How the military "ecosystem" for MLRS was createdDuring the last year during a special military operation (SVO) in the theater of operations (Theater of Operations)
multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) of the M270 MLRS type, built on a tracked chassis, are actively used.
This weapon system was developed in the interests of the field artillery of the US Army (CB) at the end of the last century. However, it is not so well known that as part of the implementation of an ambitious program to create a new artillery weapons system, the US military also attempted to create a kind of military "ecosystem", which was to include complexes for various purposes.
ALL-WEATHER AND ROUND-THE-CLOCKIn particular, in order to ensure the actions of the units of the new MLRS, the US Army command decided to create a specialized all-weather and round-the-clock air-based reconnaissance system.
Designed for remote – over its territory, outside the range of the enemy's army air defense system – the collection of intelligence data on enemy mobile ground targets and the subsequent issuance of real-time targeting data on them to the command posts of M270 MLRS type multiple launch rocket systems units (up to a firing platoon). Or even to separate self-propelled MLRS launchers (and in automatic mode).
The development of such a reconnaissance and targeting system, designated SOTAS (Stand-Off Target Acquisition System) and at the peak of its history had a pre-approved budget of $ 1.1 billion (a lot of money for such equipment for the early 1980s!), was started by the Americans in the 1970s. The first head of the department specially formed for her was Colonel, and later Lieutenant-General August Cianciolo. By the beginning of the next decade, prototypes of such a system, created on the basis of the UH-1 "Iroquois" multipurpose helicopters (five machines were converted in total), had already been tested as part of several exercises.
HELICOPTER PLUS RADARThis system was built on the basis of a three-centimeter side-view radar station with a digital selector for moving targets and an antenna with electronic beam scanning, with the possibility of adjusting the radiation frequency.
The station's antenna, stabilized in three planes, was planned to be installed under the fuselage of the UH-60 "Blackhawk" multipurpose helicopter (Blackhawk; such a helicopter received the working designation YEH-60B SOTAS).
According to calculations, the station allowed for reconnaissance of enemy mobile ground targets at a range of about 60-80 km. It is noteworthy that along with the main mode of operation – in the "hovering" position of the helicopter – there was also a "in motion" mode, which allowed creating a pseudo-synthetic aperture of the radar antenna. That, according to the calculations of American experts, should have increased the resolution of the onboard radar.
It was also supposed to place a computing unit based on an AN/AYK-14 type electronic computer (computer) on the helicopter. It provided, among other things, the possibility of reducing the excess volume of processed radar information, a control indicator and a noise-resistant integrated modular communication system for transmitting control commands and various intelligence information to ground stations.
In turn, a helicopter tracking station was to be located on the ground and continuously calculate its coordinates, followed by transmitting them to the car by radio. This station included a radar, a computer and appropriate means of communication and data exchange (tracking range – up to 75 km).
Initially, it was planned to use a special ground-based radar with an active request of the AN/UPQ-4A type as such a tracking station. However, subsequently, in order to reduce the composition of the SOTAS system and thereby reduce the technical complexity of its construction and operation, as well as increase its survivability on the battlefield, a proposal was put forward to determine the current coordinates of the reconnaissance helicopter using inertial navigation systems. However, in this case, it is necessary to have a network of ground-based radio beacons for regular number checking.
In addition, the complex included two types of ground points for processing and displaying intelligence data – the main and backup. They were placed in standard army containers of the S-280 type on the chassis of five-ton wheeled cross-country trucks and were equipped with a computing complex (AN/AYK-14 type computer, M640 magnetic disk storage device and magnetic tape drive), information display devices (AN/UYQ-23 tactical situation indicators based on CRT with a diameter of 40 cm and keyboards), a cartographic system of reconnaissance and target designation, which received the designation SOTAS with a tablet, printing media (printer, plotters), a communication complex, etc.
The main and backup points differ in the set of equipment, so the main one is placed on two cars, and the backup one is on one. The helicopter tracking station maintained communication with these points via wired (at a range of up to 5 km) and wireless (up to 80 km) communication lines.
THE PRINCIPLE OF OPERATIONThe scheme of SOTAS operation was as follows.
