example, during intense hostilities in any of the conflicts, the officers in the platoon-company-battalion link bear the greatest losses. The question arises - how to promptly compensate for such losses (both sanitary and irrevocable)?
For example, an officer has been out of action (company commander) due to injury (and a company without a commander is no longer quite a company), a replacement should arrive from the reserve immediately (within a maximum of a day) - the same company commander. And at the expense of whom and how to equip such regiments and battalions is, of course, a debatable question and it is necessary to deal with it in detail additionally.
Or how, for example, to make up for losses in personnel in units and formations? This can be done at the expense of the so-called march replenishment. It is possible to train fighters in reserve battalions for each division. Again, there is a wide field for discussion here. The issue of replenishing losses among specialists, which largely determine the combat readiness and combat capability of units and units, is very acute. That is, fighters in those military accounting specialties, the preparation of which requires a long time. For example, it is impossible to prepare a good sniper for a month on mobilization.
Many questions also arise in connection with the repair of complex weapons and military equipment in the field, especially in the service of the RAV (rocket and artillery weapons). How to do this in the course of hostilities - by the forces deployed to mobilize the repair and restoration regiments of the RAV or by the forces of special brigades of industrial enterprises in view of the complexity of weapons? Then how will the status of civilian specialists of defense industry enterprises in the war zone look like?
And there is probably no clear answer to this question today.
Finally, the military-industrial complex of the country in the course of the armed conflict in the shortest possible time should not only make up for all losses in armament, military and special equipment, but also produce a sufficient amount of military equipment for the formation of units and formations of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command.
Among other things, there are questions about the combat use of some types of troops, for example, airborne. "Newspaper.Ru" previously wrote what specific reforms the Airborne Troops need.
Domestic airborne forces in all armed conflicts of the last ten years were used not as a landing force, but as well-trained infantry.
Despite the minimal experience of actual amphibious operations, the airborne forces, by tradition, are equipped with "special" mobile equipment.
So, for paratroopers, a whole family of combat vehicles and weapons of various purposes has been produced and is being produced. These, first of all, include amphibious assault vehicles from the 1st to the 4th model (BMD), BTR-MDM "Shell", amphibious self-propelled artillery installations (ACS-57 and SU-85), 120-mm ACS 2S9, 125-mm ACS 2S25 "Octopus".
Since the equipment being developed and manufactured to equip the airborne forces is designed to be parachuted out of Il-76 aircraft, it has a light bulletproof reservation, is made of aluminum alloys and has significantly lower protection compared to the equipment used by the Ground Forces. This naturally worsens her fighting qualities.
It is advisable to preserve the total staffing of the Airborne Forces, leave all existing names (including honorary ones), banners, uniforms and blue berets to the troops.
The organizational and staff structure and armament of the amphibious assault (airborne) division should probably look like this. Instead of BMDS with their aluminum armor, the parachute regiments should have T-15 heavy infantry fighting vehicles based on the promising T-14 Armata tank. The tank regiment of the division should receive the T-14, and the self-propelled artillery - 2S35 "Coalition-SV" guns.
The Airborne division should be equipped with the necessary number of unmanned aerial vehicles for various purposes - from light to heavy shock.
In such formations, it is advisable to move away from such regular units as a parachute company (battalion) and switch to combat tactical modules.
The composition of the minimum tactical module in this case could look, for example, as follows: one or two T-14 Armata tanks (there is no doubt that sooner or later this machine will be brought to mind), two or three heavy T-15 infantry fighting vehicles, a fire support vehicle equipped with a 57-mm gun, a combat strike vehicle equipped with a 152 mm cannon, a combat control vehicle and a support vehicle.
Such a unit will have a higher potential compared to regular motorized rifle units, and most importantly, it will have equally effective mobility and security. In short, the main indicator of the success of airborne units on the battlefield today is improved armor protection.
In this case, objections are possible - after all, then it will no longer be a landing. In fact, this is true. But even the most ardent fans of the Airborne Troops have long since realized that the time of parachutists has irrevocably passed like several decades ago. In modern wars and armed conflicts, small tactical helicopter landings are only possible (and even then not always). As a consolation in future airborne units, it will be possible to leave only two or three parachutes and use them at military sports holidays.
As a conclusion, it should be noted that, of course, these are not all the lessons that should be learned from the experience of conducting a special military operation. In fact, only listing them will take a stack of paper. At the same time, it is not necessary to absolutize the experience of this conflict. After all, any war, in fact, is a separate epoch in the development of the art of war, and there is no more disastrous way in the construction of the Armed Forces than preparing for wars that have already passed.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for the newspaper.
Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy Commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia (1998).
Columnist of Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).Mikhail Khodarenok