In the "nuclear mission" with Belarus, Russia left the most important thing in reserve

Vladimir Putin's sensational statement about nuclear cooperation between Russia and Belarus was perceived by many as a direct instruction to place Russian atomic warheads abroad. However, there are a number of very subtle details in the words of the Russian leader. Some nuances suggest that Russia has left the very last step on this path in reserve.In a seemingly ordinary interview with the Rossiya 24 TV channel program, the Russian president made major statements.

The most important of them is about the construction in Belarus of a storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), including charges for the Iskander–M tactical missile system.

This could be called a "joint nuclear mission of the Union State of Russia and Belarus" (by analogy with our official translation of the practice of NATO Nuclear Sharing). Moscow deliberately draws parallels with NATO's practice regarding the deployment of American nuclear weapons on the territory of a number of "non-nuclear" members of the alliance.

American bombs in EuropeIn the North Atlantic Alliance, the practice of NATO Nuclear Sharing originated in the late 1950s - early 1960s, as a reaction to the serious preponderance of the Armed Forces of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies on the European continent (at least, this is how the situation was perceived throughout the Cold War by the junior partners of the United States).

Then, in order to increase the combat capabilities of their armed forces and as a "physical embodiment" of the American nuclear umbrella, a number of US NATO partners received American tactical nuclear weapons on their territory.

First of all, the practice concerned bombs for fighter-bombers, to a lesser extent warheads for operational and tactical missiles (for example, the German armed forces had their own Pershing 1a) or anti-aircraft missile systems (for example, Greece). At the same time, a huge number of purely American tactical nuclear weapons with a much broader nomenclature (in addition to bombs and missiles, also mines, artillery shells) were deployed in Europe, which was to be used directly by the American military. The weapons of the NATO Nuclear Sharing missions were only formally and in peacetime controlled by American servicemen who serviced and conditionally guarded them (to the extent that several dozen people can guard a warehouse at a military base from the remaining thousands of military personnel at this base), and primarily engaged in training local personnel to use these charges in wartime.

The signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by the USA and the USSR in 1968 did not prevent this practice in any way. During the negotiations, this topic was, of course, discussed. Moscow de facto agreed to its continuation. Firstly, because the goal of the NPT in the eyes of the key players of the cold War was to contain the spread of nuclear weapons uncontrollably, "on the side", and not to limit their relations with junior partners. Secondly, because the USSR itself acted in a similar way within the framework of the ATS, although in much smaller volumes. We treated the storage of nuclear charges and control over them much more strictly – although the training of flight and missile units of the ATS armies for the use of special munitions was carried out.

After the end of the Cold War, almost all types of American TNW were decommissioned, and most of the bombs (only they remained in service – the B61 family and only in the air force) were withdrawn from Europe. A number of countries were completely freed from the American TNW, which the local population, especially since the anti-war campaigns of the 1980s, was perceived mostly negatively.

The USSR, in turn, began the withdrawal of TNW from the countries of the falling apart before the eyes of the ATS back in 1989 and completed it by the summer of 1991. As a result, Russia completely stored TNW on its territory, in centralized storage facilities, and significantly (to an unknown extent) reduced it. However, its nomenclature is quite wide, and we can confidently say that new systems have been created in Russia over the past thirty years.

However, this is the only TNW remaining in American arsenals. Unlike during the Cold War, the military component of its value is increasingly inferior to political considerations. Before the crisis in relations between the United States and Russia in recent years, it was widely believed that the Americans were holding the remnants of their nuclear weapons in Europe for "exchange" for significant reductions in Russian TNW – more numerous and effective, but "less aggressively" deployed.

In the near future, the military value of American nuclear weapons in Europe may, however, grow somewhat. Starting this year, the old bombs on the bases will gradually be replaced by a new modification of the B61-12 – it uses the least powerful charge from the modification of the B61-4 (from 0.3 to 50 kilotons), but its efficiency is increased due to accuracy: for the first time for nuclear bombs, at least American, it is controllable. Omitting the bearded jokes that "any nuclear bomb always hits exactly at the epicenter," accuracy up to meters can also be useful for thermonuclear weapons in such tasks as, for example, the defeat of specially fortified underground facilities.

Unfortunately for us, this problem is temporary – in a few years for the use of these bombs, the inconspicuous fifth-generation F-35 fighters will be upgraded, which together with the new bombs will become the new look of NATO Nuclear Sharing. These aircraft, including for this purpose, are now being purchased by all countries where American bombs are stored: Belgium, Germany (decided to buy the F-35 last and exclusively for this), Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey (was a participant in the F-35 program, but then came under sanctions for the purchase of the S-400).