The helicopter detected and escorted mobile ground targets of the enemy using on-board radar. At the same time, the on-board computer, using the current coordinates of the helicopter received from the ground station, calculated the coordinates of the detected targets and transmitted them in real time to the ground intelligence processing point. Either directly to the command post of an artillery battery or a MLRS firing platoon, or to the command posts of army aviation, as well as units of the US Army Division.
At the ground point of processing and displaying intelligence data, the information received from the helicopter was processed and stored in a storage device or storage device – for subsequent referral at the request of the operator to the tactical situation indicator. Where it was possible to select a section of terrain with detected enemy targets, determine their coordinates in a mercator projection and draw up routes for their movement (including the ability to calculate the estimated route of the tracked target for the near-term perspective), as well as input operational information on targets in symbolic form (target detection time, its identification code, etc.).
In turn, the tactical situation was applied to the cartographic tablet using digital converters, and if necessary, the obtained data and cartographic materials could be printed on a printer and plotter.
All this made it possible not only to track enemy targets in real time, but also to track the dynamics of changes in the tactical situation in the assigned area of the Theater of operations. And also constantly adjust the combat tasks assigned to their artillery. In this regard, by the way, it is worth noting the possibility of interfacing the SOTAS system with elements of the automated control system (ACS) of the AN/GSG-10 TACFIRE (Tactical Fire Direction System) field artillery fire. And also with adopted or only being developed at that time, but already having gained wide popularity, reconnaissance and strike complexes. It also provided for the possibility of interfacing this system with promising automated control systems that could be created in the interests of the US Army field artillery in the future.
FREEZE AND DON'T MOVELet's note one important feature of this system in particular:
she was "sharpened" purely to work on mobile ground targets, which were of high importance to the army command: these are guided missile launchers of various classes and types and self-propelled MLRS launchers, tanks, self-propelled artillery installations, infantry groups, etc. At the same time, target designation data were transmitted in such a way that ensured the almost immediate use of their means of destruction against identified enemy targets.
In addition, according to some reports, the technical capabilities of the SOTAS system also made it possible to detect and accompany low–flying aerial targets - helicopters and tactical aircraft.
But the operation of the SOTAS system equipment for stationary targets was seriously hampered or impossible at all. So the developers even had a motto: "If you want to cheat SOTAS, just don't move!"
It was assumed that the basic composition of one set of SOTAS, designed to carry out round-the-clock and all-weather reconnaissance in the interests of one division of the US Army, would include:
up to four EH-60B helicopters equipped with specialized radar and intelligence processing and transmission facilities;
the required number of ground tracking stations for reconnaissance helicopters;
as well as up to six main and spare ground points for processing and displaying intelligence and developing and transmitting target designation data to the consumer.
GENERAL 'S REVOLTInitially, the General Dynamics company was engaged in the work on the program.
To evaluate the concept of a promising reconnaissance and targeting system, five UH-1H "Iroquois" multipurpose helicopters were converted, which received the new designation JUH-1H.
In the absence of a ready-made radar of a new type, the machines were equipped with an AN/APS-94 side-view radar (only one of the two antennas was used), which was normally part of the reconnaissance and target designation complex of the OV-1B "Mohawk" reconnaissance aircraft (Mohawk, after the name of the tribe of North American Indians).
A slot–type antenna array with a 180-degree viewing sector was installed in a ventral rotary container measuring 680 × 55 cm (at the same time, it was necessary to make the vehicle's skid chassis pull up to the fuselage), and the transceiver equipment and control unit were installed in the cargo compartment.
The commander of the 7th Army, General George Blanchard, refused to return the helicopter with the SOTAS system back to the United States from West Germany. Photos from the website www.defense.gov Thanks to the gyrostabilization system of the antenna along three axes (angles of roll, pitch and yaw), the developer managed to achieve its stable operation regardless of the position of the helicopter itself and its maneuvers in the air.
It was these experienced rotorcraft that took part in demonstration tests of the SOTAS system as part of multinational NATO exercises conducted in Europe under the code name "Reformer 76" (the name comes from the phrase REturn of FORces to GERmany – "Return of troops to Germany") and "Reformer 77". And also as part of the field exercises of the 2nd Infantry Division of the US Army stationed in South Korea.
In the part concerning the SOTAS system, the developer and the customer at these exercises, with the help of experienced helicopters, worked out the basic concepts of building the entire reconnaissance and target designation system and determined its combat effectiveness. And in the end, they evaluated the very possibility of building such a system.
It is noteworthy that already the test results of the first prototype during the "Reformer 76" exercise turned out to be so amazing that some commanders even claimed that this helicopter allowed them to "win the battle." It got to the point that the commander of the 7th Army of the US Army, General George Samuel Blanchard, simply categorically refused to return this car back to the United States, leaving it for service in West Germany.
After lengthy arguments, the helicopter was left to the general. Moreover, they quickly built a second one – they served for the next five years. That's how much NATO feared the rapid attack of the Soviet tank armada stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic.
CONTRACTOR CHANGE AND FABULOUS COSTHowever, the subsequent competition was won not by General Dynamics, but by Motorola, which received on June 19, 1979, a contract worth almost $ 55 million for the implementation of the engineering development stage of a promising reconnaissance and targeting system.
Motorola, in turn, within a month signed with another company – Lockheed Missiles & Space Company (LMSC) – a contract worth $ 11 million for the development and construction of a prototype of the main element of the system (a high-precision airborne radar with electronic beam scanning for detecting and tracking mobile targets), as well as for carrying out the necessary volume its tests (electronic beam scanning is an electronic control of the antenna's directional pattern along the azimuth (horizontal) and the angle of the place (vertical)).
It is noteworthy that according to the results of the cost analysis of the SOTAS program (conducted in 1976-1978 by specialists of the radar and instrumentation laboratory of the station for conducting technical experiments at the Georgia Institute of Technology), the purchase price of one set of a new radar in the prices of fiscal year 1979 was:
when purchasing 80 sets – 1 million 495 thousand dollars.,
when purchasing 115 sets – 1 million 332 thousand dollars.,
when purchasing 160 sets – 1 million 199 thousand dollars.
Thus, with the initially planned purchase of 80 sets of new radars for 80 reconnaissance carrier helicopters, the budget of the US army had to spend 119 million 580 thousand dollars only on radar. And this is not counting the cost of developing the station and purchasing its prototypes, as well as the cost of developing and purchasing other SOTAS elements and the cost of training operators and technical staff.
In order to test and test the new radar system, the new contractor converted one UH-60 "Blackhawk" multipurpose helicopter provided by the army, which was assigned the designation YEH-60B SOTAS. Its flight tests were started in 1981.
It was planned that the developer would build an experimental batch of eight Blackhawks for testing, and the first serial contract would number at least 80 machines. As a result, as the customer hoped, by the mid-1980s, the American army was to receive 16 serial divisional sets of the SOTAS system. However, for a number of engineering and technical reasons, this ambitious program repeatedly disrupted the initial deadlines for implementation.
A SUDDEN FIASCOIn particular, according to one of the reports of the Chief of the Main Control and Financial Administration of the United States, the date of which was attributed to about 1980-1981, the main problems in this area were as follows:
– the most critical components of the system imply the need to use modern technologies and for this reason cause technical problems that were not predicted by the specialists of the US Army and contractors involved in the program;
– the data exchange and communication line, in addition to the SOTAS program, is also being developed for two other programs that are not related to SOTAS, but have their own specific requirements for developers;
– specialists involved in the work on the creation of the main components of the SOTAS system – a reconnaissance helicopter, an onboard radar and a data exchange/communication line – are distributed among three relevant project departments that operate independently of each other and have their own subordination (subordination);
– the department that manages the entire SOTAS program, due to its limited resources, was unable to monitor the implementation of work on all components of the system and could not provide the appropriate number of specialists.
In addition, in the process of assessing the reliability of the system, army specialists unexpectedly found that the percentage and frequency of failures of the SOTAS system when using Blackhawk helicopters may be twice as much as the customer expected. This will require the inclusion of more rotorcraft in the complex. This, in turn, will lead to an increase in the complexity of the system and an increase in the cost of its purchase and operational cost.
Well, when financial surprises were added to the technical surprises, the program was eventually closed after all. The contract with the main contractor for it was terminated on December 2, 1981, the work cost the budget a little more than $ 83 million.
The feasible "help" in this crash was provided by General Dynamics, whose representatives, not accepting the loss, actively argued on the sidelines of Congress and the Pentagon that "the army chose the wrong one and at the wrong price."