Listing the list of countries participating in the NATO Nuclear Sharing program, the Russian president, in addition to the above, noted Greece. As he correctly noted, there are no nuclear bombs in this country now (since the spring of 2001, to be precise), but special storage facilities are preserved. It is somewhat strange that the United Kingdom was not mentioned in this case. Yes, the bombs were also removed from there in the noughties, but, as it became known recently, the storage facilities at the Leiknkhet Airbase are not only maintained in readiness, but are also planned for modernization. But the American F-15E and F-35 are deployed there regularly.

The Belarusian contextThe aggravation of the international security situation has caused Minsk's interest in such practices within the framework of the Union State.

The proximity to the same Poland, which buys modern weapons in record volumes, inevitably makes one think about using Cold War practices to increase the level of deterrence.

It is one thing to have a doctrinally prescribed Russian nuclear umbrella over Belarus, and another is how freely it will be used in a local conflict against a non–nuclear country and at the same time a NATO member. It is quite useful in such a situation to make the opponent worry that the Belarusian military, with whom he will hypothetically have to deal, have at their disposal a very decisive argument as a tool of self-defense.

The main thing here is that the military in this case will be exactly that Belarusian, not Russian. Yes, in fact, this is almost the same in the sense of using TNW, but formally, the "step of the escalation ladder" is lower here – which means it is more accessible. Which means it's more dangerous. This means that the opponent will think an additional ten times whether it is worth behaving aggressively.

Minsk was initially offered to limit itself to "Soviet-built aircraft" instead of finalizing the newly delivered modern Su-30SM fighters as carriers (although this issue is not yet one hundred percent clear, apparently, we are talking about Su-25 attack aircraft) and talked only about training personnel categorically without deploying bombs. Minsk's initiative has always been emphasized. They tried to present the topic as gently as possible as forced, demonstrating their willingness to abandon it at every stage.

However, the situation in the field of international security forced Russia to move to a new, probably penultimate stage of nuclear cooperation with Belarus. Answering a journalist's question, President Putin reported on revolutionary solutions in this area:

• ten aircraft of the Belarusian Air Force have already been modified for the use of TNW (their type was not named again), this process is likely to continue;
• The Iskander-M operational-tactical missile system delivered to the Belarusian army is now being considered as a carrier;
• from next week, from April 3, the "crew training" begins (probably, the calculations of the Iskanders are also meant);
• By July 1, the construction of the TNW storage facility on the territory of Belarus will be completed.

Before the last stepAt the same time, it was not directly said about the decision (and even more so the timing and quantity) of filling this repository with "content".

Although it seems self-evident, but a nuclear weapons repository does not necessarily store it.

And this is a matter of principle. Actually, the direct placement of warheads at storage bases can be called the last stage in the implementation of the "joint nuclear missions of Russia and Belarus". This last step is left, apparently, in reserve.

According to foreign experts, for a long time, in order not to create political tensions, TNW was not deployed in a modernized storage facility in Kaliningrad.

Also, despite active monitoring, since the beginning of the rise of this topic, no traces of the construction of such a storage facility in Belarus have been recorded, while construction activity in Russian is covered in sufficient detail. However, we are certainly not talking about a large facility, given the limited time – and a large one, most likely, is not planned. If the symmetry with the practice of NATO countries is emphasized, then most countries there store, according to estimates, ten or a little more bombs (the largest arsenal is stored in the Turkish Incirlik).

Probably, if the trend of information policy on this topic continues and the situation continues to be extremely difficult, then in the summer or autumn we will receive a statement on the deployment of Russian TNW in Belarus – along with the emphasis that it remains under the full control of the Russian military, not transferred to the Belarusian. Fortunately, modern code-blocking devices make it possible to guarantee the impossibility of its unauthorized use.

From a purely military point of view, advanced storage is more vulnerable. The Belarusian Air Force has less experience and can offer a maximum of the Su-30SM, which is definitely inferior as a carrier to the Russian Su-34 (and for now, some older aircraft at all). Charges for Iskanders can be transferred from nearby storage facilities on the territory of Russia, as will be done for the missile brigades of the Russian army.

There are also political risks – now Poland will even more insistently demand the deployment of American TNW on its territory. Previously, such an idea did not arouse much interest among the States and was used more as a measure of pressure on Germany, which is extremely concerned about such a prospect. Now, although there is no military sense in this for Americans for similar reasons to the above, for political reasons the situation may change. On the other hand, the TNW deployed during the crisis period in Belarus will later turn into an additional asset for bargaining on the subject – next time it is no longer necessary to withdraw it unilaterally and first, without direct exchange for valuable moves of the opponent.

The rejection of the position of placing nuclear weapons only on national territory (voiced, among other things, just the other day in a joint statement with the Chinese leader), of course, creates a threat that opponents will be able to justify their actions by the need to "respond to Moscow." However, it depends on the desire and needs. So far, the West claims that there are no reasons for counter actions. And if certain measures were badly needed by the West, they would be taken (and will be taken) without looking for excuses.

Alexander Ermakov, Researcher at IMEMO RAS