Moreover, interestingly, General Dynamics at the same time, until 1984, regularly received contracts for the maintenance of experienced Iroquois equipped with radars, which carried out their difficult service in Europe.
A SOULLESS OBSERVERHowever, the command of the US Army did not rely only on the manned version of the scout.
Taking into account the increasing role of reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on the battlefield, capable of conducting reconnaissance around the clock, issuing target designation data and providing fire correction of their firing means, American specialists planned to develop and adopt reconnaissance drones specially modified for these purposes as part of the creation of a military "ecosystem" for a promising MLRS/target designators.
The main task of such aerial observation robots was to be reconnaissance and search for potential targets for strikes using new MLRS, which the drones were to perform behind the front line - in enemy–controlled airspace.
It was planned to deliver the first batches of such all-seeing drones to the troops in the mid-1980s.
Thus, American specialists attempted to implement an integrated approach to providing units armed with new MLRS with intelligence information and target designation data necessary to open fire and adjust it.
Over their territory, up to the line of combat contact of the troops, this task was solved by manned helicopters equipped with a specialized air-based complex designed to collect intelligence data outside the area of operation of the enemy's air defense forces and means and the subsequent issuance of target designation data. And over the enemy's territory, behind the front line, reconnaissance drones should have already been operating.
CRUSHING FAILURE AS A PROLOGUE TO A NEW SUCCESSUltimately, the SOTAS project to create a specialized air-based reconnaissance system designed to remotely collect intelligence data on enemy ground targets and then issue target designation data on them to the command posts of M270 MLRS multiple launch rocket systems units or even to individual, specific self-propelled launchers, the full cost of which, together with serial purchases, was estimated at a huge at that time, the amount of $ 2.5 billion was closed with a "bang".
At the same time, four of the five JUH-1H "Iroquois" helicopters converted under this program (serial numbers 63-12974 63-12976, 67-17448 and 67-17691), equipped with retractable skids and a ventral rotating radar of the AN/APS-94 type, were used during the 1980s to patrol the border between Germany and the GDR. And then they were decommissioned and sent for storage to the US Navy Lakehurst Air Base (since 2009, the base has been a naval component of the McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst Joint Military Base). It is located in the state of New Jersey and is known to numerous aviation enthusiasts, among other things, by the fact that it was here that the famous Hindenburg airship crashed on May 6, 1937.
"The Stand-Off Target Acquisition System program was born in glory and died a political death in the halls of Congress and the Pentagon," a representative of the Ministry of the Army (Ground Forces) briefly summarized the long–term fate of the ambitious program USA Mark J. Lumer in the work "Why Programs Die: A Case Study of the Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS)", prepared in 1993 at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces of the US National Defense University.
However, the results obtained during the implementation of the SOTAS army program and its analogue, the Pave Mover program, which was carried out by the US Air Force (Pave Mover; an experimental radar was placed in 1982 on a multi–purpose fighter-bomber F-111E with serial number 67-0115), the results obtained in these programs were not in vain.
The American military command understood the urgent need to organize effective reconnaissance of ground targets, primarily mobile ones, and the creation of reconnaissance and strike complexes (for example, during the above–mentioned tests of experimental Iroquois with ventral radar, the possibility of obtaining intelligence using the new system for half an hour and even an hour earlier than it turned out was clearly demonstrated with the help of other sources). Therefore, in 1982, by order of Richard D. Delauer, then Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, both of these projects were combined into a single new one - into a program that later received the name Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS). Which can be translated from English as "A combined (or unified) radar system for aerial reconnaissance of ground targets and strike control."
This system, within the framework of which the well-known long-range surveillance and targeting complex E-8 J-STARS was created for the US Air Force on the basis of the Boeing 707-300 airliner, was designed for all-weather and round-the-clock reconnaissance of ground targets, their tracking, classification and issuance of targeting data on them to consumers. And also for real-time coordination (management) of combat operations and two-way information exchange with ground forces.
That's how the ideas that were born during the creation of a new generation multiple launch rocket system were gradually implemented by the Pentagon in practice.
Vladimir Shcherbakov
Deputy Executive Editor of HBOVladimir Leonidovich Shcherbakov is a military expert, historian, and writer.
